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The nation's approach to regulatingits transportation,telecommunications, and energy industries has undergone a great transformation in the
last quarter-century. The originalparadigmof regulation, which was established with the Interstate Commerce Act's regulation of railroadsbeginning
in 1887, was characterized by legislative creation of an administrative
agency charged with general regulatory oversight of particular industries.
This approachdid not depend on whether the regulated industry was naturally competitive or was a naturalmonopoly, and it was designed to advance
accepted goals of reliability and, in particular,non-discrimination. By contrast, under the new paradigm, which is manifested most clearly in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the goals of regulation have become the
promotion of competition and maximization of consumer choice. The role of
agencies has been reduced to monitoring access and pricing of "bottleneck"
monopolies such as the local telecommunications loop and electricity distribution systems.
Having described this transformation in six core common carrier and
public utility industries-railroads,airlines, trucks, telecommunications,
electricity, and naturalgas-theArticle sets out on a quest to find its causes.
No consistentpattern of institutionalleadership can be discerned in any of
the three types of government actors with the power to compel change: the
regulatory agencies, the courts, and the Congress. This suggests that the
causes are rooted in deep-seated economic and socialforces, such as technological changes, and chain reactions that have emerged as regulatory reform
in one industry segment has spread to another segment. The Article concludes that the two most persuasive explanations are that key interest groups
have discovered that regulatoy change is in their interests, and that an ideological consensus has emerged among economists and other policy elites that
the originalparadigmentails risks of regulatoryfailure that exceed the risks
of market failure under the new paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

No aspect of public regulation affects more Americans than the law
governing common carriers and public utility companies. Each time we
place a telephone call, hire a trucking company, travel by train or plane,
or even merely light or heat our homes, we enter into transactions that
historically have been closely regulated by a variety of government entities. Relations with firms in these fields, which are frequently grouped
together under the term "regulated industries," pervade the everyday affairs of individuals and institutions.
The law governing these regulated industries has been undergoing a
great transformation in the last twenty-five years. These changes are typically referred to as "deregulation."' But if "deregulation" means that a
system of public regulation is abolished and replaced by exclusive reliance on market transactions, this is an inaccurate characterization of
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison et al., Regulation and Deregulation (1997); Elizabeth
Pendley, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 27 (1996).
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what is happening. 2 Some of the earliest manifestations of the transformation, such as the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 3 were genuinely
deregulatory in this sense. However, more recent legal changes, most notably the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996, 4 can hardly be described in such simple terms. The Telecommunications Act contains
over 100 pages of new regulatory requirements, directs the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to commence more than a dozen
rulemaking proceedings, and is being implemented through scores of arbitrations throughout the states, each of which is subject to judicial review. Like recent changes sweeping the natural gas and electric industries, the Telecommunications Act establishes a very different legal
framework from the one that prevailed before. But it does not represent
the end of regulation-rather, it is a system of regulation transformed.
We will therefore describe the changes taking place in regulated industries law not in terms of "regulation" versus "deregulation," but in terms
of a transformation from the "original paradigm" of regulation to a "new
paradigm" of regulation.
The original paradigm was established over 100 years ago with the
enactment in 1887 of the Interstate Commerce Act.5 That paradigm was
characterized by legislative creation of an administrative agency whose
task was to oversee an industry providing common carrier or public utility
services. The firms in the industry remained privately owned, but they
were closely monitored by the agency to ensure that they provided services in standardized packages at standardized prices to all similarly situated end-users and to ensure that those services were reliable. To achieve
the legal regime's goal of standardization in services and prices ("nondiscrimination"), providers were required to file their rates and services
with the agency in public tariffs from which no deviation was permitted,
and the agency reviewed complaints by end-users about these prices and
services. To promote reliability, the agency strictly limited entry and exit
in the industry and regulated rates so that providers earned adequate
(but not "excessive") profits.
This legal regime has been giving way over the last quarter-century to
a very different paradigm. The new paradigm is more fully realized in
some industries than in others, but certain common themes and features,
most well-developed in the Telecommunications Act, are now clearly discernible. Instead of striving for equality of treatment among end-users
and reliability of service, the new paradigm seeks to encourage multiple
2. Others have decried the "regulation/deregulation" dichotomy as forced or
misleading. See, e.g., Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending
the Deregulation Debate 3-18 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Md. L.
Rev. 86 (1986). So far, however, they have failed to displace the common locution.
3. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49

U.S.C.).
4. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
5. 24 Stat. 379 (1887).

1326

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1323

providers to offer different packages of services at different prices to endusers, on the theory that competition among these providers will enhance
consumer welfare. Thus, in one regulated industry after another, we see
a movement to eliminate tariffed services in favor of contractual choice,
to unbundle standardized packages of services in order to allow end-users
to select among different service elements, and to eliminate restrictions
on entry in order to encourage competition among multiple providers.
The role of the agency has been transformed from one of protecting endusers to one of arbitrating disputes among rival providers and, in particular, overseeing access to and pricing of "bottleneck" facilities that could
6
be exploited by incumbent firms to stifle competition.
One would think that such a substantial change in the philosophy
and practice of regulation in essential industries would occasion close attention from the legal academy. And, indeed, in some industries, particular changes have been the subject of scholarly examination. For example, the recent Telecommunications Act, which is said to affect as much
as one-sixth of the American economy, 7 has attracted some discussion
and debate.8 The significant breakup of the Bell System in the early
1980s also received some academic attention, although less than was
probably warranted and most of this from disciplines other than law. 9
The extraordinary Airline Deregulation Act received enough favorable
publicity to help propel one of its architects out of the academy all the
way to the Supreme Court.' 0
These and other assessments of changes in regulated industries law,
however, have tended to be isolated to particular industries. With a few
6. A bottleneck facility is "a monopoly input needed by both its owner and its owner's
competitors in the final product market." William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricing and Its
Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services to
Competitors, 14YaleJ. on Reg. 145, 145 (1997); see also WilliamJ. Baumol &J. Gregory
Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony 7-10 (1994) (defining "bottlenecks" or
"essential facilities" as services or facilities that local exchange carriers could use to force
rivals "to bend to [their] will or to destroy those rivals altogether"). Examples include the
copper wire loops that connect users to local telephone exchanges and the distribution
lines that deliver electricity to homes.
7. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Spiwak, What Hath Congress Wrought? Reorienting
Economic Analysis of Telecommunications Markets After the 1996 Act, Antitrust, Spring
1997, at 32; Mike Mills, Telecommunications Bill Passed: Clinton to Sign Measure That
Would Have Wide Impact on Consumers, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al.
8. See, e.g., Symposium, Telecommunications Law: Unscrambling the Signals,
Unbundling the Law, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 819 (1997); Symposium, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 117
(1996).
9. See, e.g., After the Breakup: Assessing the New Post-AT&T Divestiture Era (Barry
G. Cole ed., 1991); Breaking Up Bell: Essays on Industrial Organization and Regulation
(David S. Evans ed., 1983); Robert W. Crandall, The Role of the U.S. Local Operating
Companies, in Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition,
and Regulation in Communications 114 (Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth Flamm eds.,
1989); Alan Stone, Wrong Number: The Breakup of AT&T (1989); Peter Temin, The Fall
of the Bell System (1987).
10. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform passim (1982).
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exceptions, legal academics have not essayed an overarching treatment of
the changes that span this area of the law." This is in notable contrast to
many other broad categories of the law-such as constitutional, contract,
criminal, employment, family, and products liability law-where attempts
to offer an integrated and systematic understanding of key legal principles are quite common.
Our objective is to fill this substantial gap in the legal literature. To
do so, we will analyze the changes in economic regulation that have occurred in the last twenty-five years in six core regulated industries: four
"common carriers"-railroads, airlines, trucks, and telecommunications
companies-and two "public utiliies"-electricity and natural gas. While
we selected these six industries for a variety of reasons-which include
their importance to the economy, the need to keep the inquiry within
manageable bounds, and our familiarity with them-the most important
and overriding reason is that they all come within the classic definition of
regulated industries.' 2 The fact that these six industries are collectively
undergoing a transformation that shares important common elements is
by itself an important phenomenon, and suggests that similar changes are
likely to occur in other regulated industries. We should also make clear
at the outset that we are considering only economic regulation in the
conventional sense. The burgeoning field of social regulation-including environmental laws, workplace and product safety rules, civil rights
laws, and consumer protection laws-are beyond our purview. Indeed,
the shift toward greater encouragement of competition in regulated industries law has no obvious counterpart in the field of social regulation,
13
where government mandates continue to proliferate.
Part I describes the great transformation by delineating the most important ways in which the new paradigm in regulated industries law differs from the original paradigm. Rather than simply reviewing the
11. Among the most prominent exceptions are Professor Richard Pierce and nowJustice Stephen Breyer, both of whom we draw upon in this work. Breyer's work
necessarily tapered off after his appointment to the bench in 1979-indeed, the
discussions in his 1982 book, see supra note 10, focus almost exclusively on events that had
occurred before his appointment. The bulk of Pierce's work has focused on the natural
gas and electric industries. See, e.g., infra notes 67, 97, 138, 274 (citing sources).
12. See RichardJ. Pierce,Jr. & Ernest Gellhorn, Regulated Industries 1 (3d ed. 1994)
(describing regulated industries as those where the government historically has exercised
the power to "limit entry into or exit from the business, regulate the type or amount of a
product or service offered, set the price and quality provided, and determine the sale terms
and level of profits allowed"); see alsoJames C. Bonbright et al., Principles of Public Utility
Rates 7-16 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing definition of public utilities). We do not suggest that
there are or can be no other "regulated industries" in the sense that we use the term; other
obvious examples include intercity buses, cable television, and water supply systems.
Indeed, the Department of Justice's recently commenced antitrust action against the
nation's largest computer software company has been said to suggest implicitly that the
company should be treated as a kind of regulated industry. See David Bank, Is Microsoft a
New "Public Utility"?, Wall St. J., May 19, 1998, at B1.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 344-345.
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changes that have occurred industry by industry, we proceed synthetically, in an effort to map the overall topography of change. Not all the
changes that we highlight have occurred in all industries, but they have
emerged with enough frequency that we can now identify the distinctive
features of the new regulatory order with some confidence.
We proceed by examining several sets of relationships in which regulated industries are involved. First, we discuss relations between regulated firms and their end-users, and emphasize three trends: The pricing
of services through publicly filed tariffs is being superseded by individually chosen and sometimes individually negotiated contracts; the provision of integrated service packages is being replaced by choices among
unbundled service elements; and the use of pervasive cross-subsidies is
giving way to pricing more closely tied to costs. Second, with respect to
relations among regulated firms, we note that the new paradigm seeks in
various ways to promote competition among providers, rather than to
preserve monopolies or limit competition. Finally, in terms of relations
between firms and their regulators, we find that the traditional system of
pervasive regulatory oversight and control is being dismantled in favor of
one in which the function of the agency is primarily to ensure that bottleneck facilities having natural monopoly features do not impede competi4
tion among providers.'
Parts II and III represent an effort to identify the causes of this great
transformation. Part II considers whether any institutional actor-the
agencies, the courts, or the legislature-can be considered the prime architect of the transformation. Surprisingly, administrative agencies have
often vigorously promoted regulatory change, thereby leading to some
curtailment of their own power. However, each agency necessarily has
been concerned with the industries under its own limited jurisdiction,
and therefore no single agency can be credited with directing the general
pattern of change we see. The courts, too, have often weighed in on
questions affecting the pace and direction of regulatory change. But
while the courts sometimes have acted as catalysts for regulatory change,
other times they have functioned as brakes, slowing the process down.
14. A natural monopoly exists when service can be provided more efficiently by one

firm than by two or more. See generally William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural
Monopoly (1982); Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory,
in Unnatural Monopolies 1-25 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1985); Pierce & Gellhorn, supra
note 12, at 43-49. At one time, it was thought that the critical feature of such industries
was the presence of economies of scale over the projected range of output. See Bonbright
et al.,
supra note 12, at 21-22. Today, it is recognized that economies of either scale or
scope can make a single firm the most efficient provider. See id. at 23-24; Sharkey, supra,
at 54-83. There has long been a strand of thought that is skeptical about whether any
monopoly can exist for long without government regulation. See generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical
Perspective, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1263 (1984). That strand lives on among some economists
strongly influenced by public choice theory. See infra text accompanying notes 351-361.
But the consensmu view remains that monopoly is the "natural" form of industrial
organization in some industries or at least in some industry segments.
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There is no consistent pattern of decisions that corresponds to the shape
the transformation has assumed. Finally, Congress clearly has played a
vital role, though often one of ratifying changes that have initially occurred at the administrative level. Moreover, although Congress was active in legislating changes in the transportation industries in the late
1970s and more recently promoted massive regulatory change in the telecommunications and electricity industries, for most of the 1980s it was
curiously quiet and allowed the transformation to proceed in other arenas. We thus conclude that no consistent pattern of institutional leadership can be discerned that might help explain the great transformation.
Part I searches for more deep-seated economic and social forces
that might account for what we term the great transformation. We consider four explanations: that the transformation has been driven by technological changes; that it has been produced by a series of chain reactions as regulatory change in one industry has caused further change in
that industry or other industries; that key interest groups have discovered
that regulatory change is in their interests; and that the transformation
reflects an ideological consensus among economists and other policy
elites that the original paradigm entails unacceptable risks of regulatory
failure. We find support for all four explanations, but argue that the
more general explanations-the interest group theory and the consensus
concerning regulatory failure-should be given primacy of place in accounting for what is a general phenomenon.
Part IV wraps up the discussion with some speculations about the
future course of the transformation. We offer the tentative predictions
that competition will continue to replace regulation in industry segments
that do not have natural monopoly characteristics, and that the role of
regulatory agencies will increasingly become the minimalist one of arbitrating between providers to assure that natural monopoly bottlenecks do
not interfere with this competitive process. But we do not think it likely,
at least in the foreseeable future, that the unfettered market will supplant
public regulation. Instead, the modern administrative state in regulated
industries law will live on-not abolished, but transformed.
I. TBE

GREAT TRANSFORMATION:

COMPETITION THROUGH REGULATION

The last several decades have witnessed great and still-evolving
changes in the regulation of the nation's transportation, telecommunications, and energy industries. Beginning in the late nineteenth century,
the dominant model of regulation viewed these various industries, or
their individual constituent parts, as best served by a limited number of
service providers that would be overseen by a regulatory commission concerned with maintaining standardized packages of services and prices.
But this model of regulation, which we term the original paradigm of
regulated industries law, has been giving way-at times steadily, at times
by dramatic leaps-to a new paradigm emphasizing, to the maximum degree feasible, consumer choice among multiple competing providers.

1330

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1323

This transformation necessarily has had emphases and manifestations that are peculiar to particular industries. For example, the breakup
of the Bell System has no precise analogue in the transportation industries simply because in those industries there was no single service provider that had a comparable vertical or horizontal monopoly over any
form of transportation. But, as we explain below, many of the regulatory
changes in the railroad, trucking, and airline industries that emerged in
the late 1970s have substantial parallels in the transformation taking
place today in telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity. For purposes of our discussion, we divide these common changes in regulated
industries law into three basic groups: changes in relations between providers and end-users, changes in relations between providers, and changes
in the role of regulators. Although these divisions are somewhat artificial-for example, certain changes in relations with end-users could not
occur unless regulators permitted other providers to enter a marketthey are helpful guideposts in our effort to map the topography of the
transformed law of regulated industries.
A. Relations Between Providers and End-Users
We begin with the most publicly visible and ultimately most important changes regarding regulated industries: those in relations between
providers and end-users or consumers. Today, the relationship between
service providers and end-users in many industries operates substantially
differently from the original paradigm, which was conceived in the late
nineteenth century and which predominated for the first three-quarters
of this century) -5 Although the changes vary to some extent according to
the industry, there are a number of common themes running throughout
each industry. At a broad level, the changes reflect the displacement of
the traditional model designed to produce uniformity and reliability with
one designed to maximize variety, choice, and low prices.
This general change in the way in which carriers and end-users structure their relations is defined more precisely by three trends in regulated
industries over the past two decades. These trends can be captured by
the phrases "detariffing," "unbundling," and "elimination of cross-subsidies." We examine each of these trends in turn.
1. Detariffing.- For almost a century, public utility companies and
common carriers had one common characteristic: All were required to
15. The widespread use today of the term "customers" to refer to end-users testifies to
some of these changes. While both that term and the term "subscribers" have long been
used, it is our impression that in those industries no longer characterized by natural
monopolies, the term "subscriber" is used much less frequently than previously, perhaps
because the term may connote a sense that the recipient of service lacks alternatives to a
public utility company's offerings. Compare MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S.
218, 231-32 (1994) (using term "customers" in speaking of those taking service under a
long-distance carrier's filed tariffs), with Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317,
321-26 (1945) (using term "subscribers" in same context).
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offer their customers service under rates and practices that were just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. Moreover, Congress and the states
specified precisely how this objective would be carried out. The federal
and state legislatures created regulatory commissions, required carriers to
file with these commissions public tariffs setting forth the carriers' rates
and other terms and conditions of service, and required end-users to take
any service under these public tariffs. In the last twenty-five years, however, the common carrier industries have been steadily shedding this
characteristic; contractual choice, rather than the standardized tariff, is
rapidly becoming the predominant basis for carrier-customer relationships. Tariffs remain the rule of the day in the electric and natural gas
industries, but this too could change if competition reaches the retail
level of these industries.
The progenitor of the historically dominant model was the Interstate
Commerce Act, which Congress enacted in 1887 to regulate interstate
railroads.' 6 Under this model, all common carriers or public utility companies in a particular industry are required to include in their filed tariffs
(or "schedules") all rates and any regulations, practices, or classifications
that affect those rates. 17 Deviation from these tariffs is strictly prohibited
under any circumstances, unless the regulatory commission concludes
that the carrier's rates fail to meet the statutory requirement of being just,
reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory. Even where a customer has been quoted a lower rate and has relied on that quotation, the
Supreme Court has held that the tariff rate rather than the contract rate
prevails. 18
This extraordinarily strict rule, which would eventually be called the
"filed rate doctrine," 19 was deemed necessary because non-discrimination
16. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, 24 Stat. 379. The act was also known by its enactment
date or its initial words ("An act to regulate commerce") and was formally named the
Interstate Commerce Act by the Transportation Act of 1920. See Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch.
91, 41 Stat. 456, 457; Act of May 8, 1920, ch. 172, 41 Stat. 589. The Interstate Commerce
Act was itself modelled in part on various English statutes. See Clyde B. Aitchison, The
Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887-1937, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289, 299 &
n.22 (1937) (and sources cited). But cf. Jordan Jay Hillman, Competition and Railroad
Price Discrimination: Legal Precedent and Economic Policy 31, 42 n.150 (1968) ("English
experience... was not a decisive factor" in Congress's intent or "the final form of the
statutory sections"). In addition to containing a helpful summary of the act's evolution,
Aitchison's article discusses events leading up to its passage and also cites numerous other
secondary sources addressing railroads and their regulation in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
17. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 6 (codified before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 6
(1976)) (railroads); see also infra notes 31-38 (other industries).
18. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-32
(1990); Louisville & Nashville RR. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1915); Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906); see also AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 118 S. Ct.
1956, 1964-65 (1998) (tariff provides sole measure of carrier's duty even if customer was
promised faster and better services).
19. The cases announcing and strictly enforcing this rule date back to the nineteenth
century, see Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98, 101-03 (1895), and were legion in
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was unquestionably the overriding goal of the Interstate Commerce Act,
taking precedence even over the 'just and reasonable" requirement. 20
To achieve this purpose, the carrier's tariffs, which were filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and made available for public
inspection both there and elsewhere, defined all aspects of the carrier2
customer relationship. '
The origins of this non-discrimination goal can be found in the social forces that led to the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. In
post-Civil War America it was widely believed-"especially... in the large
agricultural states of the Middle West"22 -that railroads were routinely
engaged in unequal treatment of particular shippers, localities, and commodities. These grievances found an eloquent voice in Senator Shelby
M. Cullom of Illinois. After holding hearings throughout the country,
Senator Cullom's committee issued a report stating that "discrimination
in one form or another" was "the principal cause of complaint against the
management and operation of the transportation system of the United
States." 2 3 According to the report, "[i] t is substantially agreed by all parties in interest that the great desideratum is to secure equality, so far as
practicable, in the facilities for transportation afforded and the rates
charged by the instrumentalities of commerce." 24
Although it has now become a commonplace to associate the tarifffiling system with regulation of monopolies, 25 this is an ahistorical view of
the Supreme Court in the early part of this century, see, e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
260 U.S. 156, 162--63 (1922) (and cases cited); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil, 204
U.S. 426, 439-40 (1907) (and cases cited). As early as 1915, the Court referred to the
"doctrine of the conclusiveness of the filed rates," George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo &
Co., 236 U.S. 278, 286 (1915), but the term "filed rate doctrine" apparently was not used by
courts until 1969, see Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 411, 417 (10th Cir. 1969). The
first use by the Supreme Court was in 1981. See Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453
U.S. 571, 573 (1981).
20. The Supreme Court so stated on numerous occasions:
It cannot be challenged that the great purpose of the act to regulate commerce,
whilst [also] seeking to prevent unjust and unreasonable rates, was to secure
equality of rates as to all and to destroy favoritism, these last being accomplished
by requiring the publication of tariffs and by prohibiting secret departures from
such tariffs, and forbidding rebates, preferences and all other forms of undue
discrimination.
New York, N.H. & H. RIL v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1906); see also 1 A.G.J. Priest,
Principles of Public Utility Regulation 285 (1969) ("Even exorbitant rates probably have
generated less irritation and exasperation than discriminatory practices."). See generally
Isaac Beverly Lake, Discrimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities (1947); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017, 1044-54 (1988) (and sources cited).
21. See, e.g., Maislin, 497 U.S. at 126-27 (and cases cited).
22. 1 Bernard Schwartz, The Economic Regulation of Business and Industry: A
Legislative History of U.S. Regulatory Agencies 17 (1973).
23. S. Rep. No. 46, Pt. I, 49th Cong., at 182 (1886) [hereinafter Cullom Report].
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 899 F.2d 642, 645
(7th Cir. 1990); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and

19981

TRANSFORMATION OF REGULATED INDUSTRIES

1333

the matter. The railroads of the late nineteenth century were a mix of
monopoly and competitive transportation lines, with short hauls (e.g.,
Elkhart, Indiana to Chicago) frequently being served by only one carrier
but long hauls (e.g., New York to Chicago) served by multiple carriers.
The result was rates that were often higher on the short monopoly routes
than on substantially longer hauls. However, these disparities, which
were rooted in monopoly power over certain "captive shippers," were not
the only source of popular unhappiness. The public also reacted against
the varying rates and treatment of different shippers on the competitive
routes.2 6 Indeed, the Cullom Report noted that discrimination is "most
conspicuous when and where competition is most active." 27 The committee accordingly concluded that whereas "competition [is] a safeguard
against extortion" (i.e., the excessive rates that a monopoly can exact),
"experience has shown that it is no safeguard against discrimination."28
Thus, it was vigorous competition, as much as anything else, that gave rise
to the wide variety of kickbacks, gratuities, and other devices that agitated
much of the public. By 1887, the populist movement that had arisen in
opposition to these "preferences," which were associated with large, monied, better-situated, and particularly corporate interests, could no longer
29
be resisted, and the first major federal regulatory statute was enacted.
This history is central to understanding the original paradigm of regulated industries law. The Interstate Commerce Act-in its substantive
requirements ofjust, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates and practices, in its procedural device of publicly filed tariffs setting forth these
rates and practices, and in its disallowance of deviations from the tariffswas essentially copied by Congress and the states into numerous subse-

Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 448-63 (1981) (subsequent history
omitted); see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 235-39, 245 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Maislin, 497 U.S. at 138, 145-46 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. See George W. Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J.L. &
Econ. 87, 93-94 (1966); Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 1044-54; see also Hillman, supra
note 16, at 1-35.
27. Cullom Report, supra note 23, at 189.
28. Id. at 191-92.
29. We do not wish to oversimplify the forces that led to the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act, a topic on which much scholarly ink has been spilled. See, e.g., Herbert
Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, at 131-48 (1991) ("the historical
record shows .. . rather consistent lobbying and litigation by the railroads against state
regulations, but substantial railroad support for federal regulation") (quoted material at
136); Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1887-1916 (1965) (the leading advocates
and beneficiaries of federal regulation were the railroads themselves); Thomas S. Ulen,
The Market for Regulation: The ICC from 1887 to 1920, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 306, 306-07
(1980) ("three separate groups . . . constituted the principal demanders of federal
regulation": farmers in the upper Midwest and on the edges of the Great Plains,
merchants and farmers in the East, and the railroads themselves). We believe, however,
that the centrality of the act's anti-discrimination purpose and provisions as set forth in the
text is well established.
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quent regulatory acts. 30 For example, by 1938, Congress had imposed
32
3
this model on the interstate components of the shipping, ' stockyard,

telephone, 3 3 telegraph, 34 trucking,3 5 electric, 3 6 gas, 37 and aviation 38 in-

dustries. The reason for this replication had nothing to do with the structure of these industries. Some were natural monopolies; others were
highly competitive. Rather, it simply was generally accepted that an administrative system based on filed tariffs was the appropriate approach to
regulating public utility and common carrier services, and that government oversight of the market was required to ensure the accepted goals
of reasonableness, non-discrimination, and reliable service.a 9
30. To be sure, many states regulated railroads-including their rates-even before
1887. See, e.g., Cullom Report, supra note 23, at 63-137 (detailed summary of provisions
of state statutes and operations of state commissions as of 1886); Paul Teske et al.,
Deregulating Freight Transportation: Delivering the Goods 24-25 (1995) (overview of
state efforts to oversee railroad operations). But it was in part the perceived inefficacy of
some of these regulatory schemes (particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in
Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886)) that impelled Congress to act,
and, in all events, the Interstate Commerce Act became the progenitor of much state
regulation. (For an incisive account of the interplay between state regulation of railroad
rates and its effect on interstate systems both before and after the Wabash decision and the
passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, see Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 125-68.)
31. See Shipping Act, ch. 451, §§ 14-18, 39 Stat. 728, 733-35 (1916) (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 812, 814-817 (1994)).
32. See Packers and Stockyards Act, ch. 64, §§ 304-307, 42 Stat. 159, 164-65 (1921)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 205-208 (1994)).
33. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 201-203, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070-71
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1994)).
34. See id.
35. See Motor Carrier Act, ch. 498, §§ 216-218, 49 Stat. 543, 558-63 (1935) (codified
as amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. §§ 316-318 (1976)).
36. See Federal Power Act, ch. 687, § 213, 49 Stat. 838, 851-52 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1994)).
37. See Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 4, 52 Stat. 821, 822-23 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1994)).
38. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, §§ 403-404, 52 Stat. 973, 992-94
(codified as amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. §§ 483-484 (1952)); see also Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §§ 403-404, 72 Stat. 731, 758-60 (replacing
sections 403 and 404 of the 1938 act in materially the same language) (codified as
amended and before repeal at 49 U.S.C. § 1373-1374 (1976)).
39. See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics
Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 Transp. LJ. 91, 95-108 (1979)
(describing reasons for Congress's enactment of Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); Charles A.
Webb, Legislative and Regulatory History of Entry Controls on Motor Carriers of
Passengers, 8 Transp. Lj. 91, 91-99 (1976) (discussing the purposes, motives, and
concerns that led Congress to model Motor Carrier Act of 1935 on previous enactments
governing other regulated industries). Throughout this article, we concentrate almost
exclusively on changes in regulation at the federal rather than the state level. Partly this
reflects limits of space (and our expertise). But it also reflects the greater importance of
federal regulation, both in the sense that state regulation (or deregulation) often cannot
be made effective without prior changes in federal law, and in the sense that federal law
has, since the adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act, served as a model that much state
regulation has emulated.
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By the 1970s, this consensus was crumbling. Policy elites and their
economic advisers began to call for greater competition in regulated industries, most prominently in the transportation sector.4 0 The rejection
of the original paradigm came first in the airline industry. Although the
impetus for change came in part from forces within the executive branch
and the regulatory commission,4 1 Congress delivered the coup de grace.
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was revolutionary in its approach. Although it nominally maintained the requirement that carriers'
rates and practices be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, it elimi-

nated the Interstate Commerce Act's model for ensuring the fulfillment
of those requirements: the duty of carriers to file their rates in tariffs with
a government regulator. 42 Further, a company proposing to serve a particular route was no longer required to persuade the government that its
proposal was required by the "public convenience and necessity."43 Indeed, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)-the government entity that
had overseen the rates, determined the public interest, and made the
entry-and-exit decisions in this industry-was eventually abolished.4 Cariers were effectively free to serve whatever routes they desired (if they
could acquire airport gates) and to charge whatever rates they wanted.
Other transportation industries also shifted from rate-regulated carriage, with a regulatory commission relying on tariff filings to oversee the
type, price, and quality of service, to a contract-based regime. Railroads
took a large step in that direction with the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (commonly called the "4R Act"), where
Congress limited the ICC's authority to review railroads' rates for reasonableness to situations where a carrier had "market dominance." 45 The
ICC itself thereafter changed its policy with regard to contract rates. Specifically, in 1978, the ICC abandoned its view that contract rates are inherently discriminatory and therefore must be "deemed unlawful per

40. See Martha Derthick & PaulJ. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation 35-45 (1985)
(describing this phenomenon).
41. For a discussion of the role of these institutions in airline deregulation, see infra
text accompanying notes 189-201, 346-348; see also Breyer, supra note 10, at 320, 325-26,
328-29.
42. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (a) (2) (A) (1988).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a), (d) (1) (1976) (repealed); see also Dempsey, supra note 39,
at 95. This requirement had been copied from the Interstate Commerce Act, as it had
been amended in 1920, into numerous subsequent regulatory enactments. Compare 49
U.S.C. § 1(18) (1976) (repealed), with, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, § 214, 47 U.S.C.
§ 214 (1994), and Motor CarrierAct of 1935, §§ 206(a) (1), 207(a), 49 U.S.C. §§ 306(a) (1),
307(a) (1976) (repealed).
44. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (a) (1) (A), (a) (3) (1988); see also Civil Aeronautics
Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703.
45. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 202(b), (c) (i), 90 Stat. 31, 35 (1976) (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. § 10709(c) (1994)).
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se."46 The agency's new position permitting contract rates was eventually
47
upheld by the courts.
Congress largely completed the transformation of rail regulation
when it enacted the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.48 The Act expressly authorized the use of carrier-customer contracts, which Congress viewed as
"a significant aspect of the new freedom allowed to carriers to market rail
transportation more effectively." 49 The grounds for disapproving contracts were intentionally limited, and the contracts were "to be enforced
in the courts and not at the Commission. "50 When Congress finally abolished the ICC as of January 1, 1996 (and transferred its remaining functions to the Surface Transportation Board), 5 1 the House Committee
could state that' "the railroad industry has operated in an essentially deregulated environment" since 1980.52

In the past two decades, carrier-customer relations in the trucking
industry also have moved from being governed primarily by regulation to
a contract regime. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 marked the beginning
of this process. Although it retained the requirement that truckers file
their rates in tariffs with the ICC, 53 the 1980 law permitted truckers to
46. Guaranteed Rates, Sault Ste. Marie, Ont., Canada, to Chicago, Ill., 315 I.C.C. 311,
323 (1961); see Change of Policy, Railroad Contract Rates, Ex Parte No. 358-F (I.C.C. Nov.
9, 1978) (adopting general policy statement concluding that contract rate agreements have
a number of significant transportation benefits which must be weighed against possible
adverse consequences on a case-by-case basis); Change of Policy, Railroad Contract Rates,
361 I.C.C. 205, 210 (1979) (denying petition for rulemaking).
47. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311, 1316-19 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
48. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
49. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, at 100 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4110,
4132.
50. Id.
51. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803.
52. H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 90 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 802; see
also FrankJ. Dooley & William E. Thoms, Railroad Law a Decade After Deregulation 9-10
(1994) (explaining that "relatively few commodities move at tariff rates" and that "a good
deal of carriage charges are negotiated between the railroads and the shippers of bulk
commodities").
53. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10761(a), 10762(a)(1) (1988) (repealed). Congress similarly
maintained in 1980 the requirement that truckers obtain certificates of convenience and
necessity from the ICC before they could serve a particular route, but substantially reduced
the difficulty of obtaining them. See infra note 119. The result of Congress's liberalized
entry policies (and other regulatory reforms) has been a near-quadrupling of the number
of licensed carriers. Whereas in 1980 there were approximately 14,000 ICC-licensed
carriers, "almost all descended from the 28,000 carriers that received grandfather authority
when the [original) Motor Carrier Act took effect in 1935," Breyer, supra note 10, at 226
(footnote omitted), by 1995 that number had grown to 55,000 carriers. See H.R. Rep. No.
104-311, at 92, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. at 804. Congress eliminated the licensing
requirement in 1995 when it terminated the ICC. See Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 101, 109 Stat.
803, 804. Although it simultaneously imposed a requirement that truckers register with
the Secretary of Transportation, this registration requirement is not an entry restriction
equivalent to the former certificate or licensing scheme. See H.R Rep. No. 104-311, at
115, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 827 ("[r]egistration is based on safety fitness and
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"hold both common and contract operating authority"-a change in policy that effectively eliminated the prohibition on discrimination. 54 Subsequent legislative and administrative developments have almost completely abolished the tariff-filing requirement even for common carriers.
The Negotiated Rates Act of 199355 reduced the ability of carriers or their
successors (e.g., bankruptcy trustees) to enforce a filed rate over an unfiled contract rate and permitted the filing of so-called "range tariffs"tariffs that set forth a range of rates that might apply to a particular shipment and thus do not perform the traditional tariff role of rendering
rates "fixed" or "definite and certain."5 6 Only one year later, the
Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994 eliminated tariff-filing
requirements for individually determined rates; this affected some 90 percent of the annual 1.4 million tariff filings with the ICC.5 7 When
Congress thereafter abolished the ICC, it proceeded still further, confining the tariffing requirement to only two categories of traffic. 58 Thus,
contracts have truly replaced standardized tariff offerings as the defining
element of trucking companies' relations with their customers.
Outside the transportation industries, detariffing has proceeded
more slowly, but has been advancing at least in the telephone industry.
Detariffing in the long-distance telecommunications market has taken a
long and winding path. After experimenting in the early 1980s with making tariffs optional for non-dominant carriers,5 9 the FCC attempted in
financial responsibility and shall be withheld if the carrier does not meet these
requirements"); 49 U.S.C. §§ 13901-13908 (Supp. II 1996).
54. Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5
I.C.C.2d 623, 633 (1989) ("motor common carriers that desire for some reason to
discriminate among shippers in their rates (for example, to offer lower rates to large
shippers) may do so lawfully simply by obtaining contract carrier authority") (footnotes
omitted). For an overview of historical and modem developments in the law of common
carriage, see Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers: Continuity and Disintegration in U.S.
Transportation Law, 13 Transp. LJ. 1 (1983); Jfirgen Basedow, Common CarriersContinuity and Disintegration in U.S. Transportation Law. Part II, 13 Transp. LJ. 159

(1984).
55. Pub. L. No. 103-180, § 5(b), 107 Stat. 2044, 2050 (1993).
56. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 383-84 (1932); cf.
Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (range tariffs not permitted
under Communications Act of 1934).
57. See H.P. Rep. No. 104-311, at 92, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.AN. at 804.
58. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 113, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.AN. at 825; 49
U.S.C. § 13702(a) (Supp. II 1996). The two remaining categories that require tariffs are
movements by or with a water carrier in noncontiguous domestic trade and movements of
household goods paid for by the householder. Indeed, only in the former case must the
tariffs actually be filed with the Surface Transportation Board, the ICC's limited successor;
for the latter traffic category, the "tariffs" need merely be available for inspection by the
Board or by shippers. See 49 U.S.C. § 13702(b), (c) (Supp. II 1996).
59. "[I]n the long-distance market, this amounted to a distinction between AT&T [the
only dominant carrier] and everyone else .... " MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S.
218, 221 (1994). Since then, even AT&T has been reclassified as a non-dominant carrier.
See Motion of AT&T Corp. to Be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 11 FCC Rcd.
3271, 3357 (1995) (subsequent history omitted).
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1985 to prohibit non-dominant carriers from filing any tariffs for their
services. It concluded that the tariff-filing system "imposes unnecessary
costs on [non.-dominant] carriers, their subscribers, and society generally," and that without tariffs customers would be better able to obtain
"services that meet their specific needs" and carriers would be more likely
to develop "innovative service offerings. 6 0° This mandatory detariffing
was struck down by the D.C. Circuit as inconsistent with the
Communications Act.6 1 Undeterred, the FCC switched to a "permissive

detariffing" policy, referred to as "forbearance" because the agency announced that it would "forbear" from enforcing against non-dominant
carriers the Communications Act's requirement that "every" carrier
"shall" file tariffs containing "all" its rates. This policy was also invalidated, this time by the Supreme Court, on the ground that the FCC's
statutory authority to "modify" tariff-filing requirements did not empower
it to make such a fundamental change as to eliminate the obligation for
62
virtually all long-distance carriers.
But these setbacks were only temporary. Change to the filed-rate system finally arrived the way the Supreme Court had said it should: in the
form of new legislation. 63 In the Telecommunications Act, Congress gave
the FCC the "forbearance" authority that the Supreme Court had denied
it under the original provisions of the Communications Act. 64 The precise scope of this power remains uncertain, and long-distance carriers
and the FCC are still skirmishing over mandatory detariffing (favored by
the FCC) versus permissive detariffing (the preference of the carriers).
In all events, it is clear that the FCC sees little value in tariffs; in its view, as
60. Policy and. Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and Facilities
Authorizations Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1031 (1985) (subsequent history omitted).
61. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Although
regulated companies frequently chafe at tariffs because they preclude some flexibility,
tariffs also convey some less-remarked-upon advantages on carriers-particularly if the
carriers can pick and choose which of their services are tariffed. In particular, tariffs can
be used to limit a carrier's liability. See, e.g., Boston & Maine R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97,
108 (1914).
62. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 224-34. Recalling its Interstate Commerce
Act precedents from earlier in the century, the Court noted that "'[tihere is not only a
relation, but an indissoluble unity between the provision for the establishment and
maintenance of rates until corrected in accordance with the statute and the prohibitions
against preferences and discrimination.'" Id. at 230 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907)). A subsequent last-gasp effort by the FCC to use
its original statutory authority to gut the tariff-filing requirement-by adopting a policy
permitting carriers to file tariffs containing "ranges of rates"-was also rejected by the
courts. See Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
63. See, e.g., iM1CI
Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 234.
64. See 47 U.S.CA. § 160(a) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring FCC to "forbear from
applying any regulation or any provision of [the Communications Act] to a
telecommunications carrier" if the FCC determines that, among other things,
"enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges,
practices, classifications, or regulations [of the carrier] ... are just and reasonable, and not
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory").
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long as competitive options are available, "the legal relationship between
carriers and customers will much more closely resemble the legal relationship between
service providers and customers in an unregulated
65
environment."
Not all regulated industries, or even all telecommunications services,
have been detariffed. As a rule, in the segments of these industries still
served by monopolies, the tariff requirements remain in place. For example, local exchange companies (LECs) such as the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) continue to be required by the FCC to file tariffs for
various access services (e.g., enabling long-distance companies to reach
end-users such as residential customers) on the theory that they still possess market power for those services. 6 6 For a similar reason, detariffing in
the natural gas and electric industries has also lagged behind the transportation industries and the telecommunications industry. Transmission
of both natural gas and electricity is still thought to be a natural monopoly67-a service that can be provided more efficiently by one firm than
by two or more. Where it is assumed that service will continue to be pro-

65. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 11 FCC
Rcd. 20730, 20762 (1996) (subsequent history omitted). It should also be observed that,
even short of detariffing, the telecommunications industry during the period of the great
transformation experienced in part the same migration toward purely contractual relations
between carrier and customer that marked the transportation industries. This can be seen
in proceedings concerning AT&T's Tariff 12 beginning in the late 1980s. Under that tariff,
AT&T offered various "options," each of which was a package of services designed to meet
the needs of a single specific corporate customer, and the tariffed rate for each option was
lower than the sum of the various rates that the customer would have paid if it had
separately purchased each service in the package. Although AT&T's competitors for this
corporate business (which under the FCC's policy at the time were not similarly burdened
by a tariff-filing requirement) challenged these tariff provisions as unreasonably
discriminatory, the D.C. Circuit ultimately agreed with the FCC that such preferential rates
could be justified by the fact that "the customer forfeits the flexibility of determining the
precise way in which AT & T will provide the services." Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v.
FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
66. See, e.g., Electronic Tariff Filing System (ETFS), DA 98-914, 1998 FCC LEXIS
2562 (FCC May 28, 1998); Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company
Facilities, 9 FCC Rcd. 5154 (1996) (subsequent history omitted). In implementing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC groups LECs into the categories of incumbent
LECs (also called "ILECs"), such as the BOCs and the other local telephone companies
that have traditionally provided local telephone service on a state-franchised monopoly
basis, and non-incumbent or competitive LECs (also called "CLECs"), which the Act
envisions as both interconnecting and competing with the ILECs. See, e.g.,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, 15506 (1996) (subsequent history omitted). Consistent with
traditional terminology, we use the term "LEG" to refer to incumbent LECs.
67. See infra note 299 (citing FERC orders). But cf. RichardJ. Pierce, Reconsidering
the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 345,
379-82, 384-85 (1983) (arguing that the market power of gas pipelines has been
overestimated).
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vided by a monopoly, tariffs continue to be used to ensure that all have
non-discriminatory access to such service segments. 68
Overall, therefore, we find the following pattem with respect to
tariffing. Under the original paradigm, all regulated industries provided
services pursuant to publicly filed tariffs. Tariffs were required whether
the industry was competitive or monopolistic, primarily as a prophylaxis
against discrimination. Implicit in this policy was the understanding that
"discrimination" is any differential pricing of services provided to similarly situated end-users. This is a definition grounded in a social policy of
equal treatment. Under the new paradigm, tariffing is being eliminated
for all regulated services that can be provided on a competitive basis, and
is retained only for those service segments regarded as natural monopolies. Implicit in this new policy is the understanding that "discrimination"
cannot exist in a competitive market, and hence is a concern only when a
single dominant firm has monopoly power. This is a definition grounded
in economic theory. Thus we see that regulatory changes designed to
promote competition entail, as a closely associated concomitant measure,
proposals that regulated services be detariffed.
2. Unbundling.- A second aspect of the great transformation of regulated industries law can be seen in the form in which end-users acquire
services from cariers. Under the original paradigm derived from the
Interstate Commerce Act, customers received predetermined, non-negotiable service packages. For example, telecommunications services were
offered as a single package of "end-to-end" service: customer premises
equipment, inside wiring, and local service were all "bundled into a single
tariffed package"; long-distance usage was separately measured, "but access to the service itself was likewise part of the same monopoly package." 69 Under the new paradigm, by contrast, carriers are required to
unbundle such end-to-end service into constituent parts in order to allow
end-users to mix and match different service elements to suit their own
needs and tastes.
Nowhere is this contrast between the original paradigm and the new
paradigm more evident than in the telecommunications industry. The
simple but important example of regulation of customer premises equipment-e.g., telephones, answering machines, and similar equipmentencapsulates the evolving attitude toward packaging of integrated
services.
68. See, e.g., Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing
Self-Implementing Transportation, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 1 30,939, at 30,414-15
(1992) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 636] (subsequent history omitted) (natural gas
transmission); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, FERC
Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 1 31,036, at 31,732-67 (1996) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 888]
(subsequent history omitted) (electricity transmission).
69. Michael K. Kellogg et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 2.8, at 92 (1992).
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For most of this century, it was assumed that one would obtain customer premises equipment only from the local telephone company. Indeed, the "foreign attachments" provisions in the tariffs of the Bell
System, which provided local telephone service to more than 80 percent
of the nation's subscribers, expressly prohibited use of any device not
provided by the telephone companyJ 0 Although it has become fashionable to suggest or at least imply that this restriction stemmed solely from a
desire by the Bell System to leverage its state-franchised local monopolies
(the BOCs) into a monopoly in the inherently competitive market for
customer premises equipment, 71 these suggestions are not accompanied
by evidence from the historical record that this was the self-conscious motivation of Bell executives, or of the federal and state regulators that approved this arrangement. Rather, the prohibition on foreign attachments was supported by the apparently genuinely held belief that use of
such attachments would in fact cause harm to the telecommunications
network and an apparently genuine (if misconceived) belief that the public simply did not need competitive choices among providers of customer
72
premises equipment.
In all events, although the lawfulness of this restriction was called
into question as early as 1956 in the Hush-a-Phonecase, 73 the FCC did not
begin requiring carriers to unbundle customer premises equipment from
local phone service until the late 1960s. 74 And although the FCC then
remarked that "[n] o one entity need provide all interconnection equipment..., any more than a single source is needed to supply the parts of a
space probe," 75 it was not until well into the 1970s that the FCC fully
76
unbundled customer premises equipment and local telephone service.
Since then, customers receiving local telephone service from a BOC have
had the option of obtaining customer premises equipment along with
that service or, instead, procuring such equipment from another
company.
The transition to a fully competitive marketplace was finally realized
only after the FCC, acting in the early 1980s, coupled this unbundling
70. See id. § 10.4.1, at 499 & n.1.
71. See, e.g., id. § 10.4.1, at 499; Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy
of Telecommunications Reform, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 835, 843-844 (1997); David 0. Stewart,
Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86 Yale L.J.
538, 544-50 (1977).
72. See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391, 420 (1955), rev'd, 238 F.2d 266
(D.C. Cir. 1956); see also Stewart, supra note 71, at 546 n.33 (describing "possible dangers

to 'system integrity' posed by defective equipment").
73. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
74. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968) (subsequent history omitted).
75. Id. at 424.
76. See North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977); North
Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976).
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with mandator, detariffing of customer premises equipment. 7 The FCC
explained the new regime with a statement that succinctly summarizes
the philosophy underlying the new paradigm:
In general, bundling of goods and services may restrict the freedom of choice of consumers and restrains their ability to engage
in product substitution. Unless the goods and services in the
bundle exactly match the preferences of consumers, consumer
satisfaction may be reduced by bundling. Thus, consumer satisfaction could be increased by changes in the marketing structure that allow the users, rather than the vendors, to determine
the bundle of goods and services that get purchased. 78
The telecommunications industry has also produced what is thus far
the greatest unbundling of all in regulated industries: the separation of
long-distance telecommunications services from local service. Historically, the Bell System not only dominated local exchange service throughout the nation, but also possessed a virtual monopoly on long-distance
service. 79 Any other carrier's entry into the interstate portion of this market would be permitted only if it persuaded the FCC that "the public
convenience and necessity" "required" such entry.80
The FCC long adhered to a single-provider model for long-distance
service. For example, it made no effort to compel local telephone companies, including the Bell System's BOCs, to permit long-distance companies other than AT&T to interconnect with the LECs' networks. But a
combination of factors-some highly fortuitous-led to what one commentator termed the FCC's "inadvertently creat[ing] a competitive longdistance communications market."8 1
This creation, which had its origins in a series of administrative decisions concerning "private line" services, was slow in unfolding. In 1959,
the FCC authorized private companies to operate their own microwave
77. The FCC took this additional step in order to complete the deregulation of

customer premises equipment and "foster[ ] a regulatory scheme which separates the
provision of regulated common carrier services from competitive activities that are
independent of, but related to, the underlying utility service." Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77
F.C.C.2d 384, 447 (1980) (subsequent history omitted).

78. Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
79. This monopoly was possible because there was no requirement that AT&T permit
its BOGs to interconnect with other long-distance companies. A 1913 agreement between
the Bell System and the Department of Justice, which was called the "Kingsbury
Commitment" after the name of the Bell System vice-president who had negotiated it,
provided that the Bell System would connect independent local phone companies to the
Bell System's long-listance network, but made no provision for interconnecting other
long-distance carriers to the Bell System's local telephone companies. See Gerald W.
Brock, The Telecommunications Industry: The Dynamics of Market Structure 155 (1981);
Kellogg et al., supra note 69, § 1.3.3, at 16.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994). This standard was the same as that in other acts that also
were based on the Interstate Commerce Act. See, e.g., supra note 43 (citing statutes).
81. Breyer, supra note 10, at 311.
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transmission facilities.8 2. A decade later, the FCC authorized
Microwave Communications, Inc., the forerunner of today's MCI
Telecommunications Corp., to sell private-line microwave service to business firms between Chicago and St. Louis.8 3 In a subsequent general
rulemaking, the Specialized Common CarrierServices proceeding, the Commission authorized other companies to provide such private line services
as well.8 4 None of these decisions contemplated that new entrants into
the long-distance market would become full-fledged competitors with
AT&T.8 5
But competition could not be easily confined to private-line services.
When MCI revised its tariffs in 1974 to offer an expanded service, called
"Execunet," that would provide a competitive alternative to AT&T's basic
switched service, the FCC rejected the tariffs. 8 6 As one close observer recalled the matter, direct competition with AT&T "was not part of the
'8 7
'original intent' of Specialized Common Carrier."
But on judicial review of
this decision, Judge J. Skelly Wright held for the D.C. Circuit that MCI
already had sufficient authority for its Execunet service, at least absent an
affirmative conclusion by the agency that the public interest required an
AT&T monopoly in the long-distance industry.88 The FCC soon acquiesced, and the rest, as they say, is history. Before long, ordinary residential customers could obtain their long-distance telephone service from
companies that were not part of the Bell System, such as MCI or Southern
Pacific Communications (a predecessor to Sprint).89 Long-distance service had been unbundled from local service.
Another striking example of unbundling is provided by the natural
gas industry. 90 Unbundling has been more extensive in the natural gas
context than in some other industries because the Natural Gas Act of
82. See Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359, 405
(1959).
83. See Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc. for Constr. Permits, 18
F.C.C.2d 953 (1969) (4-3 decision), recons. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970).
84. See Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point
Microwave Radio Service, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, recons. denied, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971), aff'd
sub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142, 1169 (9th Cir.
1975).
85. Even the most vigorous advocates of liberalized entry regarded the primary
benefit of private line services as the addition of "'a little salt and pepper of competition
to' traditional public utility law's 'rather tasteless stew of regulatory protection.'" Chen,

supra note 71, at 845 (quoting Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18
F.C.C.2d at 978 (statement of Commissioner Johnson)).
86. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25, 58 (1976).
87. Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of
Telecommunications, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 517, 524 (1988).
88. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter

Execunet 1].
89. See Robinson, supra note 87, at 524 & nn.27-28 (and FCC decisions cited).
90. Unbundling has been important in the electricity industry as well, but so far it has
primarily affected the beginning of the chain of production-power generation-rather
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1938, though largely modelled on the Interstate Commerce Act, "failed
to require interstate pipelines to offer transportation services to third parties wishing to ship gas." 91 Consequently, pipelines were not common
carriers, and they typically sold a bundled product consisting of gas, interstate transportation, and storage services. Moreover, they were able "to
use their monopoly power over gas transportation to create and to maintain monopsony power in the market for the purchase of gas at the wellhead and monopoly power in the market for the sale of gas to LDCs [i.e.,
local distribution companies]. *92

Nevertheless, a combination of congressional and federal regulatory
efforts has transformed the natural gas industry in the last twenty years.
The process started with the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA) , 3 which began phasing out regulation of wellhead prices
charged by producers of natural gas.94 The Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (FERC), which in 1977 succeeded to the jurisdiction of the
former Federal Power Commission (FPC) over interstate wholesale sales
of natural gas, ' 5 then issued a series of orders designed to increase the
access of local distribution companies to lower-cost gas and to stimulate
competition. Most notable were FERC orders 436 and 636, issued in 1985
and 1992 respectively. 9 6 In essence, these orders "required [interstate]
natural gas pipelines to provide service on an unbundled basis; henceforth, pipelines were required to sell natural gas, transportation service,
and storage service as separate products and services." 97 Thus, for examthan end-users. Consequently, we postpone discussing it until Part I.B.2. See infra Part
I.B.2.

91. GMC v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 816 (1997). For a helpful overview of the traditional
structure and regulation of the natural gas industry, see Pierce, supra note 67, at 348-50.
92. Richard J. Pierce, The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 Nat.
Resources & Env't, Summer 1995, at 53, 53-54.
93. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432
(1994)).
94. See Tracy, 117 S.Ct. at 816. This process was completed in the Natural Gas
Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
95. See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565
(1977) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1994)).
96. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, FERC
Order No. 436, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 30,665 (1985) (subsequent history omitted);
FERC Order No. 636, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 30,939 (1992).
97. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 342. FERC Orders 436 and 636 and
associated congressional, FERC, and state initiatives have generated an extensive body of
secondary literature befitting such a reworking of a multibillion dollar industry. Forjust a
few examples, see Arthur S. DeVany & W. David Walls, The Emerging New Order in
Natural Gas: Markets Versus Regulation (1995); Edward C. Gallick, Competition in the
Natural Gas Pipeline Industry (1993); A. Lawrence Kolbe et al., Regulatory Risk:
Economic Principles and Applications to Natural Gas Pipelines and Other Industries
(1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in
Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 Energy LJ. 323 (1994); Charles G. Stalon & Reinier HJ.H.
Lock, State-Federa. Relations in the Economic Regulation of Energy, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 427
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ple, local distribution companies could purchase gas from producers at
the wellhead and require pipelines merely to provide transport.
Many of the changes in the natural gas industry have not been visible
to the residential or commercial end-user of natural gas, because the typical customer of the interstate pipeline traditionally has been and remains
a local distribution company, which is a closely regulated monopoly service provider. But the unbundling of services has had large effects in the
industrial end-user market. Under the system of open access to interstate
pipelines that emerged in the mid-1980s, as the Supreme Court has explained, "'larger industrial end-users began increasingly to bypass utilities' local distribution networks by 'construct[ing] their own pipeline
spurs to [interstate] pipeline[s].'"98 These users have thus been able to
negotiate directly with competing producers, using the interstate pipeline
as a provider of transportation service only. In addition to these substantial changes in regulatory policy at the federal level, the gas market has
experienced some less extensive unbundling at the local distribution
level. 9 9 For example, many state public utility commissions (PUCs) "have
followed FERC's lead in authorizing, or compelling, local distribution
companies to make sales and transportation service available separately to
at least some classes of consumers." 10 0
Thus, in a variety of industries, we see that services previously packaged together by a single provider are being unbundled to allow endusers to select and combine different service elements, often from competing providers. Of course, at a certain point, the transaction costs of
assembling unbundled service elements from different providers could
become prohibitive for end-users. But the solution here too would seem
to be to allow the market, rather than the regulator or monopoly providers, to do the bundling. Thus, it is contemplated that after the
Telecommunications Act is fully implemented, various competing providers ranging from AT&T and MCI to the LECs will offer "one stop shopping" for telecommunications services, including local, long distance, cellular, Internet access, and remote video (cable or direct satellite TV).101
Indeed, one can imagine that firms will emerge that will offer "bundled"
packages of different utility services-all of the above plus electricity and
gas, for example. Unbundling thus does not necessarily mean fragmenta(1990); Christian S. Gerig, Comment, Appalachian Natural Gas and FERC Order 636: The
Deregulation Dilemma, 24 Cap. U. L. Rev. 761 (1995).
98. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 817 (alteration in original) (quoting Joseph Fagan, From
Regulation to Deregulation: The Diminishing Role of the Small Consumer Within the
Natural Gas Industry, 29 Tulsa L.J. 707, 723 (1994)).
99. Because section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act bars FERC from exercising
jurisdiction over "local distribution of natural gas," 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1994), regulatory

changes in this area are the province of the states.
100. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 344-45.
101. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 Conn.
L. Rev. 123, 131-51 (1996).
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tion; it means contractual choice, including the choice as to whether to
receive services in packages.
3. Ending Cross-Subsidies.- A third major change in the relationship
between providers and end-users concerns the provision of subsidies to
certain classes of customers. The original paradigm was characterized by
widespread cross-subsidies, meaning that some customers paid rates in
excess of the fully allocated costs of service in order to allow other customers to be charged rates less than the fully allocated costs of service.
Typically, customers in urban areas subsidized customers in rural areas,
and business customers subsidized residential customers.10 2 These subsidies were justified in the name of the ideal of universal service-the goal
of making common carrier and public utility services available to every
customer who wanted them. Without cross-subsidies, it was assumed,
many high-cost end-users would lack basic common carrier and utility
services.
The new paradigm does not necessarily repudiate the universal service ideal. To be sure, in some industries, most prominently railroads
and airlines, the introduction of competition has meant the collapse of
cross-subsidies and the loss of service to some small communities.10 3 The
Telecommunications Act, however, includes a more explicit and farreaching commitment to universal service than ever existed before.' 0 4
The Act adopts the "principle [I]" that "rural, insular, and high cost" customers should be able to obtain services "at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas." 10 5 It says
that those entided to "[u]niversal service" include "low-income consumers" 10 6 and "health care providers for rural areas."10 7 Most remarkably, it
provides that, without regard to any cost differentials, a "discount" must
be afforded to "[e]ducational providers and libraries" wherever
08
located.'
102. See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On a Collision
Course?, 13 Transp. LJ. 329, 356 (1984) (airlines); David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo,
Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications: Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent
Telephone Pricing, 11 Yale J. on Reg. 119, 144-45 (1994).
103. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Social and Economic Consequences of
Deregulation 202-09 (1989). But see Steven Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Economic
Effects of Airline Deregulation 47-50 (1986) (suggesting that loss of service to small
communities was on account of temporary diversion of fleets to other markets and
increased fuel prices).
104. See 47 U.S.CA. § 254 (West Supp. 1998).
105. Id. § 254(b) (3).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 254(h) (1)(A).
108. Id. § 254 (h)(1)(B). This last provision reflects a congressional desire to undenvrite the "information superhighway," a notion fashionable within the "high-tech wing
of the Democratic party, with itsSilicon Valley and educational constituencies." Eli M.
Noam,Will Univeral Service and Common Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act
of 1996?, 97 Colum. L. Rev.955, 961 (1997).
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But the most important change with respect to universal service subsidies lies not in who gets them, but rather in the mechanism for funding
them. The introduction of competition in regulated industries makes it
difficult if not impossible to rely on cross-subsidies to fund universal service objectives. Once customers are free to contract with either the incumbent utility or a competing provider, competitive pressures will tend
to undermine any effort to maintain cross-subsidies.
To illustrate, suppose the incumbent utility (which has a universal
service obligation) charges a business customer $2 per unit, of which
$1.50 represents the fully allocated costs of the service and $0.50 represents a cross-subsidy for high-cost rural residential customers. A competitor that does not have to worry about the universal service obligation has
an incentive to offer the same service for $1.50, and of course is likely to
capture the business at this price. The incumbent will therefore be pressured to reduce its rate to the business customer to $1.50 in order to keep
the business. If it does this, however, there is no longer any cross-subsidy
available to support the high-cost rural residential customer.
The tension between competition and cross-subsidies has long been
recognized. For many years, representatives of the Bell System pejoratively described would-be competitors as seeking to "creamskim" customers, 109 meaning that they wanted to offer rates to certain customers closer
to actual costs than these customers previously had been charged. As
long as such "creamskimming" was prohibited, regulators had substantial
"discretionary power to engage in a variety of redistribution programs."1 10 Once the commitment is made to replace monopoly with
competition, this discretionary power is sharply curtailed.
How then can universal service obligations be funded once competition and freedom of contract prevail? The Telecommunications Act directs the FCC to develop "specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms" to assure that universal service obligations are funded on "an
equitable and nondiscriminatory basis" by "[e]very telecommunications
carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services.""' The
FCC has ruled that this universal service fund should incorporate a principle of "competitive neutrality" among providers and technologies. 112 In
effect, then, what we are likely to see in telecommunications is the replacement of pervasive and largely concealed cross-subsidies with a single

109. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 161 & n.126 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
110. Pierce, supra note 97, at 345.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (West Supp. 1998); see also id. § 254(b) (4) (equitable and
non-discriminatory contribution).
112. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8799-8803
(1997) (subsequent history omitted).
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competitively
neutral tax (actually called a "fee") of much higher
3
visibility."
The net effect of the Telecommunications Act on the subsidies available to end-users will depend on the combined effect of two forces. On
the one hand, the Act creates new constituencies for universal service subsidies (low-income consumers, libraries and schools, etc.), which will
press for generous subsidies and therefore high fees. On the other hand,
by effectively eliminating hidden cross-subsidies, and requiring that any
subsidies be funded through what amounts to an excise tax on long-distance services, the Act gives other users, and especially the long-distance
providers, an incentive to oppose generous funding of subsidies in order
to keep fees low.
However those competing forces are ultimately resolved in the telecommunications industry, it is clear that the issue of subsidies will become a much more contentious one in regulated industries law. For example, state statutes permitting competition in the local electric industry
will have to address the question of how much of a subsidy rural and lowincome households should get and who should pay for it.1 4 Under the

original paradigm, the process of subsidizing some end-users at the expense of others remained largely hidden from view. The cross-subsidies
that made this possible were buried in a maze of regulatory complexity,
and very few people were aware that a portion of their transportation or
utility bill either was paying for someone else's service or was being paid
for by someone else. Under the new paradigm, the issue of subsidies
must be brought into the open, and hence becomes politicized. 1 15
113. This is the general solution to the funding of universal service obligations
advocated by economists. See, e.g., Baumol et a., supra note 6. In essence, economists
have urged that universal service obligations be funded through some competitively
neutral mechanism other than carier-to-carrier pricing, such as general tax revenues or a
system of end-user charges. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the
Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1081 (1997); William J. Baumol &
Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution Require That We Kill the Competitive Goose?
Pricing Local Phone Services to Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1122 (1998).
114. See Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the
Electric Industry, 16 Energy L.J. 347, 411-14 (1995). One of the most detailed state
statutes, that of Illinois, adopts a relatively modest subsidy program. The statute creates a
"Supplemental Low-Income Energy Assistance Fund," funded by monthly charges of $0.40
payable by residential customers, $4.00 by small commercial and industrial customers, and
$300.00 by large commercial and industrial customers. Monies collected in this fund are
to be used for payments to utilities on behalf of qualifying low-income customers and for
the provision of weatherization services for low-income customers. See Illinois Electric
Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997, 1997 Ill. Legis. Serv. 90-561, § 85 (to
be codified at 305 IMI.Comp. Stat. 20/13).
115. This process has already begun, as reflected in the recent brouhaha over
subsidizing Internet access for schools and libraries. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty &John F.
Dickerson, Gore's Costly High-Wire Act, Time, May 25, 1998, at 52 (noting that longdistance phone companies that had been ordered by the FCC to pay for program to wire
every classroom and library to the Internet "are threatening to add a new charge to the
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In general, the demise of cross-subsidies should push rates closer to
incremental costs for most end-users. Thus, low-cost end-users should see
their rates fall; high-cost end-users should see their rates rise. The realignment of prices toward costs will be offset in part by the payment of
explicit universal service subsidies to certain favored classes of end-users.
But political pressures will likely mean that these subsidies will only partially blunt the impact that the realignment of the rate structure will have
on high-cost end-users, especially in areas where the legislature fails to
adopt an effective universal service guarantee.
B. Relations Among Providers
Relations with end-users are not the only dimension of the great
transformation. Changes have been equally pronounced in relations that
common carriers and public utilities have with other service providerscompetitors, potential competitors, or firms in closely related markets.
Many of these changes, of course, have been the driving force behind
elements of the transformation discussed above with respect to relations
with end-users. For example, there could have been no effective unbundling of local and long-distance telecommunications service if competition had not developed in the latter market, and that in turn could not
have happened without the BOCs' and other LECs' being required to
permit interconnection by AT&T's long-distance competitors. Indeed, in
many industries, as a result of unbundling and interconnection requirements, the line between end-users and other providers shifts according to
which stage in the distribution of services one is considering.
In each of the regulated industries with which we are concernedrailroads, airlines, trucking, telecommunications, gas, and electricitythe federal regulatory commissions historically have been primarily concerned with regulating firms' relations with end-users, not with competitors. Indeed, to the extent that looking beyond the carrier-customer relationship was necessary, under the original paradigm these agencies
tended to devote themselves to minimizing competition even where the
industry characteristics were not those of a natural monopoly. For example, the ICC was unreceptive to applications for entry into the interstate
trucking market prior to the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980basically denying the necessary certificate if the carriers already serving
long-distance bill of residential consumers"); The Gore Tax, Wall St. J., June 12, 1998, at
A10 (editorializing against FCC's plan and stating that long-distance companies had done
"the right thing" in announcing that the five percent surcharge would be listed separately
on consumers' phone bills); Keep Internet Funding for Schools, N.Y. Times,June 12, 1998,
at A20 (editorializing in favor of FCC's plan and arguing that long-distance companies,
"stand[ing] to reap enormous financial benefits from deregulation," should "in fact be
absorbing th[e] cost" of the plan); Seth Schiesel, Budget Is Cut for a Plan to Put Schools
and Libraries on Line, N.Y. Times,June 13, 1998, atA8 (reporting FCC decision, by a onevote margin, that rejected proposal to eliminate plan for connecting schools and libraries
to the Internet but instead reduced the plan's budget by more than 40 percent).
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the route were providing "adequate" service. 116 The CAB was similarly
indisposed to fostering competition in aviation during most of the
agency's existence. 1 17 And, as described above, the FCC was in no rush to
permit competition for AT&T's core long-distance business."x 8 Under
the original paradigm, in short, each carrier had either a monopoly right
(electricity, gas, telecommunications) or an oligopoly right (railroads, airlines, trucks) to a defined service territory.
The goal of the new paradigm, in contrast, is to promote competition in as many industries and industry segments as possible. Accomplishing this goal in the industries served by oligopolies has required little
more than changing the legal standard by which agencies evaluate entry
1 20
applications 1 9 or, better yet, eliminating such government control.
After all, trucking companies typically do not depend on one another for
any aspect of the provision of service to end-users.
In contrast, the road to universal competition is somewhat sinuous in
the industries formerly governed by the monopoly norm, especially
where there are bottleneck facilities that have natural monopoly features.
Competing long-distance carriers require access to the wires connecting
each individual home and business if they are to complete calls-and
these wires are owned by the incumbent local telephone company. Competing electric power generators, if they are to sell power, require access
to local distribution systems-again, owned by the incumbent utility. In
these industries, it has been necessary to impose a series of new regulatory obligations on companies that own bottleneck facilities so that competition can flourish in other service segments of the industry. These
obligations, which can be seen as an extension and redefinition of "common carrier" duties, include interconnection duties, the provision of unbundled service elements to competitors, and mandatory sale to competitors for resale.
1. Interconnection. - Because the original paradigm viewed monopoly (or oligopoly) service as appropriate, companies in industries that
116. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 226.
117. See id. at 205-06. "Between 1950 and 1974, for example, the board had received
seventy-nine applications from companies wishing to enter the domestic scheduled airline
industry; it granted none." Id. at 205; see also Michael A. Katz, The American Experience
Under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978-An Airline Perspective, 6 Hofstra Lab. L.J.
87, 88 (1988) ("not one new airline began operations as a large passenger air carrier
between 1938 and 1978").
118. See supra text accompanying notes 79-89.
119. For example, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 changed the standard whereby the
ICC evaluated applications to enter interstate trucking markets. Whereas under the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 an otherwise qualified applicant (basically one that was "fit, willing, and
able") had to demonstrate that its entry was "required by the present or future public
convenience and necessity," 49 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976) (repealed), such an applicant could
be excluded after 1980 only if the ICC concluded that such entry was "inconsistent with the
public convenience and necessity," 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(1) (1982) (repealed).
120. Such was the case with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and, more recently,
with trucking. See supra notes 43-44, 53 and accompanying text.
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possessed bottleneck facilities had limited duties to grant access to other
companies. Particularly noteworthy was the absence of any duty on the
part of the Bell System to provide interconnections between long-distance companies seeking to compete with AT&T Long Lines and the Bell
System's local customers. 121 Although the FCC eventually imposed an
interconnection duty, even well into the 1970s neither the Bell System
122
nor the FCC regarded this as a general obligation.
Indeed, part of the genius of the 1982 consent decree breaking up
the Bell System (termed the "Modification of Final Judgment" or "MFJ")
was the so-called "equal access" obligation imposed on the post-divestiture Bell Operating Companies. The MFJ required the divested BOCsthe entities that possess most of the local telephone monopolies throughout the country-to provide unaffiliated long-distance carriers access to
the local exchanges that was "equal in type, quality, and price" to that
given to the BOCs' former long-distance affiliate, AT&T. 123 This obligation subsequently was extended to local exchange carriers of the largest
independent (i.e., non-Bell) telephone company, GTE Corp., 12 4 and

12 5
then by the FCC to virtually all LECs.
The goal of the equal access obligation in the MFJ was to reduce the
ability of the companies with bottleneck facilities to discriminate against
one or more of the various companies competing in the long-distance
business. The Department ofJustice argued, however, that history (and
the evidence that it had introduced before Judge Harold H. Greene in its
antitrust case against the Bell System) had demonstrated that it was also
necessary to eliminate any incentive on the part of the monopoly companies to engage in such discrimination. 2 6 The MFJ sought to accomplish
this by the line-of-business restrictions it imposed on the divested
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).127 Among other things,

121. See supra note 79 (discussing Kingsbury Commitment).
122. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
Execunet fl].
123. MFJ § IIA, reprinted in United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
124. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730, 744 (D.D.C. 1984); see also
infra note 236 (distinguishing GTE from the Bell companies).
125. See MTS and WATS Market Structure Phase III, 100 F.C.C.2d 860 (1985),
recons. denied, FCC 86-4, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1410 (1986). "More than 99% of the
nation's lines have now been converted to equal access." Long Distance Market Shares
Third Quarter 1997, App. 3, 1998 FCC LEXIS 133, *48 (Jan. 1998).
126. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-89, 194-95.
127. The RBOCs are the seven separate "regional" companies that were created as
part of the breakup of the Bell System to serve as holding companies for the BOCS. More
popularly known as "Baby Bells," the seven divested RBOCs were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic,
BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and US West. Under a series of
recent and proposed mergers among these companies, their number is set to reduce to
four. See Laura M. Holson, 2 Bell Companies Are Set to Rejoin in $60 Billion Deal, N.Y.
Times, May 11, 1998, at Al (reporting that SBC, formerly known as Southwestern Bell,
already having acquired Pacific Telesis, had reached a deal to acquire Ameritech; noting

1352

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:1323

these restrictions prohibited the RBOCs, "directly or through any affiliated enterprise," from providing any long-distance service.1 28 This structural bar was designed to ensure that no company again would have
"'both the ability and the incentive' to thwart competition" in competitive or potentially competitive telecommunications markets.1 29 The
Telecommunications Act similarly reflects skepticism about whether an
equal access requirement is sufficient to prevent abuses of power over
bottleneck facilities. For it not only carries forward the MFJ's equal access
requirement, but also links RBOC entry into the long-distance market to
13 0
the development of competition in their local markets.
Equal access obligations in other industries have not been accompanied by a correlative exclusion of the obligated company from providing
services in related industry segments that require access. For example,
recent statutor and regulatory changes in the electricity industry have
required owners of transmission lines to provide equal access (termed
"open access" in this industry) to other generators of power.' 3 ' Although
these regimes may include separate-subsidiary requirements, they have
not imposed the MFJ's rigorous structural division of vertically integrated
companies into unaffiliated entities providing either monopoly or competitive functions.
Whether open-access requirements alone will be sufficient to deter
abuse of monopoly power in these industries without something like the
line-of-business restrictions of the MFJ is unclear. It may be that the inherent characteristics of the gas and electric industries do not afford the
same opportunities for abuse of monopoly power as the telecommunications industry. 13 2 After all, when end-users take gas or electricity from a
network, they are not drawing on energy that was specifically intended for
them when entered into the network-as is the case with a telephone
that Bell Atlantic had previously acquired NYNEX; and discussing the antitrust scrutiny of
these acquisitions).
128. MFJ § II(D) (1), reprinted in AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227; see United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 12 F.3d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
129. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187 (quoting Department ofJustice). The Bell System's
incentive to impede competition arose from its involvement (through AT&T Long Lines
and Western Electric) in competitive or potentially competitive businesses such as long
distance and manufacturing, and its ability to do so derived from its bottleneck control
(through the BOGs) over the local exchanges upon which the competitive businesses were
dependent.
130. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1998).
131. See TimothyJ. Brennan et al., A Shock to the System: Restructuring America's
Electricity Industry 6-7, 31, 61-63 (1996); Navarro, supra note 114, at 379-96.
132. Cf. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 574 (D.D.C. 1987)
(explaining basis for Department of Justice view that "'[p] articularly in a technologically
dynamic industry such as telecommunications, there is little possibility that regulation is
capable of detecting or preventing the very subtle forms of discrimination that would be
available to the BOCs'") (quoting Department ofJustice, May 20, 1982 Response to Public
Comments, at 58), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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call. 133 Thus, targeted discrimination against competing providers by the
entity with control of a bottleneck facility is substantially more difficult to
accomplish in the gas and electric industries than in telecommunications,
34
and the introduction of open-access obligations alone may suffice.'
The recent adoption of open-access requirements in the gas and
electricity industries has nonetheless in one sense wrought a more significant change for those industries than the MFJ's imposition of equal access obligations did for telecommunications. Whereas the BOCs had had
some interconnection obligations dating at least back into the early
197 0s, interstate gas pipelines and electric-power transmitters (and local
distribution companies in both industries) were not even common carriers under the original paradigm. 135 Today, by contrast, they are evolving
toward a model where they function largely as common carriers for other
36
providers.'
2. Offering Network Service Elements to Competitors. - We have previously explained the disaggregation of the end-to-end service historically
provided to end-users-in particular, the unbundling ordered by the
FCC (and ensured by the MFJ and the Telecommunications Act) in the
telecommunications industry, and by FERC Orders Nos. 436 and 636 in
the natural gas industry. In addition to offering unbundled services to
end-users, providers have been required to provide unbundled service
elements or components to other providers, including competitors.
Thus, entities that compete with the incumbent provider for end-users
also are often its customers.
This type of mandated dual role is already upon us in the electricity
industry. Indeed, the elimination of the traditional vertically integrated
electric companyo-a single utility providing generation, transmission,
and distribution under a monopoly franchise-is a reality in some places.
Pierce and Gellhom have summarized the traditional market structure in
the electric industry:
Until 1978, virtually all electricity service was provided on a fully
bundled basis by one of hundreds of integrated firms. The integrated utility generated its own electricity, transmitted that electricity across its high voltage lines, and distributed the electricity
133. For some observations on policy issues raised by this fundamental technological
difference between the telephone and electricity industries, see Paul L. Joskow,
Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J.
Econ. Persp. 119, 122 (1997).
134. For an argument that for other reasons the electricity industry nonetheless
would be better off through vertical de-integration (such that the typical integrated
company would become a distribution company subject only to state PUG regulation, a
transmission company subject only to FERC authority, and a generation company with the
status of an "exempt wholesale generator" under the Energy Policy Act of 1992), see
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Advantages of De-Integrating the Electricity Industry, Elec. J.,
Nov. 1994, at 16, 20.
135. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 67, at 382-83.
136. See Pendley, supra note 1, at 44-45.
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to all customers in its service territory. Since it had a legally conferred monopoly
in its service area, its rates to consumers were
3 7
regulated. 1

Since then, and especially in recent years, many of these companies have
been required to unbundle various parts of electricity service-particularly, to separate transmission from power generation.
Most prominently, FERG Order No. 888, issued in 1996, works a fundamental restructuring of the interstate electric industry. 13 Recognizing
that "[electric] transmission service continues to be a natural monopoly,"' 3 9 Order No. 888 forbids companies that control transmission facilities from leveraging that monopoly power into the upstream market for
generating electricity or the downstream market for delivering it to endusers. Prompted by the Energy Policy Act of 1992,140 among other developments, Order No. 888 does this by requiring companies to permit third
parties to transmit electricity over the companies' lines (a practice known
as "wheeling"), and to do so under terms and conditions no less favorable
than those offered to the transmitters' own generating affiliates. In other
words, like natural gas companies subject to FERC's regulation, interstate
electric companies are now required to use their transmission lines to
serve as carriers of other companies' power. The purpose of this new
order of relations is "to ensure that customers have the benefits of com141
petitively priced generation."
FERC's Order No. 888 directly affects only the wholesale market for
electric power, not the provision of electric service to end-users. This is
because FERC's power over electricity markets is much more limited than
its power over natural gas. The generation and distribution of electricity
have traditionally been regulated by state public utility commissionsquite unlike the transportation of natural gas, which has long been pri137. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 347.
138. FERC Order No. 888 is only one of the more important points in the transition
to competitive electric markets. For more detailed summaries of the causes and
manifestations of this transformation, see, e.g., Pierce & Gellhom, supra note 12, at
347-50; Bernard Black & Richard Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central
Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electric Industry, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1339 (1993); Joseph
T. Kelliher, Pushing the Envelope: Development of Federal Electric Transmission Access
Policy, 42 Am. U.L Rev. 543 (1993); Pierce, supra note 97. For a skeptical view of the
benefits of the transformation, see Richard D. Cudahy, Retail Wheeling: Is This
Revolution Necessary?, 15 Energy LJ. 351, 357 (1994).
139. FERC Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 31,036, at 31,652 (1996).
140. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
141. FERC Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH)
31,036, at 31,652 (1996).
Even apart from this unbundling and common-carriage obligation, the traditional industry
structure of a vertically integrated power company that transmitted power it generated
itself has been displaced in many instances by state-imposed competitive generation
requirements. For example, by 1994, even in advance of FERC Order No. 888, "most state
PUCs ha[d] already made the decision to rely on competitive contracting [as opposed to
power companies' constructing their own facilities] as the primary vehicle for adding new
generating capacity." Pierce, supra note 97, at 329.
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marily interstate in nature. 142 Thus, many entities involved in providing
electricity service to end-users are not subject to the unbundling process
45
that is nearing completion at the federal regulatory level.'
Unbundling beyond FERC'sjurisdiction is determined state by state.
Indeed, "[t]he Energy Policy Act [of 1992] specifically prohibits FERC
from authorizing retail wheeling, i.e., use of a transmission line to transmit electricity owned by a third party to a consumer," whereas states retain the authority to mandate such retail competition. 4 4 At the time
FERC issued Order No. 888, it noted that at least twelve states had retail
wheeling proposals, legislation, or pilot programs underway, and fortyone states were actively involved in investigating a restructuring of their
electric power markets. 145 Only ten months later FERC could report that
"every state but one has proposed or is considering or developing retail
competition programs.' 46 While it is beyond our purview to detail these
specific state changes, there can be no question that the unbundling of
electric utility services is well under way in some states even to the point
of retail customers' exercising the previously unknown ability to switch
147
electricity providers.

142. Cf. Brennan et al., supra note 131, at 33 (explaining that "a much larger portion
of investor-owned [electric] utility revenues are overseen by state regulators than by federal
regulators"); Pierce, supra note 97, at 331 (noting that "jurisdictional dichotomy" of
electricity industry does not exist in natural gas industry).
143. This is not to suggest that all aspects of the FERC-ordered transformation have
reached their final form. Having been the subject of several rounds of petitions for
reconsideration before the agency, FERC Order No. 888 is currently the subject of
numerous petitions for review which have been consolidated in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Electric Shorts, Foster Elec. Rep., Mar. 4,
1998, at 25, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, Allnws File (reporting transfer of cases
from Second Circuit to D.C. Circuit) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Although it is
conceivable that the court could overturn FERG's basic decision to permit wholesale
wheeling, it is more likely, given FERC's previous experience before that court with respect
to natural gas deregulation, that the court will be concerned with (concededly important)
details such as the fact that those exiting the power system can be made to bear the socalled stranded costs. See infra text accompanying notes 266-270.
144. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 350.
145. See FERG Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 31,036, at 31,651 n.101
(1996).
146. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 31,048, at 30,184
(1997) (Order No. 888 on rehearing).
147. In the state that has received the most attention for its retail wheeling
undertakings, the response by consumers has thus far been tepid. See Power Deregulated.
Consumers Yawn. California's Effort to Promote Plan for Electricity Is Off to a Slow Start,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1998, at D1 (reporting that in the five months "so far, a minuscule
25,000 customers out of 9.9 million have switched [electric] providers" in California and
that "similar experiments in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Vermont encountered
public responses every bit as tepid as California's"). It is too early to predict whether this
lack of interest will continue.
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The most extensive unbundling of service elements for the benefit of
other providers is that contemplated by the Telecommunications Act. 148
In an effort to go beyond even the MFJ and break down the local bottlenecks to whatever proves to be their irreducible core, Congress imposed a
series of duties on incumbent local exchange carriers such as the BOGs.
In addition to interconnection and equal access obligations (noted
above) and resale obligations (noted below), all such LECs also now have
[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications
carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ....
An
incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled
network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommuni149
cations service.
The theory behind this provision is that competition will come more
quickly to local telephony if potential competitors can patch together telephone systems by constructing some new facilities on their own and leasing other needed network elements from the incumbent LEGs.
Widespread proceedings have been instituted at both the federal
and state levels to implement the obligation to provide unbundled network service elements and to implement other interconnection requirements under sections 251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.150 The RBOCs have some incentives to satisfy these requirements,
for such unbundling is a prerequisite for their entrance into the longdistance market' 5 1 Given the enormity of the stakes involved, it is perhaps not surprising that disputes over the pricing of unbundled network
elements-and in particular over whether the FCC or the state PUGs are
to take the lead in establishing general pricing principles-have bogged
down the implementation of the Act's local competition provisions. The
148. It should also be noted that proposals to unbundle service elements have been
advanced (but not adopted) in the railroad industry. See, e.g., Makeda F. Jahanshahi, The
U.S. Railroad Industry and Open Access, 65J. Transp. L. Logistics & Pol'y 22 (1997) (and
sources cited); see also Blood on the Tracks: Overworked Railroads Are Wreaking
Economic Havoc, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 27, 1997, at 52, 58 (describing how open
access would work in railroad industry, summarizing arguments in support and industry
reaction, and noting that "[in structure, the idea is analogous to market-driven reforms
imposed on such former monopolies as telephone companies and utilities").
149. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c) (3) (West Supp. 1998).
150. See generally Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted
sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998); Jim Chen, TELRIC in
Turmoil, Telecommunications in Transition: A Note on the Iowa UtilitiesBoard Litigation,
33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 51 (1998); Thomas B. Romer, Comment, "Negotiate in Good Faith
As to What?" An Analysis of the Good Faith Negotiation Clause of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257 (1998).
151. See 47 U.S.CA. § 271 (c) (2) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 1998).
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Supreme Court has agreed to resolve the jurisdictional dispute and pre-

sumably will rule by the end ofJune

1999.152

3. Mandatory Salefor Resale. - A third fundamental way in which the
relationships among providers have changed has been through the imposition of resale requirements in a number of industry segments. Specifically, carriers have been required to permit other entities to first act as
customers and then turn around and resell the service that they have
purchased. Such so-called "resale" obligations have proved indispensable
in some circumstances to the introduction of competition not only into
industries characterized by monopoly bottlenecks, but also into industry
markets where provision of nationwide service is essential but fixed costs
are high.
The FCC's imposition of resale requirements was critical to the development of competition in the long-distance industry. Under the original paradigm, limitations on resale were a standard tariff provision for
the Bell System.' 5 3 These resale bars were analogous to the "foreign attachment" provisions in AT&T's tariffs, for each constituted a limitation
by the carrier of how its customers could use the service to which they
54
subscribed.'
The FCC took a decisive initial step toward change in 1976 when it
struck down tariff provisions restricting resale of AT&T's private line services. 155 This decision made possible the development of a new category
of telecommunications companies: "resellers," which buy service at the
discounts available for bulk purchases and then resell portions to custom152. See AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998), granting cert. in Iowa Utils.
Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997). Oral argument in this case is expected to take
place in October 1998. One can get some sense of the extraordinary economic stakes at
issue in the implementation of the Telecommunications Act from the fact that the captions
in the Eighth Circuit proceedings, denominating the various challenges to the FCC's rule
and the parties attacking and defending it, alone run more than 30 printed pages. See 120
F.3d at 753-84.
153. For example, although it may seem a distant memory in this day of hotel "markups" for long-distance calls, time was that carriers' tariff provisions prohibiting resale
thereby precluded such charges. See, e.g., Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 317
(1945) (affirming lower court order enforcing AT&T tariff provision prohibiting resale);
see also Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C. 562 (1938) (finding that Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Company had violated section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934 by
extending, without first securing a certificate of convenience and necessity from the FCC,
public telegraph service into a new territory by means of a wire telegraph circuit leased
from another carrier); Richard McKenna, Preemption Under the Communications Act, 37
Fed. Comm. LJ. 1, 18 n.46 (1985) (contrasting Ambassador, Inc. and Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Co. with certain 1970s cases).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
155. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 286 (1976) (subsequent history omitted). Relying
on precedents under the Interstate Commerce Act, the FCC held that carriers may not
"deny service to prospective resellers merely because they lack a 'communications
requirement of [their] own for ...use' of private line service." Id. at 284 (citing ICC v.
Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 220 U.S. 235 (1911)).
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ers whose individual usage requirements would not enable them to buy in
such bulk.
Although the FCC's 1976 "private line" resale ruling did not directly
affect other common carriers such as MCI, the FCC's subsequent ruling
in 1980 extending the resale principle to encompass AT&T's basic
switched services was essential in ensuring the development of a competitive long-distance market. The FCC later explained:
This decision reduced entry barriers for the long-distance marketplace in two important ways. First, it reduced the capital requirements necessary for entry by permitting new entrants to
offer regional or even nationwide service without constructing
their own facilities. Second, it reduced the incentive of AT&T to
engage in price discrimination to meet competition, thereby giving assurance to new entrants that they
would be able to com56
pete successfully in the marketplace.'
The FCC's mandatory resale obligations-imposed at a time when the
FCC's commitment to competition was spotty' 5 7 -tumed out to be indispensable in the inadvertent creation of a competitive long-distance
market.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also relies on mandatory resale
obligations in its attempt to introduce competition to local telephony.
Section 251 requires LECs not only to permit other companies to resell
their services, but also to facilitate such resale by selling to these other
companies at wholesale prices.1 58 This use of resale goes well beyond the
FCC's resale policy deployed in the long-distance market, for there the
FCC did not impose a requirement that carriers do anything other than
eliminate restrictions on resale and, in fact, explicitly contemplated that
resale would disappear as facilities-based carriers were forced by resellers'
arbitrage to eliminate non-cost-based volume discounts.' 5 9 Resale at
wholesale rates thus constitutes, along with the equal access and unbundling obligations discussed above, a key means by which Congress intends to introduce as much competition as possible into the local exchange business.

156. Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627,
2630 (1990) (subsequent history omitted).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 79-89 and infra text accompanying notes
206-208.
158. State commissions are to determine these prices by taking the incumbent LECS'
retail rates and "excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing,
collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the incumbent [LEG]." 47 U.S.G.A.
§ 252(d) (3) (West Supp. 1998). The precise jurisdictional line between the authority of
the FCC and thai. of state commissions over pricing is currently pending before the
Supreme Court. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp., 81 F.C.C.2d 568, 573 (1980).
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C. Role of the Regulator
There has also been a fundamental reworking of the relationship
between regulated firms and government agencies. The original paradigm was based on the assumption that regulatory agencies had to exercise pervasive control over regulated industries in order to protect the
end-user-the consumer. The traditional regulatory agencies, such as
the ICC, CAB, FCC, and FPC, pursued this objective through four distin60
guishing functions.'
First, the regulatory agency would make the initial and central determination of whether companies would be permitted to enter the industry. We have already had occasion to discuss the vigor with which agencies exercised this power to exclude, modelled on the power granted the
ICC with regard to railroads. 16' For example, the FCC only grudgingly
approved MCI's entry into one small part of the long-distance market and
then spent much of the next decade trying to protect AT&T's monopoly
in that market.16 2 For decades, the ICC, which gained authority over
trucking through the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, and the CAB, which
regulated airlines, were similarly hostile to applications for entry into
those industries.' 63 These latter transportation examples disclose that
agencies often disfavored new entry not on the ground that provision of
service was a natural monopoly, but because they thought that such entry
would lead to "destructive competition."' 64 Indeed, in rejecting new entry applications, many agencies reasonably believed that they were simply
following Congress's directives. For how could new entry be "required by
the present or future public convenience and necessity"' 65 if the market
was already being served by an existing carrier?
Second, the agency and not market forces "regulated the type or
amount of a product or service offered."' 6 6 It is true that, once permitted
to enter the industry or at least some market segment, regulated firms
retained primary responsibility for proposing new services and the cir160. See supra note 12 (citing Pierce & Gellhorn).
161. See, e.g., supra notes 43, 53, 79-89, 116-118 and accompanying text. This
authority over entry was matched by a correlative authority to control exit from these
industries. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994); 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1976) (repealed).
Regulatory control over entry and exit had originated with state regulation of railroads in
the 1870s and gradually spread to other regulated industries at both the state and federal
levels. See William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 Cohim. L. Rev. 426, 433-501 (1979).
162. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Bonbright et al., supra note 12, at 38-40; 2 Alfred E. Kahn, The
Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions 5-6 (1971).
165. 49 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976) (repealed) (emphasis added) (pre-1980 standard
governing ICC entry determinations for trucking industry); see also, e.g., 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371 (d) (1) (1976) (repealed) (setting standard for CAB determinations for airline entry
as whether proposed entry "is required by the public convenience and necessity").
166. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 1.
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cumstances under which these would be offered-doing so by means of
the tariff filings that are discussed above. 167 The regulator then retained
the authority to enforce the firm's obligation to provide "reasonable, adequate and safe service.' 68 Agencies at least occasionally used this authority to control the nature of services offered. For example, it was on this
169
basis that the FCC attempted to confine MCI to private-line services.
Illustrations of agency attempts to 70control service offerings may be found
in other regulatory areas as well.'
Third, under the original paradigm, the regulator carefully reviewed
and approved rates that regulated companies could charge.' 7 ' The central mechanism for ensuring this control was again the carrier's tariff.
This is not to suggest that each rate was actually reviewed by the regulator. However, in some industries such as the electricity industry at the
state level and the telecommunications industry, regulators typically gave
close scrutiny to major proposed rate changes. The regulator further
could set maximum rates if, on the basis of its review, it concluded that
the carrier had set rates that were unreasonably high (or minimum rates
if too low). The rate structure could also be reviewed to police alleged
discrimination.
Fourth, regulators determined the level of profits that utilities and
carriers would earn. This was usually done in cost-of-service ratemaking
proceedings in which regulators attempted to determine a utility's costs
and the amount of its invested capital (multiplied by a reasonable rate of
retum).172 These were frequently massive proceedings in which regula167. See generally AT&T v. FCC, 487 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1973); 1 Priest, supra note 20,
at 342-44 (1969).
168. 1 Priest, supra note 20, at 276.
169. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25, 39 (1976) (subsequent history
omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 85-88 (discussing FCC's effort and
judicial reaction).
170. See, e.g.. Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984):
Turning the Tide, 14 Transp. LJ. 101, 123 (1985) (describing Southern Railway's lengthy
battle in 1960s to obtain ICC approval of new type of railroad car); Aaron J. Gellman,
Surface Freight Transportation, in Technological Change in Regulated Industries 174-78
(William M. Capron ed., 1971) (discussing delays in railroad innovation caused by
regulatory review). Another frequently cited example of an agency's delaying the rollout
of a new service is the FCC's treatment of cellular telephone service. But for the FCC, it
has been asserted, "[n ] ationwide cellular service could have been in place at least a decade
earlier [than 1983]." Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and
Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm 68-69 (1997); cf.John W. Berresford, The Impact of
Law and Regulation on Technology: The Case History of Cellular Radio, 44 Bus. Law. 721,
731-35, 740 (1989) (acknowledging this delay and appearing to attribute it to the FCC,
though defending it).
171. See generally Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory
and Practice 131-45 (3d ed. 1993) (listing state and federal regulatory commissions and
summarizing their powers).
172. See Bonbright et al., supra note 12, at 108-23 (cost of service), 210-32 (rate
base), 302-39 (rate of return); 1 Kahn, supra note 164, at 25-54; 1 Priest, supra note 20, at
45-226.
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tors would examine in detail, among other things, the historical costs incurred by a regulated company and precisely how much money the company expected to have to spend in various areas (e.g., salaries, advertising,
raw materials such as fuel). While cost-of-service ratemaking was not the
only regulatory approach for fixing regulated industries' profits, it was
the dominant mode in the original paradigm and was applied even to
173
such non-natural-monopoly businesses as airlines and trucks.
Finally, even apart from these direct roles in supervising which companies could sell which products or services and at which prices, regulatory agencies were also involved extensively in passing upon the legality
and wisdom of many proposed corporate transactions. For example,
whereas in the ordinary business world the question of whether and
under what terms and conditions to issue securities is left to the discretion of individual companies, state regulators (as well as the Securities
and Exchange Commission) have typically been required to approve a
regulated company's decision to issue securities. 174 Another example of
corporate oversight can be found in the requirement that regulated industries receive agency approval before entering into a merger. 17 5
Under the new paradigm, the regulator plays a far more limited role.
Instead of comprehensively overseeing an industry in order to protect the
end-user, its principal function is to maximize competition among rival
providers, in the expectation that competition will provide all the protection necessary for end-users. Specifically, the regulator is expected to intervene only when there is some reason to conclude that a regime of
market-based transactions will not suffice to advance competition, as
where one firm in the industry owns a bottleneck facility that has natural
monopoly characteristics. In effect, the agency becomes a limited-jurisdiction enforcer of antitrust principles, applying a version of the "essential facilities" doctrine in a single industry. 17 6 Furthermore, where such
intervention occurs, the role of the regulator is more likely to consist of
setting the background rules that help define an industry's structure than
superintending the competitive behavior of rival providers or the details
of transactions within that industry. Although this transformation has
been greatest in the transportation industries-where the federal regulatory agencies have been eliminated-it also has been extensive in both
the telecommunications and energy industries as well.
If one conceives of the regulator under the original paradigm as a
sort of ice cap, covering all aspects of the regulated industry, then the
173. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 37-59 (detailing cost-of-service ratemaking); id. at
210-12 (application to airlines); id. at 227-34 (trucking).
174. See generally 2 Priest, supra note 20, at 467-87 (and authorities cited) (chapter
discussing regulatory control over securities).
175. See, e.g., id. at 731-50 (and authorities cited) (chapter concerning railroad
mergers); id. at 676-80 (airline mergers).
176. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (invoking
'essential facilities" doctrine under the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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objective under the new paradigm is to melt away the sphere of regulatory oversight to the smallest industry segment possible-the so-called
bottleneck monopoly. Telecommunications provides an illustration of
this transformation in the regulator's role. Under the original paradigm,
as we have described, one carrier provided bundled end-to-end service
pursuant to its filed tariffs. This service included products and services
that are now-and could have been then-regarded as separate from one
another. AT&T thus provided (through its Bell System) customer premises equipment (which itself was designed and manufactured by the Bell
System's Western Electric subsidiary), inside wire, access to the local loop,
carriage over the local switched network, and, finally, long-distance or
"intercity" service. The regulators oversaw all of these services (with a
jurisdictional divide between the FCC and the state PUCs based on an
interstate-intrastate distinction),1 77 At the same time, AT&T was excluded from such non-common-carriage activities as computers and infor178
mation services.
The regulatory ice cap covering all this activity has largely melted
away under the new paradigm. The FCC has ruled that provision of customer premises equipment is not common carriage and thus is not subject to Title II of the Communications Act, including the tariffing requirements. 179 Customer premises equipment is now provided competitively.
At the other end of the spectrum, long-distance service is also subject to
competition, mad the FCC recently concluded that no long-distance carrier-not even AT&T-possesses market dominance in the interstate domestic market. 80
That is not the extent of the transformation. In addition, the FCC
no longer regulates rates on a traditional cost-of-service basis. As a general matter, there is no rate regulation for long-distance service,' 8 ' and
even for the still-monopoly access services provided by the BOCs and
'1 8 2
other LECs, the FCC applies a modified system based on "price caps.
The basic notion here is to set a ceiling on rates and allow firms to retain
any additional profits that they can earn by cutting costs, thereby creating
177. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986).
178. This restriction existed by virtue of a 1956 consent decree between the United
States and AT&T. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246
(D.N.J. 1956). The reason that the 1982 consent decree is known as the "Modification of
Final Judgment," or "MFJ," is that it was technically a modification of the 1956 decree. See
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 141 n.31, 226 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
179. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (and authority cited).
180. See Motion of AT&T Corp. to Be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 11
FCC Rcd. 3271, 3356 (1995) (subsequent history omitted).
181. See id. at. 3281; Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 31-33 (1980).
182. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873,
2877 (1989) (subsequent history omitted).
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an incentive to act efficiently.' 8 3 Further, telephone companies, including the LEGs, are now free to offer non-common-carriage services,
whether they are related to their traditional offerings (as are information
services, for example) or are entirely distinct (as with real-estate services,
for example). While separate-subsidiary and accounting regulations generally apply, such activities are not otherwise overseen or superintended
by the regulator.
In short, in telecommunications, we now confront a new regulatory
paradigm that little resembles the old. Only the local loop-the thus-far
irreducible-bottleneck facility-is still fully regulated. Once the
Telecommunications Act is fully implemented, the rest will be subject to
competition. This transformation captures the ideal of the new paradigm-at least if one adds the hope (of most) and expectation (of some)
that technological innovation will eliminate the last bottleneck altogether
84
and with it all the regulation that characterized the original paradigm.'
Although the details vary, the story is largely the same throughout
regulated industries. In the natural gas industry, for example, rate regulation has melted down to the rates charged by interstate pipelines (still
considered to be a natural monopoly) and by local distribution companies. But there is a foreseeable goal of doing away with the former as
soon as pipeline density increases and maybe eventually doing away with
the latter, at least for industrial customers. And the transformation could
scarcely be greater than in the transportation industries, for the rise of
the notion that regulators should superintend only natural monopoly industry segments has led to the outright demise of the two agencies (the
ICC and CAB) that, between them, regulated the various transportation
industries.
D. Central Tenets of the New Paradigm
We are now in a position to summarize the central tenets of the new
paradigm in regulated industries law. The new paradigm seeks to subject
to ordinary contractual relations all common carrier and public utility
services that can be provided by multiple competing providers. In industries and industry segments with few natural monopoly features, this
means complete detariffing, elimination of all entry restrictions, and outright abolition of the control of an administrative agency (airlines, trucking, customer premises equipment). In industries and segments where
183. See generally Jordan Jay Hillman & Ronald R. Braeutigam, Price Level
Regulation for Diversified Public Utilities (1989) (setting forth rationale for price cap

regulation).
184. For an overview of the technological developments, one or more of which may
lead to the overcoming of the local loop bottleneck, see generally Wireless Technologies:
Special Report, Scientific American, Apr. 1998, at 69. In eliminating regulation, some
would not even wait for elimination of the bottleneck. See Huber, supra note 170, at 151,
153; see also infra text accompanying notes 350-357, 380-381 (discussing the likelihood of
and problems with such an approach).
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services have been bundled together through vertical and horizontal integration, this means that segments that can be provided competitively
must be unbundled and opened to competition (long-distance
telephony, natural gas production, electricity generation). Once competition is introduced, cross-subsidies will disappear and universal service
obligations either will be promoted through the imposition of competitively neutral taxes (telephony, perhaps electricity) or will be ignored
(railroads, airlines).
Given the near-complete reliance on market transactions in industries and industry segments that can be made competitive, the focus of
the agencies necessarily turns to those market segments that have natural
monopoly characteristics. Here, the great concern is that incumbent
providers that control bottleneck facilities will use their monopoly power
to discriminate against competitors in the service segments that have
been opened to competition. To prevent this from happening, a new set
of regulatory obligations-including the duty to interconnect, to lease
unbundled network elements, and to sell services for resale-is imposed
on the owners of such bottleneck facilities and becomes the focal point of
regulatory attention. In effect, the owners of natural monopoly facilities
assume new common carrier duties toward their competitors, and these
duties are regarded as more important than those they owe to their traditional customers. The role of the agency correspondingly shifts from protecting the end-user to implementing a version of the essential facilities
doctrine originally developed under the antitrust laws.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF CHANGE

What has caused this great transformation of regulated industries law
over the last quarter-century? Because the changes during this time period have been so similar throughout these different industries, we first
explore the possibility that the changes have had a common institutional
source. Specifically, this Part examines the role that various institutional
actors with the power to compel change-the regulatory agencies, the
courts, and Congress-have played in the transformation. 185 Examining
the role of different institutions provides us with important clues about
the causes of the transformation. If we found that Congress or the agencies have played the dominant role, we would likely look to political
forces as explanations for the change. Conversely, if the courts were the
architects of change, we might focus on the importance of legal doctrine.
But if it turns out that no clear pattern of institutional leadership can be
discerned, then this suggests that we must look to more deep-seated economic and social forces. Besides being a useful preliminary to under185. We do noi. separately discuss the Department of Justice because its authority to
seek enforcement of the antitrust laws, though a significant factor in aspects of the great
transformation in telecommunications, depends on judicial action. We therefore discuss
the Department's role in considering the undertakings of the courts. See infra text
accompanying notes 244-246; see also supra text accompanying notes 123-129.
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standing the causes of the great transformation, examining the part
18 6
played by different institutions gives us another "view of the cathedral,"
which is helpful in coming to a fuller understanding of a highly complex
phenomenon.
A. The Agencies
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became fashionable to regard
administrative agencies as being "captured" by the industries they were
charged with regulating.1 8 7 One would predict, on the basis of this theory, that administrative agencies would play only a negative role in the
great transformation.' 8 8 After all, the agency's authority to set rates and
determine the level of firms' profits, not to mention its authority to make
entry and exit decisions, was the source of its power. And the perpetuation of this power was what made agency personnel attractive candidates
for post-government employment in the private sector and for other favors from the regulated industry. Insofar as deregulation would strip the
agency of much of its power, capture theory would suggest that agencies
would resist the transformation with the utmost tenacity.
It may come as a surprise, therefore, to learn that federal regulatory
agencies often played a significant affirmative role in promoting the
cause of regulatory change. The CAB provides perhaps the most striking
case in point. For most of its existence, the CAB was the archetype of the
captured agency: It allowed air carriers to engage in collective price-fixing, effectively prevented any new competitive trunk carriers from emerging, and carefully limited the number of carriers allowed to serve any
given route so as to preserve the "adequacy" of the incumbent carriers'
revenues.18 9 Then, starting in the early 1970s, the CAB began to receive
some nudges from other important political actors. In 1970, the D.C.
Circuit pointedly accused the CAB of being a captured agency, and ordered it to open its rate-fixing proceedings to include public representatives.' 90 This was followed by a decision in 1975 that chastised the agency
for putting insufficient weight on the value of competition in deciding
whether to award additional route authority. 19 1 That same year, Senator
186. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1089-90 n.2 (1972)
(emphasizing the value of developing different ways of looking at complex legal
phenomena-just as Monet developed different ways of depicting the Cathedral at
Rouen).
187. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983,
72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1059-67 (1997) (discussing influence of capture theory on the
legal system during these years).
188. For a brief exposition of the interest group theory of politics and references to
leading authorities, see infra notes 321-322 and accompanying text.
189. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 197-221; Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics
Board, in The Politics of Regulation 75 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
190. See Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 900-02 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
191. See Continental Airlines v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Edward M. Kennedy's subcommittee held hearings on the economic effects of the CAB's regulatory practices.1 92 Carefully orchestrated by
Stephen Breyer, then on leave from Harvard Law School, these hearings
seemed to suggest that deregulation would yield lower prices for consumers without any sacrifice in safety or service
quality-a conclusion hotly
93
disputed by the agency and the airlines.'
Shortly thereafter, the agency's policies began to shift. President
Ford's chairman, John Robson, explained later that he had few views on
airline regulatory policy before he took office. But once there, he found
that deregulation was a topic that "had gained some momentum and attracted some attention."' 94 This convinced him to steer the agency in a
new direction: "It seemed to me that the CAB provided a unique opportunity to do something-to be at a place at a time when something was
happening. It was clear there was going to be action on the CAB frontier
"195

After the election of President Carter, Robson was replaced by Alfred
E. Kahn in 1977. Kahn was a prominent regulatory economist who had
achieved a considerable reputation as a reformer while head of the New
York Public Seivice Commission.' 9 6 His nomination by President Carter
was a clear signal to proceed full speed ahead with deregulation. Kahn
responded with vigor, reorganizing the agency and installing a staff of
"bomb throwers.'

97

Taking advantage of the broad and discretionary

language of the Federal Aviation Act, Kahn's CAB encouraged widespread fare discounting and greatly liberalized entry.' 98 He then led the
successful effort to lobby Congress to adopt the landmark Airline
200
Deregulation Act of 1978,199 which locked the new policies in place.
Clearly, it would be going too far to suggest that the CAB was an
instigator of regulatory change. The agency did not begin to change its
ways until the political winds began to shift strongly in the direction of
reform. On the other hand, the agency was anything but an impediment
192. See Over;ight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: U.S. Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure, 94th Cong.
(1975).
193. See Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 40, 43-44; Breyer, supra note 10, at
317-40.
194. Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 69 (interview with John Robson).
195. Id.
196. See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation 243-59 (1984).
197. See id. at 274-75.
198. See id. at 275-80.
199. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49

U.S.C.).
200. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport, and Aviation
Industries, 21 Transp. L.J. 129, 146-47 (1992). For a more extensive description of how
"[t]he CAB performance during the chairmanship of Alfred Kahn from 1977 to 1978
violated both the capture and survival propositions about the behavior of regulators," see
Anthony E. Brown, The Politics of Airline Deregulation 156-57, 166-67 (1987) (quotation
at 166).
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to change. Once it decided to cast its lot with the cause of deregulation,
it moved with alacrity and became the principal force pushing for legislation that would make the new deregulatory policy permanent. Most remarkably, this legislation scheduled the agency itself for execution on
December 31, 1984.201
With respect to telecommunications, the FCC also failed to conform
to the stereotype of the captive agency, although its performance was decidedly more mixed than that of the CAB. Among its reform initiatives,
the FCC ordered the cancellation of the Bell System's and other carriers'
tariff provisions prohibiting use of non-company customer premises
equipment (termed "foreign attachments"). 202 It approved (by a 4-3
vote) MCI's application to provide private-line telecommunications service. 20 3 It later ordered the Bell System to permit MCI and other special20 4
ized common carriers to establish interconnections with the BOCs.
And the agency undertook lengthy (and in some instances still20ongoing)
5
efforts to detariff competitive services beginning in the 1980s.
On the other hand, the FCC spent substantial time and energy resisting increased competition in the telecommunications industry. The
FCC reluctantly commenced the unbundling process for customer premises equipment, acting only when required to by a court case referred to it
under the primary jurisdiction doctrine some 12 years after the
Hush-a-Phonecase.2 0 6 And notwithstanding its initial authorization of private microwave carriage, the FCC spent years attempting to restrict MCI
to that limited service and ordered it to cancel its Execunet tariffs after
MCI had revised the tariffs in order to offer service in competition with
AT&T's basic service. It was only when the courts intervened that MCI
found a refuge from the FCC. 20 7 In short, for much of the time of the
great transformation, the FCC was an obstacle that had to be overcome in
208
the movement to the new paradigm.
FERC came to the cause of reform later than either the CAB or the
FCC. But once it became convinced of the merits of opening significant
segments of the energy markets to competition, it became probably the
most consistent and important administrative agency in promoting the
transition to the new paradigm. This was particularly true in the natural
gas industry, where FERC's imposition of extensive unbundling and
open-access requirements was a substantial cause of the transformation of
the industry in the 1980s and early 1990s. "'[I]n a relatively short period
201. See Dempsey, supra note 200, at 148, 151.
202. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (and authorities cited).
203. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89, 121-122.
205. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (and authority cited).
207. See supra notes 88-89 and infra notes 239-243 and accompanying text.
208. For a particularly vehement argument that the FCC historically has held back
competition and protected monopoly, see Huber, supra note 170, passim.
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of time,"' as has been suggested elsewhere, FERC "'injected an unprecedented amount of competition into the regulatory process, and, perhaps
more enduring, began to persuade the other players-executives and
state regulators-to look to markets rather than men for the solution to
some of the problems that have long bedeviled the gas... industry."' 20 :9
But even here, it would be inaccurate to imply that FERC was altogether a
free agent in its transformative decisions. This is evidenced by its own
characterization in Order No. 436 that the combination of congressional
enactments and judicial interpretations of those enactments meant that
"we have no choice under the [Natural Gas Act]" but to proceed.2 10
The ICC was probably the least proactive of the agencies in generating proposals for regulatory reform. In the decade of the 1970s, the ICC
commissioners were generally more hostile to reform than were the leaders of the CAB, the other independent agency with jurisdiction over
transportation. 21 ' Nevertheless, President Carter eventually was able to
install a commission that began to dismantle regulatory barriers. 2 12 At
that point, the congressional supporters of continued regulation acquiesced in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which they regarded as a kind of
backfire designed to keep the reform effort from getting out of hand. 2 13
All in all, however, the agencies have played a significant affirmative
role in the great transformation. There can be little doubt that the agencies have been in the forefront of the effort to promote the cause of regulatory competition. 21 4 They have lent their expertise and their credibility
to the cause. They have acted as lobbyists for reform before Congress,
and as its defenders before the courts. Their performance is quite inconsistent with what the capture theory would have predicted. 21 5
Yet even if several of the agencies acted in ways that were highly supportive of the transformation, it would be impossible to credit the agen209. Richardf. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects ofJudicial Review of Agency Rules:
How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 Admin. L.
Rev. 7, 15 (1991) (quoting CharlesJ. Cichetti et al., "Hesse Moved Debate ... to Center
Stage," (Letter to the Editor) Nat. Gas Week, Dec. 11, 1989).
210. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, FERC
Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 30,665, at 31,490 (1985) (subsequent history omitted).
211. See Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 73.
212. See Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Regulation, Organizations, and Politics: Motor
Freight Policy at the Interstate Commerce Commission 223-31 (1994).
213. See Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 171-74; Dorothy Robyn, Braking the
Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of Policy Reform 29-30, 52-56
(1987); Rothenberg, supra note 212, at 231-41.
214. One observer has gone so far as to "conclude[ ] in a review of the deregulation
movement 'that major administrative reform is a necessary prerequisite to statutory
reform.'" Brown, supra note 200, at 155 (quoting Christopher C. DeMuth, A Strong
Beginning on Reform, Regulation, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 15, 18).
215. Cf. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 167 (1998) (arguing that it is "clear" that "[s)trong claims
about the inevitability of regulatory failure due to regulated parties' privileged access to
regulatory decisionmakers are untenable").
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cies with overall responsibility for these changes. It is reasonably clear
that they would not have deliberately initiated the process of deregulation if left to their own devices. It is also reasonably clear that the
processes of deregulation started by the agencies would have stalled or
would have been reversed by concerted opposition of industry incumbents if Congress had not intervened to ratify the agencies' action or spur
them onward. Further, no one agency has had authority over more than
a portion of the regulated industries landscape. No doubt there was
some emulation: The favorable publicity that Kahn garnered for his efforts at the CAB probably attracted the envy of the chairmen of other
regulatory agencies. But if there was a pattern of influence, it was
through the transmission of ideas, not the exercise of governmental
power. It seems safe to say that the great transformation would not have
occurred-at least not with the speed at which it did-without the surprising support of the agencies. But they were not the architects of the
change, since their authority was too limited and too fragmented to allow
them to act in such a capacity.
B. The Courts
One looking for an institutional author of the transformation will
have to look elsewhere-perhaps to the courts. Because the courts act in
a review capacity, their involvement in regulatory reform differs from that
of other branches of government. Although lacking the same policymaking authority as Congress and regulatory commissions, the courts affect
the pace, extent, or manner of regulatory change each time they decide a
case involving legislative or administrative regulatory policies-whether
they ratify, overturn, or require the government to reconsider a particular
policy. A consistent pattern of decisions by the courts could in theory
have a profound influence in accelerating the process of reform, or
spreading it from one industry to the next.
When we examine the judicial performance in greater detail, however, we find that the courts have been anything but consistent in cases
implicating regulatory reform. Simplifying greatly, we identify two types
of judicial decisions. On some occasions, the courts have acted as catalysts for change. They have had this effect both by disapproving certain
regulation on constitutional grounds and by overturning on narrower,
statutory grounds agencies' attempts to close off certain markets to competition. In other instances, however, the courts have served as a brake
on affirmative legislative and, in particular, agency attempts to transform
regulation of industry. The courts have played this latter role in a
number of ways, primarily by protecting the reliance or other interests of
incumbent firms and by enforcing longstanding interpretations of statutes even where agencies had attempted to maneuver around them to
realize their vision of regulatory change. We group the courts' decisions
into the two categories of catalyst and brake, and discuss them respectively, but there is not always a crisp division between the categories.

1370

COLUMBIA LAW REVEW

[Vol. 98:1323

1. The Courts as Catalyst. - There can be no question that in some
industries the courts have pried open doors to competition that legislators or regulators preferred to keep shut. Though proceeding in the
name of generally familiar-sounding doctrines, this judicial intervention
has occurred in surprising and unexpected ways.
This has been especially true in the arena of telecommunications litigation, where the Constitution has been used to overcome some barriers
to competition. In so ruling, the courts have not relied on the constitutional doctrines that one might have expected to encounter in the past.
For example, neither the Commerce Clause, nor the Contracts Clause,
nor substantive due process has played an appreciable role in knocking
down regulatory barriers. Rather, the First Amendment has become the
preferred constitutional assault vehicle for telecommunications companies challenging government regulation.
The use of the First Amendment as an instrument of deregulation is
part of one of the most dramatic changes in constitutional law in the last
quarter-century: the birth and coming of age of the commercial speech
doctrine. As has been recounted elsewhere, 21 6 Supreme Court precedent
prior to 1975 imposed no First Amendment limits on regulation of
"purely commercial advertising." 217 The Court then repudiated this approach, 218 and. shortly thereafter developed a four-part test to assess
219
whether commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.
Most recently, the Court came within one vote of holding that "complete
bans on truthful, nonmisleading" commercial speech should be given no
more deference than such restrictions of non-commercial speech. 220 Not
since the demise of the negative implication of Munn v. Illinois22 ' and of
2 22
the economic substantive due process typified by Lochner v. New York
216. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of
Commercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 747 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44
U. Chi. L. Rev. 205, 207-13 (1976).
217. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
218. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-21 (1975); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-70 (1976).
219. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
220. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-04 (1996) (principal
opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.); see id. at 518-28 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
221. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). Munn had held that an Illinois law regulating the prices that
warehouses could charge for the storage of grain was constitutional because these
businesses were "affected with a public interest." 94 U.S. at 126, 130. The Court
subsequently relied on this rationale to strike down price regulation of some other
businesses on the grounds that they were not similarly affected. See, e.g., Pierce &
Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 81-82 (collecting cases). Eventually, in Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court discredited this rationale for reviewing regulation of
business, stating that "there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a
public interest" and upholding price regulation of the dairy industry. 291 U.S. at 536.
222. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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has American business had such success in challenging the constitutional2 23
ity of government regulations.
Use of the First Amendment as a wedge to insert firms into markets
from which the government had sought to exclude them is more recent
still. In some instances, firms have used the First Amendment merely as a
secondary argument-an example being the RBOCs' claim after divestiture that their exclusion from information-services businesses by virtue of
the MFJ violated their First Amendment rights. 224 At other times, however, the First Amendment has served as the weapon of first resort and
has proven quite effective. Most notably, beginning in 1993, several of
the RBOCs challenged, on freedom-of-speech grounds, a provision of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 that essentially prohibited local telephone companies from owning cable television franchises in the
areas in which they provided local telephone service. 225 The purpose of
this provision, like the MFJ's exclusion of the RBOCs from long distance,
was to prevent the LECs from cross-subsidizing cable services with revenues from their franchised monopoly telephone systems. The RBOCs
persuaded several courts of appeals that the restriction on their ability to
provide cable in their telephone service areas violated their First
Amendment right of free speech. Before the Supreme Court could resolve the issue, Congress repealed the statute in the Telecommunications
Act.2 2 6

One observer has termed the RBOCs' success in these cable/telephone-company cross-ownership cases as "mark[ing] a startling change in
223. Quite unlike Lochner, the Supreme Court's willingness to strike down economic

regulation under the First Amendment has been generally celebrated by commentators.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-15, at 890-904 (2d ed.
1988); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev.
627, 651-53 (1990); see also Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1971)
(pre-Bigelow article arguing for First Amendment protection of commercial speech). But
see Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 30-31 (1979) (criticizing Court's
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech and terming it a revival of
Lochner in another guise).
224. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 585-86 (D.D.C. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The RBOCs
obtained entry to this business on other grounds. See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
774 F. Supp. 11, 12 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991).
225. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1) (1994).
226. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 190-204 (4th
Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); see
also Huber, supra note 170, at 83, 228 (citing other cases). The Supreme Court accepted
the United States' request to review the Fourth Circuit's decision in Chesapeake & Potomac,
and the case was briefed and argued before Congress's action halted the proceedings.
Huber speculates "from the oral argument" in Chesapeake & Potomac that "the phone
companies were set to win the votes of all nine Justices." Huber, supra note 170, at 83.
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the legal landscape." 22 7 This is because the RBOCs and other telephone
companies are now able to challenge, on First Amendment grounds, restrictions on any service that combines carriage and content. These
claims are not assured of success, as is evident from the Supreme Court's
recent decision that cable television companies can be required to dedicate some of their channels to carrying local broadcast stations. 228 But
the narrowness of the Court's majority in that case, 2 29 the extraordinary
scrutiny to which this so-called "must carry" rule imposed by Congress was
subjected,2 30 and the current Court's general receptiveness to First
Amendment claims23 1 all suggest that the First Amendment will continue
to be a powerful weapon for telephone companies attacking certain
forms of regulation or fending them off in the first instance. 23 2
In addition, the telecommunications industry has seen the courts intrude on congressional regulation on a constitutional ground even more
remarkable than the First Amendment: viz., the Bill of Attainder Clause.
On December 31, 1997, one of the RBOCs persuaded a federal judge in
Wichita Falls, Texas, that the provisions of the Telecommunications Act
that restrict the RBOCs from offering long-distance service in areas where
they control the local exchange monopolies are unconstitutional because
they do not apply to companies other than the RBOCs (i.e., to the socalled "independents" such as GTE).233 It did not matter that the RBOCs
had lobbied heavily for congressional enactment of the 1996 Act,2 34 that
227.
228.
229.
litigation

Huber, supra note 170, at 83.
See Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1184 (1997).
The Court's decisions in both this and a previous appeal in the "must carry"
were by 5-4 votes, and the majorities were also fragmented among themselves.

See id. at 1183 (noting that four separate opinions were filed); Turner Broad. System, Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1994) (five separate opinions).
230. The government was required to introduce "substantial evidence" demonstrating
"that the must-can-y provisions further important governmental interests... and [that] the
provisions do nor burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests." Turner. 117 S. Ct. at 1184. This entailed more than "18 months of factual
development.., yielding a record of tens of thousands of pages of evidence, comprised of
materials acquired during Congress' three years of preenactment hearings, as well as...
expert submissions, sworn declarations and testimony, and industry documents...." Id. at
1185 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
231. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (striking down provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996); O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S.
712 (1996) (invalidating independent contractor's termination for political reasons);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (same); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down state law limiting price advertising of
alcoholic beverages).
232. See Lance Liebman, Foreword: The New Estates, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 819, 828-32
(1997); Fred H. Cate, Telephone Companies, The First Amendment, and Technological
Convergence, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 1035 (1996). For an intelligent overview of the First
Amendment in the context of electronic communications, see Richard Klingler, The New
Information Indtu.try: Regulatory Challenges and the First Amendment (1996).
233. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1002-07 (N.D. Tex.
1997).
234. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.

1998]

TRANSFORMATION OF REGULATED INDUSTRES

1373

the long-distance restriction in the Act was more favorable to the RBOCs
than the MFJ proscription that it replaced, 23 5 or that the Act continued
an historical injunction to which the RBOCs' corporate predecessor (i.e.,
the old AT&T, on behalf of the vertically integrated Bell System) but not
other companies had agreed. 23 6 This ruling was recently reversed on appeal by a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit. 237 Had the decision stood,
one of the RBOCs (the former Southwestern Bell) would have been able
quickly to provide local and long-distance service bundled togetherwhich would have been the first time since the breakup of the Bell System
that customers in the BOGs' service areas (which contain the vast bulk of
the nation's telecommunications subscribers) could receive such bundled
23 8
service from one company.
In all events, one should expect constitutional challenges to regulation to be made with increasing frequency. The attractiveness of these
arguments, as reflected in the cases of the past two decades, is not difficult to understand. Courts confront constitutional challenges in many
contexts and are comfortable with them, even when the particular chal235. For example, Congress permitted the RBOCs immediately to provide longdistance services on calls originating outside of the regions where they control the local
telephone monopolies and on cellular telephone calls. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (2),
(b) (3), (g) (3) (West Supp. 1998). The MFJ had banned RBOC provision of both
"extraregional" and cellular long-distance services. See United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
890 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1995) (loosening, but only minimally, the MFJ's ban on some of
these services), vacated as moot, No. 95-5137, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7285 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
16, 1996).
236. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1087-88 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(rejecting RBOC claim that MFJ could not bind it). The only other telephone company
that combined substantial local operations and long-distance service was also sued by the
United States on antitrust grounds, but the consent decree settling that case did not
restrict the company from such vertical integration, see United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 730, 733-37 (D.D.C. 1984) (explaining reasons for this difference from the MFJ),
and the 1996 Telecommunications Act's provisions concerning long-distance services
accordingly apply only to the RBOCs.
237. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-10140 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 1998); see also
Chen, supra note 150, at 59 (terming the district court's ruling a "rogue decision" and
correctly predicting that it would be overturned on appeal).
238. Another RBOC believes that its entry into basic long-distance service is
imminent, see Seth Schiesel, Bell Atlantic Wins Backing to Add Service, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7,
1998, at BI (reporting that based on conditional approval from the Department ofJustice
and the New York Public Service Commission, Bell Atlantic hopes to persuade the FCC to
permit it to offer long-distance service byJanuary 1, 1999), although previous such RBOC
efforts under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 have been unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, 12 FCC Rcd.
20543 (1997). The RBOCs are also expected to argue that AT&T's recent proposal to gain
access to end-users via a merger with Telecommunications Inc. (TCI), one of the nation's
largest cable companies, means that the RBOCs should no longer be excluded from longdistance service. See Peter Elstrom et al., At Last, Telecom Unbound: AT&T-TCI Could
Deliver on the Promise of Melding Telephones, TVs, and Computers, Bus. Wk., July 6,
1998, at 24; Catherine Yang, This Could Be the Breakthrough Merger, Bus. Wk., July 6,
1998, at 29.
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lenge arises in a complex, highly regulated context where they would
generally defer to more expert bodies. As a related matter, constitutional
arguments are frequently easier for a challenger to articulate and for a
court to understand than some other potential arguments. These other
arguments, moreover, are frequently unappealing, because, even if successful, they do not necessarily strike a death blow against regulation as
some constitutional arguments do. And perhaps most importantly in an
evaluation of the incidence of constitutional arguments in regulated industries, the amount of money at stake is frequently so massive that it
would be economically unreasonable not to raise the argument. There is
no better example of this last point than the RBOCs' bill-of-attainder
challenge to their exclusion from part of the long-distance business.
The telecommunications industry has also provided the most significant instances where statutory (as opposed to constitutional) review has
acted as a catalyst in moving an industry away from the single-service provider model and toward the new paradigm described above. This occurred in a series of D.C. Circuit decisions in the 1970s involving the
long-distance industry. As we described previously, the FCC had attempted to limit MCI and other specialized common carriers to providing specialized. private line services, which fell far short of full-fledged
competition with AT&T's basic switched services. 23 9 In reversing this decision, the court of appeals did not question the FCC's authority to conclude that the "public interest" required that AT&T face no competition
for basic switched services. Indeed, the court acknowledged that "there
may be very good reasons for according AT&T dejure freedom from competition in certain fields." 240 But the reasons for favoring a single service
provider could not include "simply that AT&T got there first." 24' In all
events, according to the court, the FCC would be required to conclude
affirmatively--and explain its reasoning for any such conclusion-that
competition with AT&T's basic services was not in the public interest.
Although nominally requiring only a fuller explanation from the
FCC, this ruling, along with follow-on decisions by the same court, 242 has
been aptly termed "the beginning of the end":
Execunet would be as devastating to AT&T as the iceberg was to
the Titanic. On remand the Commission instituted a rulemaking proceeding to consider the scope of competition in AT&T's
switched service markets, concluding in 1980 that there should

239. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
240. Execunet I, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Execunet I, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (requiring AT&T through its
BOG subsidiaries to provide local interconnections for MCI). Execunet II has been
characterized as a "rambling, poorly reasoned... decision" that, "[t]hough dubious as a
matter of law,... had profound implications." Kellogg et al., supra note 69, § 12.5.2, at
608-09.
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be open
competition and unlimited resale of switched
243
services.
Thus, through the routine device of granting a petition for review of an
FCC decision rejecting a tariff, the D.C. Circuit helped to ensure the
transformation of the telecommunications industry. Of course, it is impossible to conclude definitively that the turn to the competitive model in
telecommunications would not have occurred-or would have occurred
substantially differenty-in the absence of such decisions. It seems fairly
certain, though, that the D.C. Circuit's decisions at a minimum ensured
and expedited the change.
Finally, another way in which courts have influenced the pace, scope,
or form of the transformation of regulated industries has been through
their jurisdiction over antitrust actions-both those brought by the government and those brought by private parties claiming damages. Again,
the most significant examples come from telecommunications and involve the Bell System. We have already discussed the most significant of
these: the government's lawsuit, commenced in 1974, that resulted in the
consent decree, known as the MFJ, which broke up the Bell System by
requiring that AT&T divest itself of its local exchange companies. While
there is no question that the "Prime Mover" of the lawsuit was the United
States Department ofJustice, 24Judge Harold H. Greene's presiding over
the case was of extraordinary importance. First, Judge Greene ensured
that the case moved through a massive discovery process to trial. 245 Sec-

ond, Judge Greene's rulings on important mid-course matters-such as
whether state and federal regulations gave AT&T certain immunity and
how the United States could establish liability-made clear to AT&T
which way he was likely to rule at the end of the day, and impelled it, after
eleven on-and-off months of trial, to capitulate while it could still exercise
246
some modicum of influence over the form of the decree.
243. Robinson, supra note 87, at 524.
244. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
245. This alone was no small accomplishment. See Thomas D. Morgan, Economic
Regulation of Business 826 (1976) (prospect that government's then-pending antitrust
claim against Bell System "is ever litigated" would be "a bold assumption, given the scope of
discovery alone which would be involved"). For a description of how Judge Greene guided
the case to trial, see Temin, supra note 9, at 202-03, 210.
246. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D.D.C. 1978)
(holding that the FCC's regulation of AT&T did not render company immune to antitrust
action); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1379 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that
government could establish antitrust violation under less stringent test of liability than that
urged by AT&T); see also Temin, supra note 9, at 202-03, 251-54, 261-62 (describing
Judge Greene's rulings and apparent likely future actions); Robert E. Taylor, Picking
Targets: Antitrust Enforcement Will Be More Selective, Two Big Cases Indicate, Wall St.J.,
Jan. 11, 1982, at I (reporting that "[m]ost observers believe the trial was going badly for
the Bell System"). But see Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing:
The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 21-31
(1983) (assessing merits of government's case against AT&T and concluding, without
much assessment ofJudge Greene, that neither finding of liability nor, assuming liability,
remedy of divestiture would have been a likely result). For a succinct account of the
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Though less remembered, private antitrust suits also played a critical
role. By the time AT&T agreed on January 8, 1982 to the historic divestiture under the MYJ, it faced a staggering 50-plus such suits seeking damages. 247 The Bell System's historic agreement to divest itself of the BOCs

was attributed in part to this continuing stream of pending and contemplated private antitrust suits. 248 This is not to suggest that the Bell System

lost most of these cases. In fact, it fared reasonably well when the cases
were decided.2 4 9 But as long as the vertically integrated company remained in a business where it had a monopoly over bottleneck facilities to
which its competitors in adjacent markets required access, every Bell
System success, and every competitor failure, could be a regulatory complaint, an antitrust suit, or both.
Our point is not that the courts have commonly been the primary
driving force behind the great transformation of regulated industries
law-they have not. But they do serve from time to time as catalysts, and
this should not be forgotten lest certain changes that might well not have
occurred without judicial intervention be erroneously seen in retrospect
as having been. inevitable.
A simple example illustrates the point. Among the many private antitrust suits against the Bell System in the 1970s was one filed in
Washington, D.C. by Southern Pacific Communications (the predecessor
to Sprint). Southern Pacific lost that lawsuit when, after a 33-day bench
trial, Judge Charles R. Richey ruled for AT&T. So persuaded was Judge
Richey by the IBell System's argument that, as the D.C. Circuit lamented
on review (even while affirming), his opinion not only "strongly expressed his personal policy view that an AT&T monopoly, and not competition, is in the public interest in the telecommunications industry," but
also "simply copied-word-for-word (including even typographical errors)-most of AT&T's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law."25 0
government's antiirust suit against the Bell System and its settlement in the MFJ, see John
R. McNamara, The Economics of Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry 41-46
(1991).
247. See Brock, supra note 79, at 287; see also Southern Pacific Suit Dismissed Against
AT&T, Wall St.J., Dec. 22, 1982, at 4C (discussing other such suits).
248. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 246, at 1.
249. See, e.g., Temin, supra note 9, at 333-34 (discussing lawsuits brought by MCI
and Southern Pacific); infra note 250 and accompanying text (describing AT&T's victory
in Southern Pacific case). Even when AT&T lost, its losses tended not to be significant.
For example, although MCI initially won a $1.8 billion jury verdict (once the award was
trebled) on its antirxust claims against AT&T, this damages award was set aside on appeal in
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1160-69 (7th Cir. 1983), and AT&T
fared well at the retrial on damages. See Christine Winters, AT&T A Winner in Damages
Suit: Only $37.8 Million Awarded to MCI, Chi. Trib., May 29, 1985, at I (although verdict
would "automatically . . . be trebled to $113.4 million," proclaiming this "a clear-cut
victory" for AT&T because "MCI had sought $5.8 billion").
250. Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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But for a quirk of history, this-and not the MFJ-might have been
the result of the government's suit. Both the government's and Southern
Pacific's cases against AT&T had originally been assigned to the same
judge, Judge Joseph C. Waddy. When Judge Waddy died, the government's case was reassigned to Judge Greene, while Southern Pacific's case
went to Judge Richey. As one observer has noted, "[h] ad the docket assignments been reversed, Sprint might be a good bit richer, and the Bell
System might still be intact today." 251 Thus is the course of history influenced by small events.
2. The Courts as Brake. - In contrast to their role as catalyst, the
courts have served at times as a brake, restraining change or requiring
agency consideration of reliance or other interests of those already in an
industry. In some industries, judicial decisions of this sort have had a
significant effect on the course of the transformation.
Detariffing has been one area in which the courts have restrained
agency efforts to move away from the original paradigm of regulated industries law. The most notable example arose in the trucking industry.
In its initial deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980, Congress maintained the tariff-filing requirement. This was largely regarded as a formality by those in the industry, however, because revised tariffs could be
filed and made effective on one day's notice and could incorporate deals
struck with individual customers (so long as the rates set forth were nominally open to all those willing and able to meet the tariffs' terms and
conditions). Given this practical insignificance, many truckers stopped
filing tariffs. Problems arose, however, when numerous trucking companies went bankrupt (casualties of the new competition in the industry)
and bankruptcy trustees sought to collect from customers the difference
between the negotiated rate and the rate embodied in the carriers' tariffs
actually on file. Against a formidable array of opposition-including not
only most industry participants but also the ICC itself-the Court "surprised all participants in the trucking market ' 252 by holding in Maislin
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc. that not even the agency's broad
power to prohibit "unreasonable practices" could be used to permit
255
deviation from the filed-rate doctrine.
Similarly, on several different occasions in the 1980s and 1990s,
courts concluded that the FCC lacked the authority to do away with the
tariff-filing obligation set forth in section 203 of the Communications Act.
Although the Supreme Court's decision to this effect has received attention mostly because it is regarded as the apogee (or nadir, depending on
one's perspective) of the Court's reliance on dictionary definitions in
construing statutes, 2 54 the Court also emphasized that the structure of
251. Huber, supra note 170, at 90.
252. Pierce & Gellhorn, supra note 12, at 340.
253. 497 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1990).
254. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 & nn.2-3 (1994);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword:
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the statute required this conclusion, for discrimination could scarcely be
55

2
policed effectively without tariffs.
The main effect of the courts' filed-rate doctrine decisions such as
Maislin and MC v. AT&T has been to require congressional authorization for agency efforts to detariff (which was eventually forthcoming).256
But other judicial decisions have had a more permanent effect on the
ultimate characteristics of the new paradigm of regulated industries law.
This has been particularly true in the natural gas area.
More than in any other regulated industry, the transformation of the
natural gas industry has involved the courts and the federal regulatory
agency in a back-and-forth process, with the courts acting as both catalyst
and brake. This process began after Congress's enactment of the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978,257 which provided for a gradual phase-out of regulation of producer prices. One of the consequences of this partially deregulated producer-price system was that in the late 1970s and early 1980s
pipelines and producers entered into contracts containing so-called
"take-or-pay clauses." These contract provisions can be summarized as
"requiring the pipelines either to purchase a specified percentage of the
producer's deliverable gas or to make 'prepayments' for that percentage
anyway." 258 When market prices proved to be substantially lower than the
contract prices, these take-or-pay obligations escalated into billions of dollars of pipeline liabilities. 2 59 FERC then adopted a set of regulatory policies designed to afford the pipelines some relief. Specifically, FERC announced that pipelines could "sell gas at deeply discounted prices for use
only by consumers who certified that they otherwise would switch to other
gas supplies or to alternative fuels less expensive than the pipeline's regulated price of gas,, 260 and that pipelines could "transport gas at lowered
prices to 'non-captive consumers'-large industrial end-users capable of
switching to alternative fuels-without any obligation to provide the same
26 1
service to 'captive consumers.'
The D.C. Circuit struck down FERC's policies in a set of companion
cases. 2 62 In essence, the court reasoned that FERC's attempt to give pipe-

Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 73-75 (1994); William Safire, On Language:
Scalia v. Merriam-Webster, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1994, § 6, at 30.
255. See supra note 62 (quoting 512 U.S. at 230).
256. See supra notes 55-58 and 63-65 and accompanying text.
257. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3348 (1994)).
258. Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
259. For example, "in 1983 pre-payment liabilities for the period between 1982 and
1985 were predicted to reach $7 billion." Id.
260. Pierce, supra note 209, at 16.
261. Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter MPC fl].
262. See Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter MPC i];
MP C,
761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The D.C. Circuit also struck
down a successor policy to the "special marketing program" at issue in MPC L See
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lines more flexibility in dealing with consumers having ready access to
low-cost alternatives, while not extending similar benefits to captive customers, "was unduly discriminatory, unjust, and unreasonable within the
meaning of the NGA."2 63 This was not all bad news for the agency, for

the ruling pushed FERC in the direction of a more far-reaching policy
which it previously had proposed to adopt.2 64 Specifically, in response to

these D.C. Circuit decisions, FERC issued its landmark Order No. 436,
which effectively required pipelines to provide open access to their facilities. 265 FERC's extraordinarily significant decision to unbundle pipeline

services thus originated, to a great extent, in the D.C. Circuit's resistance
to the agency's previous policy.
The court's subsequent decision upholding most of Order No. 436
commenced a new round of back-and-forths with FERC that caused one
prominent commentator to lament in 1991 that the decision on Order
No. 436 "was FERC's last success in obtaining judicial acceptance of its
gas policy initiatives." 26 6 While the subsequent series of decisions does
not require recounting here, it is important to note that "[t] he judicial
challenges to FERC's changes in regulatory policy focused almost entirely
on the transition cost issue." 2 67 Of particular concern was the question of
liability for "stranded costs," i.e., sunk costs that could not be recovered
because of competitive pressures. 2 68 The result of the back-and-forth
process-wherein the courts "revers [ed] and remand [ed] about a dozen
FERC attempts to deal with transition cost issues over a five-year period"-was that FERC ultimately "allow[ed] its regulatees to reallocate to
their customers 100 percent of the cost of the transition to the unbundied service regime implemented in Order 636. ' 269 FERC's unhappy experience with the courts on the issue of who would bear transition costs
in the natural gas industry undoubtedly is the reason that FERC determined in its subsequent unbundling of the electric industry to permit
270
utility companies to recover 100 percent of their stranded costs.

Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 768 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Associated Gas,

824 F.2d at 1020.
263. Pierce, supra note 209, at 16.
264. See id.
265. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
notes 132-134. In upholding this aspect of Order No. 436, the D.C. Circuit noted that its
previous decision in MPG ,referred to above, had come "about as close to endorsing the
Commission's [new] approach as Article III permits." Associated Gas, 824 F.2d at 1000.
266. Pierce, supra note 209, at 18; see also id. at 10 n.14, 15 ("'FERC's current record
of remands and reversals by appellate courts is unprecedented in regulatory history.'")
(quoting A.B. Util. Sec. Newsl., Jan. 1990, at 7).
267. Pierce, supra note 97, at 325.
268. See generally J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and
the Regulatory Contract: The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the
United States (1997) (overview of stranded costs debate).
269. Pierce, supra note 97, at 326.
270. Cf. FERC Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 31,036, at 31,789 (1996)
(describing treatment of stranded costs in electric industry and noting that "[w] e learned
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At the end of the day, it is impossible to say whether the courts have
been more of a catalyst in the great transformation of regulated industries law or more of a brake. Overall, the role of the courts appears to be
akin to that of a random variable, sometimes accelerating the process of
change, sometimes slowing it down, but never really shaping the ultimate
direction or content of the changes taking place around them. Whether
courts have performed a valuable function in these cases is at best debatable. 2 71 What is not debatable is that the courts cannot claim to be the
architects of the great transformation. Certainly, the theories that the
courts have propounded in support of their most notable decisionswhether it be the First Amendment or the hard-look doctrine in the catalytic cases, or the idea of stare decisis or the hard-look doctrine in the
cases that act as a brake-bear no affinity with the ideas that underlie the
new paradigm in regulated industries law.
C. Congress
That leaves the legislature. Without question, Congress has played a
substantial role in the great transformation of regulated industries law.
Yet there are three features about the legislative performance that call
into question whether Congress can be regarded as having exercised institutional leadership.
First, Congress has generally not made the first move in opening up
regulated industries to greater competition. As two respected students of
the early reform measures have observed:
Customarily, in American government, major new policies are
first set forth in statutes enacted by Congress; then in due
course administrative agencies carry them out. In the case of
airlines, trucking and telecommunications deregulation, however, this sequence was largely reversed. The commissions took
the first formal steps toward procompetitive deregulation without new statutory instructions and proceeded to elaborate them
with ever-increasing boldness. Serious legislative
activity, be2 72
yond merely investigatory hearings, came later.
from our experience with natural gas that, as both a legal and a policy matter, we cannot
ignore these costs").
271. Compare Pierce, supra note 209 (arguing that courts have no comprehension of
the big picture and nitpick agency decisions in ways that can lead to severe dysfunction in
policymaking), with Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and
Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. Rev.
763 (1994) (conceding that judicial review has inhibited agency decisionmaking but
defending it as protector of "deliberative democratic values").
272. Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 96; see also Clifford Winston, Economic
Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. Econ. Literature 1263,
1264-66 (1993) ("[Clongressional action was not the sole source of the deregulation
movement and, in fact, was often the last step in the process."); Thomas S. Ulen, Book
Review. Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, 17 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 293, 295 (1997) ("more typically, Congress keeps its distance from the regulators
and allows the courts to hold the agencies accountable").
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This role reversal is less evident with respect to later reform measures.
With respect to natural gas and electricity reform, for example, Congress
has occasionally interceded in ways that have moved the process forward
after FERC has reached an impasse. And although the central disputes
resolved by the Telecommunications Act were defined by previous fights
among contending interests in court and before the FCC, there can be
no question but that the Act sets forth a comprehensive blueprint for a
new order far more sweeping than anything that would have been produced by continued litigation and administrative action. Still, it would be
difficult to say that Congress has played the role of the initial policymaking body with respect to most of the great transformation.
Second, congressional involvement in the transformation has been
intermittent. Federal regulatory reform legislation has been concentrated in two waves: one in the last half of the 1970s, the other in the
early to mid-1990s. The reasons why Congress has been more active at
these times, and relatively quiescent in the 1980s, are unclear. In the late
1970s, Congress played a major role in getting the transformation under
way. This is particularly true in the transportation industries, where
Congress in relatively short order enacted the 4R Act of 1976, the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, and the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980.273 Within this same time period, Congress also
enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which, even if an "abysmal
failure," as some have asserted, 2 74 got the regulatory reform ball rolling
for FERC in the natural gas area. In general, however, Congress moved
to the forefront of the great transformation in these years largely only in
275
the transportation industries.
During the 1980s, Congress stood mostly on the sidelines. For example, Congress played no substantial role in the telecommunications industry until 1996, by which time the FCC and the courts had already
moved a large way toward the new paradigm. The entire opening up of
the manufacturing and long-distance telecommunications markets during these years was the result of efforts by the FCC (prodded at times by
the courts) and the Department ofJustice. The most that can be said of
Congress in this regard is that it resisted-or at least did not act uponthe Bell System's pleas that it be given protection from the Department of
Justice's antitrust suit that led to divestiture (or the RBOCs' subsequent
pleas that the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions be lifted).276 Both in the
273. See supra text accompanying notes 41-54.
274. RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to
Burnertip, 9 Energy LJ. 1, 12 (1988).

275. Even in these industries, of course, it would be a mistake to suppose that
Congress was alone in promoting the transformation. See, e.g., Richard D. Stone,
Administrative Deregulation of the Railroads: The ICC's Change of Philosophy, 61
Transp. Prac. J. 278, 283-88 (1994) (discussing ICC's actions in the decade preceding the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980).
276. See, e.g., Temin, supra note 9, at 175-90 (Bell System); infra note 329 and
accompanying text (RBOCs).
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early 1980s and. for substantially more than a decade afterwards, Congress
was unable to come to a consensus concerning whether and what type of
significant telecommunications legislation should be passed.
Toward the end of the 1980s, this relatively dormant congressional
period ended, and a second wave of legislation commenced. The most
dramatic breakthrough was the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
was many year; in the making and wrought the most complex and farreaching regulatory change to date. Other substantial congressional actions during this period were the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of
1989, which can be succinctly characterized as having "ratified FERC's
major changes in regulatory policy,"2 7 7 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
which authorized electricity sales by "exempt wholesale generators" (or
EWGs) and mandated that FERC require owners of electricity transmission lines to provide equal access to their facilities. This second phase of
congressional enactments also included legislation designed to clean up
the administrative and judicial debris resulting from implementation of
Congress's first wave of legislation from 1976 to 1980. Examples include
the Negotiated Rates Act of 1993, passed in response to Maislin and other
decisions, and the ICC Termination Act of 1995.278
Finally, it should be noted that, even when Congress has acted, it has
usually done so very slowly. The foregoing telecommunications example
demonstrates this, as does the 1978 NGPA, which was enacted only
"[alfter twenty-eight years of frequent
consideration . . . and nineteen
2 79
months of continuous bitter debate."
For each of these reasons, it would be difficult to award Congress the
mantle of architect of the great transformation. Its role has been reactive, irregular, and often ponderously slow. Without a doubt Congress,
like the agencies and the courts, has had a substantial effect in causing
the great transformation of regulated industries law. But it, like these
other government actors, cannot be regarded as the driving force behind
the change.

At the end of the day, the conclusion must be reached that none of
the institutional actors with the power to compel change can be considered the author of the great transformation. The agencies have played a
surprisingly supportive role. But they had to be prodded into action by
the courts or Congress, and no single agency had a sufficiently broad
jurisdiction to coordinate the forces of change. The courts have been
schizophrenic in their response to regulatory change, sometimes propelling it forward, sometimes holding it back. And they have always acted in
the name of legal doctrines that do not themselves dictate any particular
277. Pierce & Gellhom, supra note 12, at 343.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
279. Pierce, supra note 274, at 11.

1998]

TRANSFORMATION OF REGULATED INDUSTRIES

1383

regulatory policy. Congress has played a vital role. But it was often the
last to act, and in many instances seems to have been less interested in
uncorking the forces of change than in keeping them bottled up.

Im.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CAUSES OF THE TRANSFORMATION

To this point, we have established two propositions: first, that a wideranging transformation sharing many common features is taking place
throughout regulated industries law, and second, that there is no consistent pattern of leadership such that one institution of government could
be said to be the primary architect of this great transformation. The combination of these two propositions strongly suggests that the transformation is being driven by deep-seated economic and social forces-forces
that affect all the industries under consideration and transcend the particular historical episodes in any particular industry.
Identifying these forces takes us into largely uncharted waters.
Although there are many advocates applauding or opposing "deregulation," only a handful of scholars have offered positive accounts of what we
have denominated the great transformation, and virtually all of these accounts focus only on the first wave of changes that took place in the late
1970s. 280 Moreover, because the transformation is still going on around

us, we lack the critical distance that may be necessary to offer generalizations about the causes of fundamental legal change. What follows, therefore, is necessarily tentative in nature.
We will consider four economic and social explanations for recent
regulatory changes, arranged in order of increasing generality: (1) that
the great transformation has been caused by technological changes; (2)
that it has been caused by a series of chain reactions brought about by the
introduction of competition in one industry which has destabilized the
status quo in another industry; (3) that it is the product of interest group
politics; and (4) that it reflects an ideological consensus among policy
elites that the risks of regulatory failure associated with the original paradigm are greater than the risks of market failure associated with competition. The first two explanations presuppose that the transformation has
produced real efficiency gains widely shared throughout society. Thus,
these explanations implicitly embrace a version of the public interest theory of regulation. The latter two explanations are agnostic as to whether
the transformation will in fact produce real efficiency gains, but focus
instead on the distributionalconsequences of regulatory change and the
perceptions of efficiency gains shared by policy elites. Consequently, these
280. See, e.g., Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40; The Political Economy of
Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Regulatory Process (Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen
eds., 1983); Dennis Swann, The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privatization in the
UK and US (1980); Richard H.E. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and
Deregulation in America (1994).
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explanations are more congruent with public choice or social construction theories of regulation.
Our assessment is that all four factors have probably played some
role in unleashing the great transformation. Since the transformation is
a general phenomenon, however, there is some reason to think that the
more general explanations (nos. 3 and 4) have greater force than do the
more specific explanations (nos. 1 and 2).
A. Technological Change
It is often suggested, usually in the context of discussing one industry,28 1 but sometimes in conjunction with a broader overview of regulatory changes, that what we have termed the great transformation is being
driven by technological change. In its most common form, the argument
is as follows. The original paradigm was created because of widespread
perceptions of market failure in regulated industries, most prominently
the presence of natural monopolies. In recent decades, however, advances in technology have eliminated many of the natural monopoly features of these industries, or at least have significantly reduced their scope.
As the technological conditions demanding that industries be structured
as monopolies have disappeared, the regulatory systems predicated on
monopoly and restricted entry have been dismantled. Cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex.
The technological change argument (like the next argument, which
is based on chain reactions) presupposes that there are significant efficiency gains to be obtained in moving from a monopolistic or oligopolistic industrial structure to a competitive market structure, provided that
competition is feasible. The argument for the superior efficiency of competition in industries that do not have significant natural monopoly attributes (such as airlines and trucking) is straightforward and has long
been accepted by most economists. 28 2 Imposing regulatory barriers to
entry and restricting price competition in such an industry creates what
amounts to a legalized cartel. Such a legalized cartel, relative to a competitive market, will result in reduced output, increased prices, and diminished aggregate social welfare. 288 Studies conducted before the first
wave of regulatory reform showed that unregulated segments of the
trucking and airline industries had significantly lower prices than regulated (i.e., oligopolistic) segments.

28 4

Studies conducted since those re-

281. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 170, at 168-73 (telecommunications); Navarro,
supra note 114, at 353, 357 (electricity generation).
282. See, e.g., 2 Kahn, supra note 164, at 251-323 (1971); see also Breyer, supra note
10, at 15-19.
283. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 8-22
(1976).
284. See, e.g., Michael Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation
and National Regulatory Policy, 74 Yale L.J. 1416 (1965); William Jordan, Airline
Regulation in America (1970); Theodore E. Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market
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forms were implemented show more complex effects, but generally also
conclude that "average prices of air travel, trucking, and long-distance
telephoning are down substantially, producing not only consumer savings
'28 5
but net welfare improvements in the billions of dollars each year.
By a similar logic, an industry characterized by multiple service segments could achieve efficiency gains by unbundling the potentially competitive service segments from the natural monopoly segments, and limiting regulation to the latter. This is the central premise underlying the
deregulation of field production of natural gas and the unbundling of
bulk gas sales from pipeline transmission services; the deregulation of
electricity generation and the unbundling of bulk electric power sales
from transmission and distribution; and the unbundling of customer
premises equipment, long-distance service, information services, and now
(potentially) all elements of local exchange service under the Telecommunications Act. It is too early to assess the efficiency effects of these
reforms, but the expectation is that lower average prices and net welfare
28 6
gains will be substantial.
It is occasionally suggested that the mere existence of efficiency gains
in moving from monopoly or oligopoly to competition is sufficient to explain the great transformation. 28 7 This is not correct. The magnitude of
the efficiency gains must be weighed against the transitional costs of moving from a regime of regulation to one of competition, as well as the
transaction costs of operating under a regime of competition after the

Performance, 3 BellJ. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 399 (1972); Thomas Gale Moore, Deregulating
Surface Freight Transportation, in Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets 55
(Almarin Phillips ed., 1975); see also Teske et al., supra note 30, at 38 n.79, 68 n.28 (citing
sources).
285. Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7YaleJ.
on Reg. 325, 342-43 (1990); see Teske et al., supra note 30, at 44 n.101, 75 (citing studies
suggesting annual customer gains from airline and trucking deregulation of $6 billion and
$38 billion respectively); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 233, 250 (1991) (placing the total
annual savings from regulatory changes in the airline, trucking, rail, natural gas, oil, and
telecommunications industries at between $33.6-42.9 billion); Winston, supra note 272, at
1284 (estimating the annual benefits from deregulation as between $36-46 billion in 1990
dollars).
286. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Costello & Robert J. Graniere, The Outlook for a
Restructured U.S. Electric Power Industry: Lessons from Deregulation, Elec.J., May 1997,
at 81, 91 n.19 (citing one study estimating that electric industry restructuring could save
consumers $60 billion or more and another estimating consumer savings of $108 billion
annually with the economy as a whole benefiting on net by $24 billion annually); Pierce,
supra note 97, at 324 (commenting that the transition to a competitive natural gas market
"has enhanced consumer welfare by billions of dollars per year").
287. See, e.g., Black & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1350-54 (portraying potential
efficiency gains from introduction of competition in electricity industry as making
deregulation inevitable).
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transformation is complete. The transition will take place only if the ben288
efits in terms of gains from competition clearly outweigh the costs.
Technological change enters the picture as an exogenous variable
that explains a sudden discontinuity in the benefit-cost equation. If existing technology makes an industry a natural monopoly, then there
would be little in the way of efficiency gains from dismantling regulation
and introducing competition, because the competitive process will lead
to a weeding out of competitors until only a single provider remains. Absent regulation, the transaction costs to customers of adjusting to a market dominated by a monopoly provider (for example, the need to negotiate complex long-term contracts) would be extremely high.28 9 However,
if we hypothesize that new technologies are introduced that make it possible for more than one firm to operate in an industry, this would mean
that the industry is ripe for achieving the efficiency gains associated with
moving from monopoly to competition, and (putting aside transition
costs) that the transaction costs would be no greater than those encountered in other competitive markets in which contractual exchange
2 90
predominates.
288. This proposition is essentially the same one that Harold Demsetz used to explain
the origin of private property rights. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 347 (1967). Demsetz posited that a property
rights regime is a form of collective action designed to reduce the externalities produced
when resources exist in an open-access commons. See id. at 347-52. He hypothesized that
such a property rights regime will be created when the benefits in terms of reducing
externalities exceed the costs of creating and sustaining the new property rights regime.
See id. at 350. The Demsetz argument can be generalized to any situation in which one
institutional arrangement generates inefficiencies relative to other possible arrangements.
For examples of such a generalization, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for
Transboundary Pollution, 46 Duke L.J. 931, 972-76 (1997) (international environmental
law regimes); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 31-32 (different stages in environmental
protection regimes); David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for
Trading of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 967, 975 (1991) (international financial
markets). The great transformation of regulated industries law may represent another
example.
289. See Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies in General
and with Respect to CATV, 22 Bell J. Econ. 73, 82, 102 (1976).
290. The efficiency gains hypothesis may help explain why the legislative aspects of
the transformation have occurred largely in two waves-the first in the late 1970s, the
second in the 1990s. The first wave involved industries or industry segments that were
already competitive or where natural monopoly barriers did not stand in the way of
developing competitive markets-airlines, trucking, railroads, and long-distance service.
Competition could be introduced fairly easily in these industries, and so the efficiency
gains were large and foreseeable. Conversely, the transitional costs were not great because
most assets in these industries (except for railroad track) are redeployable and hence are
unlikely to be stranded by competition. And the transaction costs of going forward after
the transition need not be great, especially if the regulatory apparatus simply disappears
(as in the case of the CAB and, for most purposes, the ICC), resulting in a clean
substitution of a regime of contract for regulation.
The second wave of legislation, in contrast, has centered on common carrier and
public utility services having significant natural monopoly features, the strategy now being
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We have no doubt that there is some merit to the technological change
argument in some circumstances. Some regulated industries-most
prominently telecommunications and the airline industry-have experienced rapid technological changes in the post-war period. In particular,
many observers believe that the collapse of the Bell System monopoly and
the Telecommunications Act's mandate of universal competition in telecommunications markets are the product of dramatic technological
changes that have rendered the natural monopoly theory obsolete in this
industry. 291 For example, advances in electronic switching technology
and in computers were probably a necessary condition of moving to competition in the long-distance telephone industry. The newer switching
technology allows the LEGs to originate and terminate calls from multiple long-distance carriers, something that would have been prohibitively
expensive using switchboard operators. 292 Similarly, the advent of wireless and satellite communications capabilities may eventually overcome
the LECs' bottleneck monopoly that exists in the form of the local copper
wire loops connecting individual homes and businesses with local
29 3
exchanges.
Looking at the larger picture, however, we find the technological
innovation argument unpersuasive in most instances. Consider the railroad industry. Railroads have for most of this century experienced tortoise-like rates of technological innovation. 294 This is especially true with
respect to the critical facility that gives railroading its natural monopoly
to unbundle these services in order to allow competition in segments not characterized by
natural monopoly. The efficiency gains from this strategy are more uncertain, resting
largely on a new economic theory. See infra text accompanying notes 362-365 (discussing
development of contestable markets theory). The transitional costs are often massive,
especially in the electricity industry, which is faced with a large stranded-cost problem that
must be resolved in order to complete the transformation. See Pierce, supra note 97, at
335-38. (Whether there are likely to be large stranded costs from the introduction of
competition in local telephone markets is more debatable. Compare WilliamJ. Baumol &
Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Taldngs, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037, 1057-61 (1997) (stranded costs
predicted to be negligible), with J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings,
and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1068, 1164 (1997) (stranded
costs likely to be large).) And the transaction costs that remain after competition is
introduced are likely to be high, because regulators have a continuing role to play in
setting prices and terms for access to the remaining bottleneck monopolies. Thus, the
delay in moving to competition in these "second-wave" industries can be explained by the
more problematic efficiency gains and the higher transitional and transaction costs.
291. See, e.g., Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The
Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modem World
347 (1998) ("it was technological change that really undermined AT&T's monopoly and
the regulatory system that went with it"). But see Paul Eric Teske, After Divestiture: The
Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation 6-7 (1990) (collecting varying
scholarly explanations of reasons for breakup of the Bell System).
292. See Huber, supra note 170, at 77-78, 82, 111.
293. See id. at 106-09.
294. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 170.
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aspect-railroad track. The ballast, wooden ties, and steel rails used for
railroad roadbed and track in the period immediately prior to deregulation were not significantly different from those used at the beginning of
the century.2 95 Yet notwithstanding this static technological state, railroad transportation was largely deregulated in a relatively short period of
time in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Whatever the explanations for this
phenomenon, technological innovation overcoming the high fixed costs
of constructing and maintaining railroad track is not one of them.
A similar story can be told about natural gas pipelines and wholesale
electricity transmission grids. To be sure, there have been refinements in
transmission technology in both industries, and it is clear that electricity
can be wheeled over much greater distances today than was thought possible forty years ago.2 9 6 But the basic technology of transmission in both
industries today is little changed from that developed many decades ago.
The principal difference in the gas industry is that the network of interstate pipelines has become increasingly dense over the years, 297 and in
the electric industry transmission lines have been interconnected in regional grids to a much greater extent than was the case up through the
immediate post-war period.2 98 In neither case, however, has there been a
technological "breakthrough" that would allow us to say that the natural
monopoly aspect of gas and electricity transmission has been eliminated. 299 And yet, as in the case of railroads, we have seen significant
movement toward competition in both industries.
The picture is similar with respect to trucking. No doubt there have
been many small refinements in diesel truck tractors and trailer rigs over
the last several decades. But there have been no major breakthroughs in
trucking technology.3 00 A more plausible candidate for technological
change in the trucking industry would be the construction of the federal
Interstate Highway System, which was largely completed in the decade
295. See Terry Breen, Railroads in Transition: Better but Not Different, Modem
Railroads, Oct. 1979, at 51, 54.
296. See, e.g., Asghar Zardkoohi, Competition in the Production of Electricity, in
Electric Power Deregulation and the Public Interest 63, 64-66 (John C. Moorhouse ed.,
1986); Black & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1345.
297. See Pierce, supra note 97, at 333-34; Pendley, supra note 1, at 32-45.
298. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Electric Power Wheeling
and Dealing: Technological Considerations for Increasing Competition, OTA-E-409, at 53
(1989); see also Scott Fenn, America's Electric Utilities: Under Siege and in Transition
12-13 (1981) (discussing rise of regional power pools); Richard F. Hirsh, Technology and
Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry 56-58 (1989) (same).
299. See FERC Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 31,036, at 31,652 (1996)
("transmission [of electricity] continues to be a natural monopoly"); FERC Order No. 636,
FERC Stats. & Regs. (CCH) 1 30,939, at 30,393 (1992) ("pipeline control of the [gas]
transportation system [remains] a natural monopoly").
300. Cf. Gellran, supra note 170, at 178-81 (discussing constraints on highway
transport as of 1971, noting no substantial technological deficiencies, and observing that
constraints were generally regulatory rather than technological).
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before enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.301 The interstate
system clearly improved the performance of motor carriers and permitted a large increase in the size of the fleet.30 2 But again, the change has
been quantitative rather than qualitative and took place gradually over
several decades. In any event, no one believes that there was ever a natural monopoly in the motor carrier industry to begin with, so there is no
bottleneck to point to that these technological changes can be regarded
as having overcome.
Even in industries that have experienced high rates of technological
innovation, a closer look suggests that technological change is a problematic explanation for the transformation. With respect to long-distance telephone service, for example, it is true that the early challenge to AT&T's
Long Lines division was from MCI and other private line providers, which
used microwave transmission technology rather than the traditional coaxial cable. Microwave transmission, unlike coaxial cable, has roughly constant average costs with increasing usage rather than falling average
costs; 3 0 3 thus, the advent of microwave transmission might be thought to
have overcome the natural monopoly characteristics of long-distance service. Ironically, however, by the time the courts and the FCC had opened
the door to general competition in the long-distance market, the technology of choice had shifted again-this time to fiber optic cable, which like
the original coaxial cable, and unlike microwave transmission, does have
natural monopoly features. 30 4 So even the story of the transformation
from regulation to competition in long distance is difficult to explain in
terms of technological change.
The technology story also seems implausible because the coming of
competition has had variable impacts on the degree of technological sophistication in common carrier and public utility services. In the airline
industry, for example, the introduction of competition has meant that in
many regional markets carriers have substituted smaller propeller-driven
planes forjets.30 5 In other words, competition has resulted in a reversion
(in part) to use of a less advanced form of technology. Similarly, competition in the wholesale electric generation market is likely to result in the
301. See Craig Stock, The Great Infrastructure Debate, J. Corn., Oct. 30, 1992, at 6A;
see also John Brannon Albright, At 40,253 Miles, the Interstate Highway System Is 95
Percent Complete, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1981, § 10, at 5; cf.James 1. Scheiner, The Effect of
the Interstate System on Short-Haul Air Passenger Demand, 1 Transp. Sci. 286 (1967).
302. See Tom Lewis, Divided Highways: Building the Interstate Highways,
Transforming American Life 286-87 (1997).
303. See Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of
Deregulation, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1, 30 (Martin
Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989).
304. See Huber, supra note 170, at 17, 80, 104-06.
305. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Deregulation: Increased Competition Is
Making Airlines More Efficient and Responsive to Consumers 30-31 (1985); Adam Bryant,
AWrinkle in theJet Age: Propeller Planes, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1994, atAl; George Marsh,
Propellers Bite Back, Commuter World, Oct.-Nov. 1990, at 13.
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displacement of large and enormously complicated nuclear generating
plants with small and relatively simple gas-turbine-powered plants.3 0 6
The gas turbines represent a refinement of conventional technology developed in response to demands for greater flexibility in meeting uncertain load growth.3 0 7 But they are unquestionably a less advanced form of
technology than nuclear plants.
Indeed, if there is a dominant causal relationship between regulatory
and technological change, it might be more plausible to say that regulatory changes lead to changes in technology, rather than vice versa. This
certainly appears to be the case in the railroad industry, long the sluggard
in terms of innovation.3 08 More impressionistically, there may be some
tendency for deregulation to cause a shift in the scale of technology from
larger to smaller, as in the airline and electric generation industries. In
any event, technological change is at best a modest explanatory factor in
understanding the transformation.
B. Chain Reactions
A second explanation (which could easily be seen as a complement
to the first) hypothesizes that the great transformation has come about
through a series of chain reactions: Once the process starts-for
whatever reason, including technological innovation in one industry-it
is difficult for it to stop until it is complete.3 0 9 Like the technological
change argument, the chain reaction argument presupposes that the underlying benefit-cost equation has shifted in such a way as to make a competitive market structure feasible where previously, because of natural
monopoly, it was not. Now, however, the hypothesized exogenous
change that causes the shift is another change in regulation elsewhere in
the legal system. This initial change could be caused by any number of
factors, ranging from new technology to ad hoc political events. But once
unleashed, regulatory change rapidly spreads.
Several possible chain reaction mechanisms can be identified. Decontrol in one industry could give rise to pressure for decontrol in an306. See, e.g.. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Annual
Energy Outlook 1998 with Projections to 2020, at 5 (1997) (projecting that, between 1996
and 2020, no nuclear power plants will be built, many existing nuclear units will be retired
early, and "[the natural-gas-fired share of electricity generation (excluding cogenerators)
more than triples, from 9 percent to 31 percent").
307. See Hirsh, supra note 298, at 163-64.
308. See Deregulation: Perspectives of Economist/Regulators: Hearing Before the
Joint Econ. Comm., 101st Cong. 29 (1990) (statement of Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., former
Chairman of the ICC); cf. James M. MacDonald, Railroad Deregulation, Innovation, and
Competition: Effects of the Staggers Act on Grain Transportation, 32J.L. & Econ. 63, 92
(1989) (arguing that regulated pricing for railroads retarded, and deregulation restimulated, the adoption of unit cars for grain shipments by the railroad industry).
309. As Kahn has observed, "partial deregulation has introduced a host of
asymmetries and distortions, which have been and are still being resolved primarily by
further liberalizations." Kahn, supra note 285, at 333.
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other industry that competes against the first, as a kind of defensive reac-

tion. Alternatively, reform in one industry that provides inputs into
another industry could trigger reform in the second industry. Finally,
partial deregulation in an industry could give rise to pressure for further
or complete deregulation in that industry.
All three of the foregoing chain reactions arguably have been observed in the last twenty years. One possible example of a defensive chain
reaction is provided by the deregulation of the motor carrier industry.
ICC regulation was originally extended to trucks in 1935 in part to protect the struggling rail industry against a new form of competition from a
substitute service.3 10 When the ICC, prodded by the Carter White House,
began to liberalize regulation of the trucking industry in the late
1970s,3 11 it is plausible to assume that this was similarly threatening to the
railroads. The railroads' intense advocacy of the relaxation of controls in
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 may have been motivated in part by their
need for greater freedom to respond to competition from trucks and also
by their need to raise rates on captive traffic in order to offset losses from
3 12
trucking competition.
Another and more striking example of a defensive chain reaction is
supplied by the Telecommunications Act. The RBOCs pressed to be allowed to enter the long-distance market for almost fifteen years.3 13 When
it finally appeared that they had the votes in Congress to achieve their
objective, the existing long-distance carriers responded by demanding
that local telephone markets be opened up as a condition precedent to
allowing the RBOCs to enter the long-distance market. This was a second-best solution as far as the long-distance carriers were concerned. Undoubtedly, most would have preferred to keep the RBOCs bottled up, but
if the RBOCs were to enter long distance and could offer customers "onestop shopping" (both local and long-distance service), then the incumbent long-distance carriers wanted to be able to offer one-stop shopping
too. To do this, however, they had to get Congress to open the local
3 14
market.
310. See Robyn, supra note 213, at 12-14; Hardaway, supra note 170, at 116 & n.69
(and sources cited); Webb, supra note 39, at 97; see also John Richard Felton, Background
of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, in Regulation and Deregulation of the Motor Carrier
Industry 3, 4-13 (John Richard Felton & Dale G. Anderson eds., 1989) (providing overview
of various interest groups' positions on trucking regulation leading up to the 1935 act).
Prior to the 1920s, railroads had enthusiastically supported the improvement of roads and
highways, assuming that trucks and automobiles would be used to deliver additional
passengers and freight to the railroads. See Lewis, supra note 302, at 21-22, 286.
311. See Rothenberg, supra note 212, at 223-31.
312. See, e.g., Marcus Alexis, The Political Economy of Federal Regulation of Surface
Transportation, in The Political Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the
Regulatory Process 115, 128-29 (Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen eds., 1983).
313. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
314. For another example of deregulation in one industry leading to deregulation in
another industry, see Teske et al., supra note 30, at 138-44 (describing how airline
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There is also evidence that regulatory reform in one market has triggered reform in another market that uses the services of the first as an
input. The primary example might be the gradual decontrol of the natural gas market in the 1980s and its impact on the bulk electricity market.
The transformation of the natural gas industry-in particular the deregulation of wellhead prices of natural gas-over time resulted in significant
declines in the prices of delivered natural gas and increases in production.a15 As natural gas thus became cheaper and more plentiful, this
stimulated interest in using natural gas as a fuel for electric power generation. Gas was always regarded as a more environmentally friendly fuel for
power generation than coal. Now it was also economically competitive.
The interest in gas-powered generation contributed to the development
of a new generation of gas turbine generators, which could be owned and
operated by independent power producers. 3 16 The possibility of plentiful
and cheap wholesale electric power supplied by these independent producers has in turn stimulated the movement for unbundling in the electric power generation market.
Finally, there is evidence that partial deregulation of an industry can
give rise to internal pressures for further deregulation. The natural gas
industry provides one illustration, where decontrol of wholesale markets
led to pressure for lifting of regulation at the retail level. As Black and
Pierce explain:
Wholesale producers soon sought regulatory permission to sell
directly to large consumers, at prices well below those charged
by local gas distribution companies, while large consumers
threatened to move their operations if denied access to cheap
gas. Some producers proposed to build new pipelines, exempt
from state regulation, to serve large customers. Regulators
had
3 17
little choice but to allow retail competition as well.
The telecommunications industry is the most striking example, however.
Reform started with customer premises equipment, spread to long-distance service, then to information services, and finally to local services.
After the fully integrated vertical Bell monopoly started to be disassembled, firms operating in one segment of the market continually pressed to
deregulation helped lead to federal preemption of most economic regulation of intrastate
trucking).
315. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 504 (1984); Adam D.
Samuels, Comment, Reliability of Natural Gas Service for Captive End-Users Under the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order No. 636, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 718, 726
(1994).
316. See Henry R. Linden, Operational, Technological and Economic Drivers for
Convergence of the Electric Power and Gas Industries, Elec. J., May 1997, at 14; see also
Raymond S. Hartnan, The Efficiency Effects of Electric Utility Mergers: Lessons from
Statistical Cost Analysis, 17 Energy LJ. 425, 436 (1996) (noting that "independent power
production has been further stimulated by the decline in natural gas prices").
317. Black & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1351.
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be allowed to enter other segments, which created pressure to extend the
scope of the reform.
To be sure, the chain reaction theory, standing alone, fails to provide
a complete account of the great transformation. The theory cannot account for the initial change that triggers the chain reaction. Nor does it
explain why there is a predisposition to move in a certain direction (more
competition) rather than the opposite (more regulation). After all, in
other times and places, we have seen chain reactions of expanding regulation: For example, regulation of railroads gave rise to regulation of inland waterways, oil pipelines, trucks, and buses in part to make the original regulation more effective,3 18 and the FCC agreed to regulate cable
TV in order to protect broadcasting.3 19 Nevertheless, we think that the
phenomenon of chain reaction helps explain why regulatory change has
occurred simultaneously or nearly simultaneously in so many industries.
C. The Role of Interest Groups
Students of politics have shown some interest in what we term the
great transformation-more so than legal academics, although probably
less than the phenomenon deserves given its importance. 3 20 The feature
that has most intrigued such analysts is that deregulation appears to run
counter to the interest group theory of politics. 3 21 This theory, as developed by George Stigler, Mancur Olson, and others, posits that the political system is a kind of market in which groups with high per capita stakes
and low costs of organizing will generally "outbid" groups with low per
capita stakes and high costs of organizing. 322 A primary prediction of the
theory is that concentrated interests, such as producer groups and unions, will be able to obtain legislation and regulation protecting their interests at the expense of diffuse groups such as consumers.
Regulatory reform, however, appears to present an example of political change in which concentrated interests-industry incumbents and
unions-lose out to diffuse interests, to wit, consumers and future rivals
318. See Swann, supra note 280, at 23.
319. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1968).
320. See, e.g., Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40; McCraw, supra note 196, at 303-04;
Siwann, supra note 280, at 32-41; Vietor, supra note 280, at 11-16.

321. For a basic exposition of the interest group theory of politics, a principal
component of modern public choice theory, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law
and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (1991); Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect
Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 53-89 (1994);
Croley, supra note 215, at 34-41; Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political
Faith, 22 L. & Soc. Inquiry 959, 959-64 (1997).
322. See, e.g., Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 33-36 (1965); GeorgeJ.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell. J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971),
reprinted in GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation 114, 119-28
(1975).
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for market shares and jobs.3 23 Indeed, careful case studies of the first
wave of regulatory reform have confirmed that the interest group theory
of politics cannot account for these initiatives. Probably the best-known
case study, by Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk, examined the deregulations of the airline, trucking, and long-distance industries.3 24 The authors found that in each case incumbent firms and their unions strenuously opposed regulatory change.3 2 5 They uncovered very little evidence
that these parties asked for deregulation or, "at any rate, engaged in
32 6
enough political activity to have much effect on the outcome."
When we cast our gaze beyond the three industries examined by
Derthick and Quirk, however, the proposition that interest group influence has been. suspended seems more questionable. For example, railroad decontrol, which also took place as part of the initial wave, was supported with considerable fervor by the railroad industry.3 27 Railroads
wanted greater flexibility to abandon unprofitable lines and to raise rates
on demand-inelastic traffic. The final shape of the Staggers Rail Act of
1980 was hammered out in a negotiated compromise between established
interest groups much in the way the interest group theory of politics
28
would predict.3
The second wave of reform legislation has also tended to conform
much more closely to the picture of the political system painted by the
interest group theory of politics. The story of telecommunications regulation after the breakup of the Bell monopoly is largely one in which a
classic concentrated interest-the RBOCs-assiduously pursued every
political avenue available in an effort to enter the markets off-limits to
them under the MFJ. They pressured the Justice Department, lobbied
the FCC, litigated before Judge Greene and the D.C. Circuit, and sought
repeatedly to get friendly members of Congress to sponsor legislation
3 29
overturning the line-of-business restrictions.
323. This point has not gone entirely unnoticed in the legal literature. See, e.g., Peter
L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75
Cornell L. Rev. 280, 286-87 (1990); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L.
Rev. 199, 220-23 (1988).
324. See Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40.
325. See id. at 21.
326. Id. But see Peltzman, supra note 303, at 18-41 (arguing that firms in some
regulated industries did not oppose deregulation because the economic rents they had
originally earned were beginning to dissipate).
327. See Alexis, supra note 312, at 129.
328. See Congress Passes Rail Deregulation Bill, Sends It to President Carter, Traffic
World, Oct. 6, 1980, at 27, 27-28.
329. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 217, 237-38 (1996); see, e.g.,
Peter H. Stone, Some Hard Facts About Soft Money, Nat'l J., Mar. 23, 1996, at 672
(describing the "big chunks of soft money" contributed by RBOCs and others to
Washington political operations "at critical junctures" in the drafting of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, whose "stakes were staggering [because] the legislation
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the successful culmination
of these efforts. At the center of the Act are provisions abolishing the
MFJ and permitting the RBOCs to enter the equipment-manufacturing
and long-distance businesses. In this last respect, the quid pro quo extracted by the established long-distance carriers was that the RBOCs and
other LECs would first have to open their local exchange markets to competition. 330 Other features of the legislation, including cable TV and
broadcasting provisions, also bear the mark of provider influence. All in
all, the basic shape of the legislation was determined largely through a
process of negotiated give-and-take among rival groups of providers.
Similar, if less stark, struggles among rival producers can be discerned in the gas and electric industries. In the natural gas industry,
pipelines that had signed long-term take-or-pay contracts during the era
of price controls and natural gas shortages found themselves, after partial
decontrol, at a disadvantage relative to those that could take advantage of
lower prices on uncontrolled "new" gas.3 3 ' The encumbered pipelines
demanded relief from these long-term contracts; on the other side of the
coin, the promisees insisted on compensation if the contracts were abrogated.3 3 2 In the electric industry, Congress inadvertently created a lobby
for open access to the interstate grid when it adopted the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), requiring utilities to purchase
the output of cogenerators and small power producers.33 3 Independent
power producers have since become an active force pushing for greater
334
access to interstate power grids.

In addition to struggles among rival producer groups, there is also
evidence that powerful consumer groups have played a greater role in
more recent reform initiatives. It is always instructive to consider who are
the winners and who are the losers from major policy changes. With reset the conditions for how the regional Bell operating companies could enter the $70
billion-a-year long-distance market"); Alicia Mundy, Winners and Losers, Adweek, May 8,
1995, at 24 (describing bill that after modifications became the Telecommunications Act
and stating that "[t]he RBOC lobbyists are hailed as new power players in Washington");
Mike Mills, The New Kings of Capitol Hill: Regional Bells Use Lobbying Clout to Push for
New Markets, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1995, at HI (describing political contributions and
evidence of the "Bells' clout"); Marl Lewyn, The Baby Bells and Their Rivals Nuke It Out
on the Hill, Bus. Week, Oct. 21, 1991, at 89, 89 ("the free-for-all (over whether to remove
the MFJ's manufacturing restriction on the RBOCs] is turning into one of the most
expensive lobbying campaigns in some time"); Mary Lu Carnevale, Baby Bells Grow Up,
Wall St.J., Nov. 9, 1990, at R46 (describing the RBOCs' multi-pronged efforts, "[elver since
[the RBOCs] were born in 1984," to have the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions removed);
Frances Seghers, The Baby Bells Become Problem Children for AT&T, Bus. Week, Jan. 18,
1988, at 60, 60-61 (describing the RBOC lobbying blitz of the FCC, executive branch, and
Congress against the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions).
330. See generally Krattenmaker, supra note 101, at 136-42.
331. See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Fagan, supra note 98, at 718-20.
332. See De Vany & Walls, supra note 97, at 6-8; Vietor, supra note 280, at 159-60.
333. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1994).
334. See Black & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1347-48.
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spect to changes in telecommunications (both long distance and presumably local exchange service), electricity, and gas, the big winners appear
to be large commercial and industrial users of these services. They are
the ones that have obtained the largest discounts and the greatest array of
new service options in telecommunications.3 35 To date, they are also almost the only ones that have received direct benefits from competition in
the electric and gas industries. Ordinary residential consumers have received little or nothing. And if regulatory reform results in elimination of
or reduction in traditional cross-subsidies, the disparities in benefits between large commercial and industrial customers and residential (especially rural residential) customers will become even greater.
Note that this pattern of winners and losers is very much consistent
with what the interest group theory of politics would predict. Business
and commercial consumers are a more concentrated and organized interest than residential and rural customers. Not surprisingly, industrial
customers have started to form lobbying groups pressing for further decontrol of public utilities. 3 36 Although there may be independent justifications for reform on efficiency grounds, all this suggests the possibility
that the movement toward competition may be explained by the interest
group theory after all, especially in the second wave featuring
the big3 37
ticket entries of telecommunications, electricity, and gas.

It is true that interest group theory does not provide a complete explanation for the great transformation. The findings of Derthick and
Quirk and others about the lack of interest group influence in the early
deregulation of airlines and trucks remain unrefuted. 33 8 But the great
transformation would not have happened-at least in most industriesunless there were concentrated groups that stood to gain disproportionately from the change and that therefore had an interest in continually
335. Cf. Teske, supra note 291, at 9-12 (suggesting that "large users and potential

competitors [as opposed to direct competitors such as MCI] played a crucial role .. . in
[AT&T's] divestiture [of the BOCs]").
336. See Black & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1352.
337. Another factor that may be of some importance is that public concern with
reliability and equality of utility services has declined in recent decades. This is partly a
function of expectations. In the 1920s, when telephone and electric services were new and
subject to frequent interruptions, reliability was an obvious concern; today, after decades in
which uninterrupted high-quality service has been the norm, anxiety about reliability has
naturally dissipated. It is also partly a function of a relative decline in the importance of
certain common carrier and utility services as inputs for many small businesses and
households. A North Dakota farm in the 1920s could be driven out of business by a
"discriminatory" rail rate that increased its costs of getting grain to the market relative to
other farms. Today, trucks can provide competition to rail service in the transportation of
grain, thus reducing the extreme risk posed by exclusive dependence on the railroad.
338. See, e.g., Robyn, supra note 213, at x, passim (Motor Carrier Act of 1980
.represented a case where diffuse interests triumphed over fire-in-the-belly resistance from
narrow economic groups"). But cf. Teske, supra note 291, at 126 (distinguishing in this
regard "deregulation of airlines and trucking" from telecommunications).
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pressing for change in a variety of forums (including not just agencies
and Congress but also the courts).
The emergence of interest groups, such as large industrial users, that
stand to gain from deregulation has been important because these
groups have kept the issue on the political agenda. If the only factors
supporting deregulation were overall efficiency gains and elite opinion
about the risks of regulatory failure, then chances are that, after an initial
burst of reformist enthusiasm, the entrenched interests would reassert
themselves, and would successfully block any fundamental alteration of
the old regime. The creation of interest groups eager for changes-such
as the RBOCs in telecommunications, the independent power producers
with respect to electricity, and large industrial customers in several different industries-has acted as a counterweight to the incumbent providers
and their unions. These new interest groups have acted as a battering
ram, continually pressing the cause of reform on the political system until
at some point, the underlying conditions favoring change-the efficiency
gains and new policy presuppositions-have allowed the great transformation to burst through another legal barrier.
D. Perceptionsof Regulatory Failure
A final explanation for the transformation which is encountered in
the literature is that it is symptomatic of a larger "capitalist revolution"
sweeping the world. Thus, Alfred Kahn, in looking back on the first wave
of deregulation starting in the late 1970s, has concluded that the "most
fundamental" cause was "the rediscovery all over the world of the virtues
of the free market."33 9 Richard Vietor reaches a similar conclusion:
"What had changed most was the New Deal's fundamental premise,
namely that competition was the problem. Now government itself was
viewed as the problem-at best, a necessary evil."3 40 Or, as a recent book
puts it, what we have termed the great transformation is part of a "movement from an era in which the state sought to seize and control the commanding heights of the economy to an era in which the ideas of free
markets, competition, privatization, and deregulation are capturing the
34
commanding heights of world economic thinking." '
The hypothesis that the transformation is being driven by changing
ideas about the relative merits of markets and governments is supported
by international developments. Throughout the developed world, countries are either deregulating or privatizing public utilities, including railroads, natural gas, electricity, airline, and telecommunications providers. 342 There are, of course, important differences in the pace and
339. Kahn, supra note 285, at 330.
340. Vietor, supra note 280, at 330.
341. Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note 291, at 365.

342. See, e.g., International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Transportation:
Organisation and Regulation (1994); Telecommunications Politics:

Control of the Information

Ownership and

Superhighway in Developing Countries (Bella Mody et al. eds.,
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direction of the change, especially given that most other countries start
from a baseline of state ownership rather than public regulation of privately owned utilities. But the trend is unmistakable and nearly universal.
This remarkable congruence in the evolution of policy across otherwise
dissimilar societies strongly suggests that a significant degree of ideological consensus has emerged about the virtues of markets as the dominant
mode of industrial organization for delivering public utility services.3 43
It is important not to overstate the degree to which ideas about the
relative merits of markets and government regulation have changed.
Government regulation in the United States is expanding rather than retracting in many areas. The first wave of the great transformation occurred in the 1970s during the trailing years of what has been called a
"rights revolution" featuring unprecedented expansion of government
authority over product safety, worker safety, employment discrimination,
and the environment. 344 This type of social regulation continues to expand, although perhaps at a slower pace than in the early 1970s. To take
just one example, in the area of employment law we have seen-during
the same period of time in which the great transformation in regulated
industries law has been taking place-a dramatic expansion in legal protection for disabled persons, new rules against sexual harassment,
3 45
mandatory parental leaves, and plant-closing laws.

Moreover, many of the great partisans of the ongoing expansion of
social regulation-Senator Edward M. Kennedy comes to mind as a particularly striking example-have also been leading advocates of the trans1995); George Williams, The Airline Industry and the Impact of Deregulation 67-161 (rev.
ed. 1994); John Armstrong, Unplugged? The Effect of the New World Electric Power
Order on Renewable Energy Industries, 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 449 (1997);
Alexander J. Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 Fla. J. Int'l L. 117
(1995); Cosmo Graham, Privatization-The United Kingdom Experience, 21 Brook. J.
Int'l L. 185, 202-06 (1995) (discussing electricity, gas, telecommunications, and water);
Alan S. Gutterman, Japanese Securities Markets: The Impact of Privatization and
Deregulation ofJapan's Public Enterprises, 12 U. Pa.J. Int'l Bus. L. 589 (1991) (discussing,
inter alia, telecommunications, airline, and railroad industries); Amy Lin,
Telecommunications Competition in the European Union After Francev. Commission-The
Terminal Equipment Case, 9 Conn. J. Int'l L. 355 (1994); Diane Preston, Privatization of
Energy in Argentina and Brazil: A Roadmap for Developing Countries, 48 Admin. L. Rev.
645 (1996); Ingo Vogelsang, Micro-Economic Effects of Privatizing Telecommunications
Enterprises, 13 B.L. Int'l LJ. 313 (1995); Rafael X. Zahralddin & C. ToddJones, Venture
Capital Opportunities and Mexican Telecommunications After Passage of the NAFTA and
the Ley de Inversion Extranjera,20 Del. J. Corp. L. 899 (1995).
343. On the Amportance of ideas in generating regulatory change, see Peter H.
Schuck, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration Policy in the 1980s, in The New
Politics of Public Policy 47, 77-85 (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995);James Q.
Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in The Politics of Regulation 357, 393-94 (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1980).
344. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the
Regulatory State (1990).
345. For a critical overview of these developments, see Walter Olson, The Excuse
Factory: How Employment Law Is Paralyzing the American Workplace (1997).
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formation of regulated industries law. These supporters see deregulation
as part of a larger package of "consumer protection" measures, not as a
celebration of free markets. Conversely, the pace of legislative reform
slowed somewhat during the Reagan and Bush years relative to what we
have seen during the two principal waves of such deregulation, which
have coincided with the Carter and Clinton administrations. Yet
Presidents Reagan and Bush consistently embraced the market and decried government regulation to a far greater extent than Presidents
Carter and Clinton, both of whom sent decidedly more mixed messages.
Nevertheless, if we confine ourselves to considering elite opinion
about economic regulation of common carriers and public utilities, there
can be no doubt that the perceptions of regulatory failure are in the ascendancy, while perceptions of market failure are in decline. Nowhere is
this clearer than within the economics profession. There has been a
broad consensus among economists since the early 1970s, if not before,
that the original paradigm of active government regulation makes no
sense as applied to industries without any natural monopoly featuressuch as trucking and airlines.3 4 6 This broad consensus was eventually
translated to key White House staffers in the Ford and Carter administrations, which in turn led to the appointment of economists such as Alfred
Kahn, Elizabeth Bailey, Darius Gaskins, and Marcus Alexis to serve as
commissioners on the CAB and the ICC. 34 7 On the congressional side,
the consensus among economists clearly influenced key staffers such as
Stephen Breyer in advising Senator Kennedy about what sorts of issues he
could champion in order to position himself as the pro-consumer presi348
dential candidate.
Beliefs within the economics profession about the proper treatment
of regulated industries have changed in three important respects in recent decades. First, economists today tend to be less apprehensive about
the phenomenon of natural monopoly as a type of market failure than
they were in the past. Second, economists tend to regard public regulation more skeptically than was true in earlier generations. Third, a new
theory-generally known as the theory of contestable markets-has
emerged which is widely viewed as justifying a much more minimalist
346. See Peltzman, supra note 303, at 18 (noting that if early deregulation measures
had been put to a vote of the American Economic Association, "all the initiatives would
have passed with large majorities").
347. See Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 78-79, 85 (CAB); Rothenberg, supra
note 212, at 236-37 (ICC). An interesting question is whether these agencies' roles in the
great transformation are largely attributable to an increasing influence of economists
relative to lawyers at the agencies. Cf. Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, Presidential
Control Versus Bureaucratic Power- Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34
Am.J. Pol. Sci. 269, 282-84 (1990) (presenting evidence that the changing antitrust policy
of the Department ofJustice in the 1980s was caused not by presidential or congressional
politics, but by the hiring of more economists in the Department).
348. On the role that the airline deregulation hearings played in Senator Kennedy's
presidential ambitions, see Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 106-07.
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form of regulation of natural monopolies than the pervasive oversight
associated with the original paradigm.
The first two changes-a declining concern with natural monopoly
and a concomitant rise in skepticism about the effects of public regulation-can be seen in their starkest form in the writings of economists
closely associated with the Chicago School. When the original paradigm
was created, economists at the University of Chicago as elsewhere thought
that the central issue raised by natural monopoly was whether it should
be controlled by public regulation or through state ownership.3 49 Starting in the 1960s, however, the terms of the debate significantly shifted.
At least among the economists at Chicago, the relevant issue became
whether it was better to regulate natural monopolies or simply to leave
3 50
them unregulated.
The basic case for leaving natural monopolies unregulated was set
forth by Milton Friedman. 35 1 Friedman conceded that there are industries where one supplier may provide output more efficiently than multiple providers.3 5 2 He also noted that there are in principle three ways to
structure such an industry: public ownership, regulated private monopoly, or unregulated private monopoly. 35 3 Europe and most of the rest of
the world opted for the first choice; the United States, of course, adopted
the second-the original paradigm. Friedman, however, iconoclastically
argued that the third choice-unregulated private monopoly-was in fact
the best of an imperfect set of options.
Friedman's principal argument for unregulated private monopolies
was a negative one: that regulated monopolies would exercise de jure
rather than merely defacto monopoly power. A defacto monopoly will be
constrained in the short run by the existence of substitute services, and in
the long run will stimulate rivals to develop technological innovations
permitting them to enter the market and capture a portion of the economic rents earned by the monopolist.3 54 In contrast, Friedman believed, de jure monopolists would capture the regulators and would thus
be able to restrict output and raise prices more than unregulated private
monopolies would.3 55 Friedman's theory was bolstered by empirical studies showing that public regulation has had no appreciable effect on utility
349. See Harry M. Trebing, The Chicago School Versus Public Utility Regulation, in
The Chicago School of Political Economy 311 (Warren J. Samuels ed., 2d ed. 1993).
350. See id.; Swann, supra note 280, at 130-39.
351. See Milton M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 119-60 (1962). The thesis
was subsequently systematized and restated by Harold Demsetz, see Harold Demsetz, Why
Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & Econ. 55, 65 (1968), and by a young Richard Posner. See
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548, 620 (1969).
352. See Friedman, supra note 351, at 128.
353. See id.
354. See id. at 128-29.
355. See id. at 139-44.
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prices over the long run.3 5 6 Some of Friedman's ideas-most particularly

the notion that public utilities tend to capture regulators and bend the
system of regulation to their own advantage-subsequently became a
3 57
kind of orthodoxy shared by conservative and liberal economists alike.

Various studies have identified other or derivative reasons why regulation fails, even if the underlying industry structure is characterized by
natural monopoly. The best known is the Averch-Johnson hypothesis,
which posits that cost-of-service rate regulation creates an incentive for
utilities to make excessive capital investments in order to boost their rate
of return. 35 8 Although attempts to confirm the theory empirically have

been inconclusive,3 59 there can be little doubt that electric utilities operating under cost-of-service regulation made very expensive investments in
nuclear power plants in the 1960s and 1970s that in retrospect appear
unwarranted. Similarly, many observers believe that the pre-divestiture
Bell monopoly gold-plated its physical plant.3 60 Alfred Kahn and others
have also argued that the extensive cross-subsidies that characterize regulation of natural monopolies are inherently inefficient (whatever one
thinks of their distributional consequences)s,61 To the extent that regulatory reform causes providers to shift toward setting prices closer to marginal costs for different classes of customers, such inefficiencies will be
reduced.
356. See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?:
The Case of Electricity, 5J.L. & Econ. 1 (1962), reprinted in GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Citizen
and the State: Essays on Regulation 61 (1975); see also Nina W. Cornell & Douglas W.
Webbink, Public Utility Rate-of-Return Regulation: Can It Ever Protect Consumers?, in
Unnatural Monopolies 27, 33-36 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1985) (and sources cited)
(indicating that regulation may lead to higher prices as regulated firms pass on costs of
technology lag to the customer).
357. See Merrill, supra note 187, at 1059-67 (and sources cited).
358. See Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, The Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 1053, 1058 (1962).
359. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger C. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An
Overview, in Studies in Public Regulation 1, 13 (G. Fromm ed., 1981). For empirical
studies tending to support the Averch-Johnson effect in the electric industry, see Leon
Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BellJ. Econ. & Mgmt.
Sci. 53, 72 (1974); H. Craig Petersen, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 Bell J.
Econ. 111, 124 (1975); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in
Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BellJ. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci.
38, 50 (1974).
360. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
533-35 (1st ed. 1970).
361. See, e.g., 1 Kahn, supra note 164, at 190-91. It has been demonstrated, for
example, that if the demand of rural customers for utility service is lower than that of
urban customers (because rural customers are fewer in number), and the marginal cost of
serving rural customers is higher than the marginal cost of serving urban customers, then
setting the price of service for all customers at a point midway between the marginal cost of
rural customers and urban customers will produce a net loss in consumer welfare. See
Swann, supra note 280, at 142-43 (demonstrating the point with a simple graphic
exposition).
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The Chicago School position that even natural monopolies should
simply be deregulated has yet to be embraced by mainstream economists.
However, in the late 1970s, William Baumol and others developed the
theory of contestable markets, which suggested that lowering entry and
exit barriers could produce efficiency gains, even if only one firm served
an industry at any given time.3 6 2 This theory suggested that even natural
monopoly industries should be opened to competition, as long as regulators establish and enforce competitively neutral prices for access to bottleneck facilitiesA. 63 Baumol's "domesticated" version of the case for eliminating traditional entry controls and rate-of-return regulation has been
immensely influential with the professional staffs of agencies such as the
FCC, FERC, and the Justice Department, which increasingly have included professionally trained economists among their numbers. 364 It has
also plainly been influential with congressional staff. The theory of contestable markets is the intellectual foundation on which the local competition provisions of the Telecommunications Act rest, and has been the
lodestar that the FCC has used to guide its implementation of those
3 65
provisions.
Changing ideas about market failure and regulatory failure within
the economics profession thus have almost certainly played a critical role
in the great transformation. On the question of how best to regulate
common carriers and public utilities, the views of the mass electorate are
"weakly articulated and greatly baffled. '366 Into this policy vacuum step
the professional economists, who offer very confident assessments about
what sort of industrial structure will maximize economic efficiency and
consumer welfare. These views filter into the political system through
362. See, e.g., William J. Baumol et a]., Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the
Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 350 (1977); John C.
Panar & Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 Bell J.
Econ. 1 (1977); William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of
Industry Structure, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (1982); William J. Baumol et al., Contestable
Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (1982); Elizabeth E.Bailey & William J.
Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 Yale J.on Reg. 11
(1984). For a somewhat critical take on the theory, see William B. Tye, The Theory of
Contestable Markets: Applications to Regulatory and Antitrust Problems in the Rail
Industry (1990).
363. See, e.g., Baumol & Sidak, supra note 6, at 93-116; William J. Baumol & J.
Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YaleJ. on Reg. 171, 178-89,
201 (1994).
364. See Eisner & Meier, supra note 347, at 275-77, 280-84 (discussing growth of
economists' influence in the Department ofJustice, beginning in the early 1970s).
365. See generally Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996) (subsequent history omitted);
cf. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 268, at 307-42 (criticizing FCC's approach to applying
contestable markets principles in local competition proceedings under the 1996 Act).
366. Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin, The New Politics of Public Policy, in The New
Politics of Public Policy 282 (Marc K Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995) (quoting Wilson
Carey McWilliams, Two-Tier Politics and the Problem of Policy, in The New Politics of
Public Policy, supra, at 268).
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advice provided by the White House Council of Economic Advisors, the
Office of Management and Budget, and other elite offices.
This transmission of ideas unquestionably has had a pronounced effect on the shape of public policy. Every president from Gerald Ford to
Bill Clinton has devoted significant political capital to the cause of regulatory reform. The reason for this, without a doubt, is that they have been
convinced by their advisors that such a transformation will enhance the
overall performance of the economy, and thus contribute to one of the
36 7
most important variables determining presidential approval ratings.
Gerald Ford, for example, became a convert to deregulation because he
thought-perhaps naively-that deregulation would help "whip inflation. '3 68 President Carter became an even more fervent proponent 3 of
69
deregulation, which he saw as a partial cure for chronic stagflation.
Later presidents have supported regulatory reform because they thought
that it would stimulate productivity gains and improve anemic growth
rates.3 70 In short, for the last quarter-century, three Republican and two
Democratic presidents have consistently supported decontrol of regulated industries, on the understanding that this would expand the size of
the economic pie. This has helped convince administrative agencies and
ultimately Congress that regulatory reform is desirable. Without this bedrock conviction at the highest levels of our political system, the great
transformation would not have occurred.
IV. THE FuTURE OF THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
It remains to offer some brief thoughts about the future path of the
great transformation. To be sure, we have no crystal ball. Indeed, as lawyers our comparative advantage is probably more backward-looking than
forward-looking.3 7 ' Nevertheless, we can at least outline from a legal perspective what appear to be the three ideal-typical trajectories for future
evolution. (In reality, the law will probably follow some path that constitutes a blending or compromise of at least two of these three trajectories.) First, the legal system could revert toward a system that more
367. See George C. Edwards HI,Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook 135-36 (1990).
368. See Derthick & Quirk, supra note 40, at 45-50.
369. See id. at 53-54.
370. Examples would include President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291, see Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (subsequent history omitted), reprinted as note
after 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), which mandated general cost-benefit analysis of major federal
regulatory initiatives, and President Clinton's National Performance Review, see Al Gore,
From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less
32-33 (National Performance Committee ed., 1993), which posed numerous suggestions
for enhancing the efficiency of government and reducing regulatory burdens on the
economy.
371. See Merrill, supra note 187, at 1115; cf. 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations 98-99 (1991) (characterizing judges as passengers sitting in a caboose,
looking backward over the terrain unfolding behind them (but giving no indication as to
whether any of them had been given a preferential rate)).
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closely approximates the original paradigm (or perhaps even sees state
ownership of public utilities). Second, the legal system could continue to
follow the current path that places critical reliance on the concept of
natural monopoly. The task of regulatory agencies under this trajectory
would generally be to control access to and pricing of these natural monopoly service elements, but otherwise to foster open competition in all
common carrier and public utility markets. Third, the legal system could
gravitate toward the position that Milton Friedman outlined in 1962 in
which natural monopoly plays no role; this would mean dismantling the
system of active regulation of public utilities altogether, leaving technological innovation, market forces, and antitrust and common-law actions
as the only forms of discipline.
The first of these pathways-a return in whole or part to the original
paradigm-strikes us as the least plausible vision of the future. To be
sure, as competition spreads to local telephony and electricity, complaints
about the quality and reliability of service could rise, and this in turn
might create sentiment for returning to the world of restricted service
territories, limits on new entry, and administered prices.3 72 The experience with airline and long-distance telecommunications deregulation
suggests that there surely will be such complaints. 373 But it also suggests
that providers will respond by regarding these complaints as marketing
opportunities, and that the market will segment into customers who are
more concerned with price (and willing to tolerate some shortcomings in
service) and those who are more concerned with quality (and willing to
pay a premium for it). These market segments will be served by different
providers or perhaps even by different service options offered by a single
provider.
We also think it unlikely that concerns about discrimination will
again mount to the heights that existed at the beginning of the original
paradigm. One reason for this is that the extreme dependency on a single provider that characterized the early years under the original paradigm is unlikely to reemerge. The percentage of transactions that customers have with monopoly or oligopoly providers has steadily declined
throughout this century,374 and this trend is highly unlikely to be reversed. The only scenario in which public concern about discrimination
might return to its previous intensity would be if the economy entered a
severe and prolonged depression in which competitive pressures on small
businesses (a potent political force instrumental in the creation of the
original paradigm) became intense, and competitive alternatives to particular modes of transportation, communications, or power generation
disappeared. We think the odds that both of these things will happen are
small.
372. See Cudahy, supra note 138, at 357; see also James F. Bromley, A Trip Back to
the Age of Faith, 59 Transp. Prac. J. 389, 394 (1992).
373. See, e.g.. Dempsey, supra note 103, passim.
374. See Bonbright et al., supra note 12, at 583.
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If we are correct in these predictions, then the real choice to be
made in the future is between a world of regulatory transformation and a
world of deregulation. By regulatory transformation, we mean the
emerging paradigm that we describe in Part I, where public agencies continue to monitor access to, and the pricing of, monopoly bottlenecks in
the provision of public utility services, such as the local distribution systems in the electric and natural gas industries. By deregulation, we mean
a world in which active administrative control of public utilities simply
ends, and utility services are governed by the same legal rules that determine entry, pricing, and access for other commodities and services. In
such a world, "natural monopoly" as a separate economic category justifying positive regulation would disappear, and what we know as public utilities or common carriers would be governed by the same rules of contract,
tort, and antitrust that apply to auto parts distributors. The FCC, FERC,
and state PUCs would follow the CAB and the ICC into the sunset.
Significantly, the American legal system has not yet moved beyond
the transformation model. The far-reaching Telecommunications Act
envisions a world in which all segments of the electronic communications
industries-including local telephony, wireless, long distance, cable television, and broadcasting-are open to competition, and indeed converge
and blur beyond recognition. But the Act also envisions that the FCC
and the state PUCs will continue to stand guard assuring competitors access to bottleneck service segments-at prices that do not inhibit the
emergence of true competition. Thus, there is no mandate for a "withering away" of the FCC or the state PUCs; they simply get a newjob description. Similarly, even the most far-reaching legislative proposals to bring
competition to electric and natural gas markets do not call for the abolition of federal and state regulatory agencies which will watch over the
natural monopoly segments of these distribution systems.
The fact that the legal system has yet to cross the "natural monopoly"
line does not mean that it will not do so in the near future. In keeping
with what we have seen to date, the determination of whether the great
transformation will breach this line will be a function of elite perceptions
of regulatory failure and interest group politics. The first variable will be
influenced critically by the future course of what may be called the "public choice" vision of government regulation. 375 The second will depend
on whether a powerful concentrated interest emerges that adopts complete deregulation as its preferred political position.
The public choice conception of regulation, in keeping with Milton
Friedman's original critique, tends to view all positive regulation of entry
and pricing as yielding greater deadweight costs than any unregulated
market would, even in an industry where it is conceded that one firm will
operate more efficiently than two. There is some evidence that this per375. See supra notes 321-322 and accompanying text.
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spective is gaining ground among economists. 3 76 But it has not yet displaced the mainstream perspective of those who study industrial organization, which remains deeply uncomfortable with the idea of
monopoly.3 7 7 Antitrust law and economics are the most prominent illustration of this. Although antitrust scholarship has witnessed considerable
retrenchment in terms of defining when a monopoly exists and what kind
of conduct constitutes misuse of monopoly power, so far few antitrust
scholars (and certainly no courts) have been willing to renounce the idea
that monopoly is dangerous to economic health. Those who share this
conviction are likely to resist the suggestion that "natural monopoly"
should cease to be an occasion for heightened regulatory oversight.
The public choice perspective is also vulnerable insofar as its central
premise-that positive regulation is always inferior to market orderingis usually advanced as an article of faith rather than by empirical demonstration. The history of the great transformation that we have recounted-in which regulatory agencies often led the charge for regulatory reform-s hould by itself be enough to give pause before one asserts
any invariant hypothesis about the behavior of regulators. Contrary to
the theory popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, agencies3 78do not
always behave as the hopeless captives of their client industries.
Moreover, there are good reasons why the comparative institutional
choice betweert positive regulation and deregulation, insofar as it applies
to natural monopoly service segments, will continue to be regarded as at
best a difficult one in which deregulation has no clear advantage. No
doubt positive regulation has ample flaws, including-sometimes-industry capture. But market ordering would be far from costless, especially in
industries in which there is a "natural" tendency (for whatever reason)
for only one firm to survive. Other providers or customers using the output of this industry would have to resort to elaborate long-term contracts
to protect their interests, and such contracts would entail high transaction and litigation costs. 3 79 And insofar as the behavior of the incumbent
firm would be disciplined by antitrust oversight rather than positive regulation, this would in effect simply replace one regulatory regime (that of
the administrative agency) with another (that of the Department of
Justice and the courts). Lawyers would be generally happy with this substitution, but it is not clear that it would produce better results at lower
costs.
376. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, Is It Time to Eliminate Telephone Regulation?, in
Telecommunications Policy: Have Regulators Dialed the Wrong Number? 17, 22 (Donald
L. Alexander ed., 1997); WalterJ. Primeaux, Jr., Total Deregulation of Electric Utilities: A
Viable Policy Choice, in Unnatural Monopolies 121, 121 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1985).
377. See William F. Shughart II, Public-Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, in The
Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective 7, 18-19 (Fred S.
McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995).

378. See supra text accompanying notes 187-215.
379. See Hazlett, supra note 329, at 17.
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As to the interest group dimension, the obvious candidates to champion complete deregulation would be the incumbent utilities that currently operate natural monopoly bottlenecks. 3 0 If the mainstream analysis of monopoly is correct, complete deregulation, in conjunction with
the high natural barriers to entry that the incumbents would enjoy, would
allow them to earn monopoly profits. But whatever temptation this prospect might offer is likely to be severely tempered by the thought that the
elimination of positive regulation would bring with it a more vigorous
regime of antitrust scrutiny. Certainly, the experience of the Bell System
monopoly in the late 1970s when the hounds of antitrust law were unleashed should give any incumbent utility monopolist serious pause
before advocating complete deregulation.3 8 ' Thus, it also remains uncertain, at this point in time, whether any energized and well-organized interest group will emerge advocating complete deregulation.
In sum, we cautiously predict that the most likely path of the great
transformation is the current one: a mixed system of competition
through regulation. In all industries and industry segments where more
than one firm can effectively operate, positive regulation will continue to
give way to competition. But in industries or, rather, industry segments
where one firm can operate more efficiently than two, positive regulation
will continue to exist under the guise of regulatory superintendence of
natural monopoly bottlenecks. In this narrow but critical domain, regulation will continue to be perceived as a superior instrument to a regime of
common-law entitlements and antitrust scrutiny. 38 2 Of course, this prediction could be dead wrong. Virtually no lawyers would have predicted
in 1975 that in less than a quarter-century competition would be coming
to local telephone services and electric power generation. 38 3 And our
powers to see the future are no greater than those of our predecessors.
380. For example, a recent book advocating complete deregulation of the
telecommunications industry was written by a legal representative of the RBOCs. See
Huber, supra note 170; see also Joseph D. Kearney, Twilight of the FCC?, 1 Green Bag 2d
327, 328 (1998) (reviewing Huber's book in light of this undisclosed fact). It is
appropriate to note here that we have at times provided legal services to AT&T.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 244-251 (AT&T faced major government
suit and over 50 private suits); see also Taylor, supra note 246, at 1 (recounting
congressional staff member's estimate that, if AT&T litigated the government's antitrust
case to judgment and lost, piggyback private suits "could cost AT&T $14 billion").
382. The shrinking of the domain of positive regulation will almost surely result in an
expansion of antitrust scrutiny, even in areas where agencies retain jurisdiction. This is
because one of the variables in determining whether compliance with positive regulation
confers antitrust immunity is the degree to which the regulatory regime is incompatible
with competition. See 9 Earl W. Kintner &Joseph B. Bauer, Federal Antitrust Law 10-11,
18-19 (1989). To the extent that the regulatory regime is transformed into one designed
to promote competition, this clearly reduces the tension between regulation and the
application of the antitrust laws.
383. To be sure, this does not distinguish lawyers from economists, who also failed to
predict the transformation. See Peltzman, supra note 303, at 41.
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CONCLUSION

There is a pronounced tendency in legal scholarship to concentrate
on potential or impending additions to the corpus of legal regulation.
The law reviews are filled with articles about new or emerging rights, regulatory requirements, and causes of action. However, there tends to be
very little commentary on apparent subtractions from the corpus of regulation. To a considerable extent, this is a rational response. It is probably
important that. the legal community channel its attention to areas where
the future demand for legal services will be greatest. But the radical disparity in scholarly focus also has its costs, for it can produce severe gaps in
the legal community's understanding about the evolving shape of the universe in which it operates.
The great transformation in regulated industries law that has been
taking place since around 1975 is a prime example of how scholarly neglect of subtractions can leave the legal community largely oblivious to
legal changes of enormous significance. Most legal scholars and lawyers
are only dimly aware of the monumental changes that have been taking
place in common carrier and public utility law in recent years. A small
number have some grasp of the changes taking place in one industry.
Only a handful have any sense of how the legal landscape has shifted
overall. The fact that the changes that we have discussed are widely advertised as "deregulation" probably contributes to the complacent sense
that public law has no on-going role to play with respect to common carrier and public utility services.
Our objective in this article has been to close this gap in understanding. In large terms, the transformation is one from hostility to competition to the maximum promotion of competition. Publicly filed tariffs are
giving way to contracts, standardized packages of services are being unbundled, and cross-subsidies are being rooted out in favor of pricing
based on incremental costs. But as regulatory reform has moved beyond
the first wave--in which industries that are not natural monopolies, such
as airlines, trucks, and long-distance telephony, were opened to competition-new complexities, defining a new role for regulation, have
emerged.
The second wave of the transformation, which began in the late
1980s and continues today, entails the breakup into separate segments of
what were formerly vertically and/or horizontally integrated public utility
monopolies, so that the segments that are not natural monopolies can be
opened to competition. This project entails the creation of a new set of
legal duties for firms in regulated industries toward other firms, including interconnecting firms and competitors. These duties, which did not
exist under the original paradigm of regulation, include duties of interconnection, offering unbundled network service elements to competitors, and selling services to competitors for resale. With the rise of these
new duties toward other firms, and the diminishing significance of duties
toward end-users, the role of the administrative agencies is being radically
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redefined. Rather than comprehensively overseeing the industry in order
to ensure reliable and uniform services, the primary role of the agency is
to act as the facilitator of competition. Specifically, the agency, operating
now like a limited-jurisdiction antitrust enforcer, must stand watch over
the remaining natural monopoly bottlenecks, in order to assure that the
inter-firm duties of interconnection and so forth are being properly defined and enforced. Thus, the transformation entails a continuing-but
redefined-role for public regulation.
Perhaps the most important question raised by the great transformation is how this massive shift in the legal landscape came about in such a
relatively short period of time. We have argued that no legal institution
has been the architect of these changes. The independent regulatory
commissions, the courts, and Congress all took important steps, but none
of these institutions played a consistent leadership role. Instead, the
source of these changes must be found in more deep-seated economic,
political, and intellectual forces. The candidates we find most persuasive
include the rise of powerful interest groups that stand to benefit from
regulatory change and changing ideas among policy elites about regulatory failure.
Our assessment of the causes of the transformation is, however, necessarily a tentative one. Even more tentative is our prediction that the
transformation will continue to abide by the natural monopoly/non-natural monopoly line, and will not spill over into a general deregulation of
all public utility industry segments. But the initial step in understanding
a phenomenon is to recognize that it exists. That has been our central
objective here. The legal community must come to understand that a
great transformation is taking place in regulated industries law. Once
that knowledge is absorbed, our collective understanding of the wider
implications of this dramatic change and its future course can be expected to progress more rapidly.

